lnclo-Pa.k War 1947-48
(In Two Volumes)
Col. M. N Gulati (Retd.)
(Volume One)
Manas Publications
New Delhi -110 002 (India)
MANAS PUBLICATIONS
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© Col (Retd )M N Gulati
First Published 2000
ISBN: 81-7049- 1 23-1
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what so ever
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and Published by Mrs Suman Lata for
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PREFACE
When I passed through the selection procedures tor
joining the Army, the War in Jammu & Kashmir was in its
closing phases. The Battle for Zojila was almost coming to an
end Naturally this was a hot topic of discussions in the
Selection Board With the exception of a casual article in an
odd newspaper, it was virtually impossible to find any reading
material on the subject And that is where the matter rested
My first posting was to 69 Field Company of Bengal
Sappers This unit had played an active role in a number of
battles in Jammu Region — hewing out tracks over rocky
outcrops, clearing mines in advance operations, laying
minefields in defensive positions, building bridges, et a/,
besides important contribution in developing Pathankot-
Jammu Road Talking to the jawans was an invigorating
experience The War Diary of the unit made interesting
reading But that was about all Still no reading material on
the subject itself One thing stood out clearly no body called
It a war, not even in the Army circles It was always "J & K
operations" It was only after a couple of decades that one or
two books came in the market They too called it 'Military
Operations' or 'Kashmir Confrontation', or whatever So it
was not a war, after all' Or was it?
Even after almost half a century, the available literature
on the history of military operations of 1947-48 is limited to
2-3 books written as personal accounts by Majors-Brigadiers
who directly participated in various actions Certain element
of subjectivity is bound to creep into such works Then came
a large number of regimental history books highlighting acts
of individual and collective bravery, and achievements of the
Regiments We also have a couple of books covering specific
6
Military Plight of PaKutan
battles like that of Zojila, or specific sectors like the Kashmir
Valley, or Ladakh Of late, a number of books have been
published portraying various aspects of the "Kashmir
Problem" But, and it is a big 'but', there is hardly any book
that provides a comprehensive coverage of the entire
Campaign in its totality
This new book is a Campaign Study, a compilation, a
synthesis of various published sources, a complete history of
the First Indo-Pak War No, it was not a mere 'conflict' or
'confrontation', it was War, right and proper. Calling those
military operations by any other name shall be derogatory to
the memory of thousands of soldiers of Indian Army and the
State Forces who sacrificed their lives and limbs in a fervour
of patriotism, despite all round poor compensation, including
drastic pay cuts while the War was still on.
The fifteen chapters do not follow a chronological
sequence; instead, each chapter is more or less a complete
story. The role of the State Forces of Jammu & Kashmir who
fought many lonely battles, and whose sacrifices and gallantry
have not been adequately acknowledged or rewarded, the
part played by the civil population, the National Conference,
and the nascent Indian Air Force, enemy's plans and
deployments, et al, find their due place In a lighter vein, a
separate chapter also includes some personal anecdotes
This work is compiled from innumerable sources, spread
over more than thirty years It is virtually impossible at this
point of time to contact each one of them individually I have
therefore made every effort to acknowledge the various
authors and their publishers, as would be evident from the
rather exhaustive lists under "Notes & References" at the end
of every chapter I am deeply indebted to each and every
one of them, and seek their forgiveness for my inability to get
in touch with them personally Credits have been liberally
given If some have been inadvertently left out, my apologies
to them. In the process, if any error has crept in, the mistake
is mine only. The comments on the battles, personalities and
the events are my own, as are the conclusions; I take full
responsibility for the same.
Col. (Retd) M.N. Gulati
COrsJTENITS
Preface 5
Volume 1
1. Gilgit: The Bone of Contention 15
Gilgit Brought into Sikh Domain
The Rise of Gulab Singh;
Military Campaigns of Zorawar Singh;
Victory into Defeat
Gilgit Comes into Dogra Domain
The Treaties of Lahore and Amritsar;
Gilgit goes partly under the British
British Residency at Srinagar;
Gilgit Agency;
Gilgit under Complete British Control
Lease Agreement;
Gilgit in Pakistan's Lap: Kind Courtesy — The British
Retrocession of Gilgit;
New Governor for Gilgit;
Major Brown and Gilgit Scouts;
Desertions by 6 JAK Battalion; Pakistan Takes
over Gilgit;
Notes & References (1-54)
2. The Fall of Skardu: "All Sikhs Shot, 61
All Women Raped"
Raiders Advance to Skardu;
8
Military Plight of Pakii>tan
The Siege of Skardu,
Last Relief Column to Skardu,
Enemy's Daring Stroke,
Abortive Attempt to Recapture KargH,
The Noose Tightens,
All Sikhs Shot, All Women Raped,
Notes & References (1-29)
3. Political Developments: Pre-Independence 89
Communications
Political Developments
Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah,
Maharaja Sir Han Singh;
General Situation in the 30's;
Silk Factory Strike,
The Crisis of 1931,
The Abdul Qadir Incident,
Clancy Commission, The National Conference,
Quit Kashmir Movement,
Notes & References (1-14)
4. Partition and Independence 122
The Princely States
Memorandum by the Cabinet Commission,
Boundary Commission;
The Maharaja Dithers
A Peep into junagarh;
A Glance at Hyderabad,
Partition & its Aftermath
Communal Riots,
Poonch Rebellion;
Economic Blockade;
Joint Military Command;
Division of Armed Forces,
Contents
9
Division of Military Assets
Indian Army in a Flux,
Notes & References (1-26)
5. The Raiders Raid
State Forces on the eve of Indian Independence
The Raiders,
Raiders Start Raiding;
Desertions & Treachery,
Pre-Accession Developments
The Mother of All Raids
Enemy Intelligence;
"Operation Gulmarg" Plans
Pathans Invade in Full Force,
Muzzaffarbad Ransacked
Valiant Defence by Brigadier Rajinder Singh
Mahura Power Fails;
Rape of Baramula,
Ethereal Victory Vapourizes,
Role of the State Forces
Notes & References (1-44)
6. Indian Military Intervention
"Azad Kashmir" State
The Accession
The Air Lift
The First Encounters
A Brigade is Deployed
Notes & References (1-42)
7. The Battle of Shalateng
Fallout from Pattan,
Daimlers Join the Battle,
The Battle is joined;
Baramula Recaptured,
155
205
243
70
Military Plight of Pakistan
Uri Liberated
Victory India Advantage Pakistan
Notes & References (1-27)
Volume-2
8. Defensive Posture North: Offensive Actions South
Logistical Build-up
Construction of Roads & Bridges
Operations against Terror-Tactics,
Akhnur-Beripattan Sector
Jhangar falls into Enemy Hands,
The Mother of All Battles in Southern Sector
"Op Kipper"
Battle of Naushera
Battle of Kalal;
"Op Vijay". Recapture of Jhangar
Battle of Rajauri
Phase 1 Capture of Barwali Ridge;
Phase 2 Advance to & Capture of Chmgas,
Phase 3 Advance to & Capture of Rajauri,
Operations in Beripattan-Naushera Sector
Notes & References (1-45)
9. The Story of Poonch
Poonch as Sanctuary,
Partial Link-up from the North,
Attempted Link-up from the South,
Air Maintenance of Poonch;
Gram Harvesting Operations,
More Piquets around Poonch,
Temporary Link-up with Poonch
Break-Through Poonch Siege
Planning for "Op Easy";
291
333
Contents
11
Deception Measures,
Capture of Pir Badesar,
Capture of Pir Kalewa,
Advance to Bhimber Cali,
The Final Link-up,
Mopping Up,
Notes & References (1-46)
10, Summer-Offensive Operations in Kashmir
Battle of Bhatgiran,
Limber Nullah Battle,
Towards Domel, After All'
Outline Plan, Operations in Handwara-Kupwara
Sector,
Advance on Mam Axis "Op Behram",
Summer Offensive An Exercise in Futility
A Costly Stalemate,
Capture of Pir Kanthi & Ledi Cali
Victory India Advantage Pakistan
"Tariq" Recaptures Pandu,
Srinagar Threatened from North & East
Gurais Valley Operations
Notes & References (1 -44)
1 1 . Succour to Ladakh
Defence of Ladakh,
To Leh via Zojila,
Local Defensive Measures,
Defensive Measures in Nubra Valley;
Defence at Khalatse;
Air Link to Leh;
Raid Against Raiders' Gun,
To Leh via Manali,
Notes & References (1 -42)
383
445
Military Plight of Pakistan
72
12. Battle of Zojila
Abortive Attempt towards Zojila
"Operation Duck",
Second Shot at "Op Duck",
Break-Through to Zojila-Kargil
"Operation Bison" Plans,
Tanks & "Kangaroos" to Baltal,
Baltal-Zojila Jeep Track,
Preparations for Breakthrough,
Deception Plan,
Breakthrough at Last,
Capture of Machoi-Matayan,
Matayan to Drass,
Drass to Kargil,
Leh Link-up,
De-Induction & Winter Stocking,
Victory India, Advantage Pakistan
Notes & References (1-59)
13. The Cease-Fire
United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan;
"Operation Venus",
Cease-fire comes into effect.
Truce Sub-Committee,
Karachi Conference,
Victory India Advantage Pakistan
Notes & References (1-28)
14. Some Interesting Anecdotes
Human Sacrifice of 1st Punjab Regiment Pak Army
Dogs Take Priority over Royal Harem
Revelation Beyond Imagination "Op Gulmarg"
475
535
558
Contents
13
Incident in the "Ops Room
General Cariappa Attempts to Visit Pakistan
A Signalman's Sixth Sense saves Sinha Good Generals
are Born Brave
Dinner Party in Karachi
Khalil Sends an Emissary
The Last Enemy Attack on Uri
Madras Battalion CO leads a Fighting Patrol
Accident in Anti-Personnel Minefield
Sen's Sixth Sense
Thimayya Persuades Meher Singh to Leh
Conference in Circuit House Rawalpindi
Some Bright Ideas from "GHQ Azad Kashmir"
General "Tariq" Lands in Prison
Nehru's Emissary in Srinagar 27-28 October 1947
FSMO Parade in Badami Bagh Cantonment
Army Shares a Map Sheet with the Air Force
Capturing a POW with own Pants Down
Audit Objection on War Activity
Soviet Incursion in 1942
Visit by a Fake General
Rani Saheba of Stok
A Girl of his Choice to Subedar Bhim Chan
Jeep Scandal
Notes & References (1-31)
In Conclusion
585
Select Bibliography
601
Index
607
Maps & Sketches
1 Jammu & Kashmir State and Adjoining Areas
2 Jammu & Kashmir State Northern Areas
3 Routes into Jammu & Kashmir State
4 The Battle of Shalateng 7'^’ November 1947
5 Jammu & Kashmir Naushera-Jhangar-Rajauri Sector
6 Jammu & Kashmir State (Western Area)
7 Jammu & Kashmir Summer Offensive Operations in Kashmir,
1948
8 Jammu & Kashmir State The Cease-Fire Line
The above maps/sketches are based on material gleaned from
'Great World Atlas', Indian Geographical Atlas, and other published
material Sketch at serial 4 above is based on "Slender Was the
Thread" by Lieutenant General L P Sen, DSO, published by Orient
Longman, New Delhi
7
GILGIT: THE BONE OF
CONTENTION
The lofty mountain ranges of Hindu Kush, Pamir and
Karakoram have, over the centuries, guarded the northern
borders of the State of Jammu and Kashmir against incursions
from Central Asia In turn, these areas assumed a unique
strategic importance in the context of security of the
erstwhile British Empire The bedrock of British policy for the
defence of Indian Empire was the simple rule of
commonsense — fight your wars on someone else's land, the
neighbour's and not on your own soil Hence the vital
imp®rtance of creating, and thereafter holding buffer zones
between the frontiers of the Empire and the borders of
neighbouring countries
It IS in this context that Cilgit-Hunza region occupying an
area of approximately 17,500 square miles comprising Gilgit
Wazarat, Astor Tehsil and Frontier areas which included
Punial, Ishkoman, Yasin, Kuh, Ghizar, Hunza, Nagar and
Chilas, assumed strategic significance in the eyes of the
British administrators This had to be so, since this barren
land of high mountains peaks abutted on British Indian
Empire, Tsarist Russian Empire in Asia, The Chinese Empire
through Its province of Smkiang besides of course Tibet and
Afghanistan Gilgit has about 50 miles of common border
with Afghanistan where Wakhan, a sliver of Afghan territory
separated the State of Jammu and Kashmir from Russia The
route from Russia came through the Pamirs over the
Hmdukush through the Dorah and Baroghil passes via
JAMMU 8< KASHMIR STATE
Gilgit The Bone of Contention
77
Wakhan down to Chitral and Gilgit This further emphasizes
the strategic importance of this region in the context of
Central Asia ^
The renowned peak of Pavalo Slovikovaski is the meeting
place of erstwhile Soviet Russia, China, India, Pakistan and
Afghanistan "Within a radius of 56 miles from Gilgit, the
survey maps show, amidst innumerable smaller peaks, eleven
varying from 18,000 ft to 20,000 ft, seven from 20,000 to
22,000 ft, SIX from 22,000 to 24,000 ft and eight from 24,000
to 26,000 ft",^ and of these the 26,620 ft Nanga Parbat and
24,270 ft Haramosh are specially noteworthy The old maps
also show a number of foot suspension bridges m and around
Gilgit district
It IS no wonder therefore that British intelligence agents
had been active in this region from the early nineteenth
century For instance, Moorcraft and Trebeck visited Ladakh
in 1820 ostensibly to study wool trade to Tibet, William
Lockhar visited Hunza as far back as 1886 And so did many
others In fact, the various OSDs (Officers on Special Duty)
appointed from time to time were in fact intelligence agents
acting as the eyes and ears of the Empire Although, the
political situation in this region has undergone cataclysmic
changes since those times, the geo-strategic position remains
unaltered Even today the security of the Northern Frontiers
continues to be pivotal to the security of Jammu and Kashmir
and thereby of India
*-
The most important caravan route across this mighty
mountain range from Yarkand to Leh covering a distance of
482 miles went via Khardung La, Sasser La and passed over
the 18,500-ft high Karakoram Pass On the Ladakh side this
route passed through the Depsang plains onto the Nubra
Valley to Panamik and thence to Leh On the northern side of
the range, the Chinese had their posts at the foothills of the
Kuen Lun mountains, at Sanju, Kilian, and Kugujar which was
later advanced to Suget Karoul on the northern descent from
the Karakoram Pass The Kashmir Darbar used to have their
customs post at Shahidulla on the northern side of the Pass.^
18
Military Plight of Pakistan
The Great River Indus, which has its source in the
Mansrovar Lake — the highest and holiest major lake in the
world — flows east to west in Gilgit region and separates
Karakoram Range frim the Himalayan Range Mustagh
Mountains in the nrrtheast separate Hunza and Nagar from
Chinese Sinkiang. i .le Indus in its middle reaches drains
through much of this Northern Frontier region including
Bunji, Skardu, Kargil and Ladakh besides, of course, the
Gilgit-Hunza region While at Leh the River flows at 1 1,000 ft
and the Indus gorge at Kargil is at 8,000 ft, but at Bunji :t
flows only at an altitude of 4,000-ft above MSL To the left of
the Indus lies the extensive Astor valley, land of dry barren
brown hills where it hardly rams or snows, but the climate is
generally salubrious
The Indus Valley tableland with Karakoram mountain
ranges in the North and the Outer Himalayas m the South is
called Baltistan and has an average elevation of 10,000 ft
above MSL. The Gilgit-Hunza region known as Dardistan lies
to the west It controls the vital passes leading to
Pakhtoonistan region of Pakistan, the North West Frontier
Province on the West, Central Asia on the North-West, and
Baltistan, that is Skardu and Kargil towards the South. Ladakh,
valley of Shyok and the area of Shigar lie to the east. Skardu
on river Indus at 7,700 ft AMSL is the capital town of
Baltistan while Kharmang, Khaplu, Shigar, Skardu and Rondu
are its sub-divisions
It will thus be seen that political developments on both
sides of the Karakoram directly affect the situation in the
Kashmir Valley, thereby adding to the strategic importance of
the present Ladakh region to the security of the Indian
Republic. Which ever power controls the northern passes
over the Karakoram has direct military access to Ladakh and
thereby through the Kashmir Valley to not only the northern
Indian plains but also to the plains of Punjab in Pakistan This
was all the more so since Cilgit also commanded one of the
two main caravan routes from Srinagar via Gurais, Burzil Pass
and Mintaka pass to Kashgarh. In this connection it should be
Cilgit The Bone of Contention
79
noted that although politically Curais was not a part of the
Northern lllaqas, geographically speaking, Leh, Kargil, Drass,
Skardu, Gurais and Gilgit all fell in the same basket of high
mountainous rugged northern segment of the State of Jammu
and Kashmir
Gilgit situated on the Right Bank of River of the same
name is at a comfortable altitude of 4,800-ft AMSL Bunji to
Its south is at 4,630 ft, while the rest of the northern areas in
general suffer from arctic cold conditions Prior to 1947, the
political district, i e , the Agency and the Wazarat covered an
area of 14,680 square miles It was a military station,
headquarters of the Agency and the Wazarat, having the
usual facilities of a post and telegraph office, police station,
rest house, hospital, workshop, all the usual paraphernalia of
a small military cantonment acting as an out-post of the
Empire in an otherwise desolate land Thus Gilgit was an
oasis in the arctic wasteland It was well connected by surface
routes, as per the standards of those days in such inhospitable
lands A ten feet wide track connected the Agency with
Havelian m Hazara district of Pakistan over the Babusar Pass
A track over the Burzil Pass (13,755-ft) went all the way to
Bandipur to the south over a distance of 195 miles and
thereafter another 33 miles to Srinagar Gilgit was
connected with Ladakh by a mule track which went over high
mountain passes 12,000 to 14,000 ft AMSL for a distance of
300 miles to Leh Beyond Gilgit, this track went to Wakhan
province of Afghanistan, and also to Sinkiang over the Pamirs.
Gilgit Tehsil used to cover an area of 1,750 square miles
Astor covering an area of 1,450 square miles used to be a
subdivision of Gilgit. The small town of Astor situated at
7,853 ft too enjoyed similar civil and military facilities as
Gilgit, albeit at a much reduced scale It was also the seat of
the Wazr-i-Wazarat The population of the Northern Areas is
totally Muslim in as much as Gilgit Agency had 270,000
Muslims and a mere 1,250 Hindus The Muslim population of
Dardistan is divided into three sects. Shias, Sunnis and the
Maulais. While the people of Nagar are Shias, those of Hunza
20
Military Plight of Pakistan
are Maulais and are followers of Agha Khan They correspond
to the Noor Bakshis of Baltistan
The people of this region are said to be " descendents
of Greeks, the Scythians, the Bactrians, Parthians and the
Kushans ^ Collectively, they are known as Dards and their
country as Dardistan. During ancient times when Buddhism
came to this area in the 6“’ century A D, Sahi princes ruled
Gilgit and the adjoining areas They left their mark in the
shape of many stupas remnants of some of which may still be
there
GILGIT BROUGHT INTO SIKH DOMAIN
Oppression, extortions, cruelties and forcible conversions
of Hindu Brahmins and Shia Muslim communities under the
severe 49 years long rule of Moghul Emperor Aurangzeb of
Delhi, particularly under Governor Iftikar Khan (1671-75)
broke the back of the local population of the Kashmir Valley
The Brahmins requested the ninth Sikh Guru, Guru Teg
Bahadur to come to their aid In the process. Guru Teg
Bahadur suffered untold atrocities at the hands of the
Moghuls In the wake of the chaotic conditions that prevailed
in the Kashmir Valley after the death of Aurangzeb, two
influential local leaders invited Ahmed Shah Abdali to invade
Kashmir. Thus Afghan rule was re-established in the Valley m
1 753 ushering in a yet more ruthless and cruel regime. ®
The Afghans proved to be much worse masters than the
earlier Moghuls. As in the past in their earlier avtar, they
were still the same old barbarous hordes that indulged in
cruelties, abductions and rape, bringing in their wake still
worse forms of mismanagement, hunger and privations on
the local populace. And once again, as was their wont, the
Kashmiris sought outside intervention — this time of the
Sikhs The initiative was taken by Birbal Dhar, a Pandit
nobleman during the rule of last Afghan Governor of the
Valley, Jabbar Khan.
Gilgit The Bone of Contention
21
Maharaja Ranjit Singh, the Sikh lord at Lahore had earlier
made two futile attempts to capture the Valley Beautiful, the
first in 1812 and the second two years later He could take
these liberties by virtue of the terms of 1809 Treaty of
Friendship between the British and the Maharaja under
which the British had agreed not to interfere with the
Maharaja's territories north of River Sutlej But this time in
April 1819, an army of over 30,000 troops under Prince
Kharak Singh and Diwan Misr Chand was better equipped
and led. The force split into two columns at Rajauri for a
pincer movement into the Valley Kharak Singh marched up
the Jhelum valley to Baramula while Misr Chand led his
column across the Pir Panj'al range over the Haji Pir Pass The
two columns converged at Shopiyan The Afghan army of
about 12,000 men could not withstand the onslaught of the
Sikh forces whose superior artillery, along with the invaluable
assistance and information provided by Pandit Birbal Dhar,
proved to be the deciding factors in Jabbar Khan's defeat at
Shopiyan on 1 5 July 1819 The Sikhs marched into the capital
the next day thus bringing to end 67 years of Afghan
predatory rule Three days of illuminations and celebrations
at Amritsar and Lahore marked this historic event.
The Sikh victory over Afghans was an epoch making
event It ended five centuries long Muslim rule in the Valley
And the Valley Beautiful once again passed into the hands of
Hindus. Raja Kak Dhar and other nobles now ruled Kashmir,
on behalf of the Sikhs of course "The Sikhs were not so
barbarous or cruel as the Afghans, but were hard and rough
masters"^ Be that as it may, Sikh rule was not much of an
improvement over their predecessors' in so far as welfare of
the masses was concerned. Their rule lasted for 27 years only,
1819 to 1846, during which short period the Valley was ruled
by ten governors appointed from Lahore. However, that does
not detract from the significance of the above event, not only
in Itself but also in the subsequent campaigns and
developments which were to have far reaching consequences
both for the Kashmiris themselves as well as for the British
Empire
22
Military Plight of Pakistan
The first and foremost of these developments was the rise
of the Dogras in Jammu. Later, it was to spread not only over
the entire Valley but also pave the way for the first ever
attempt from the Indian side to invade Tibet, during which
process the strategic Northern Regions first came under the
Dogras, and later under the British control
The Rise of Gulab Singh
Culab Singh was born in 1792, son of Mian Kishore
Singh,® m a jagir near Samba, about 24 miles south of
Jammu As a young man in his teens, he was good at horse
riding and handled the sword effectively He was also a sharp
shooter, besides being brave and dashing He distinguished
himself in the Battle of Gumat for the defence of Jammu
when the Sikh forces attacked it. His daring feats of valour
came to the personal notice of Maharaja Ranjit Singh who
took him and his two brothers, Dhyan Singh and Suchet
Singh, in the service of his Kingdom
Gulab Singh proved his worth in the service of the Sikh
Kingdom and its Maharaja. By dint of unmatched skill,
personal valour, and organizing ability in the various
campaigns undertaken by Ranjit Singh, he continued to add
glory to himself, not only in the field of battle but also in
administering the territories brought into the Sikh domain.
The Maharaja was greatly impressed by his loyalty to the Sikh
qause and the Kingdom, particularly during the sieges of
Multan and Jalandhar The subjugation of the tribes of
Yusafzai in 1819 resulting in the capture of Peshawar by
Ranjit ~§Tn gh wa s~a~ s igm f i ca i il ach'e'ompnt of which Gulab
Singh could be justly proud In the process, Gulab Singh
became one of the trusted senior generals of the Sikh Army.
In recognition of these services, Ranjit Singh granted a
number of estates to Culab Singh and also made him the
hereditary Raja of Jammu. ^
Cilgit The Bone of Contention
23
Military Campaigns of Zorawar Singh
The trust and esteem m which Ranjit Singh held Gulab
Singh IS evident from the fact that the Sikh Maharaja himself
presided over his installation ceremony held at Akhnur in
1823 and personally applied the saffron Rajtilak on Gulab
Singh's forehead This also conferred on the new Raja the
right to raise his own military forces, which he did with great
speed and proficiency Soon Gulab Singh brought Reasi,
Kishtwar, Rajauri, Chenani etc under his control and
appointed Zorawar Singh^° as the Governor of Kishtwar
Zorawar Singh was a brilliant general of his times In
1834, with the implied consent of Ranjit Singh and The East
India Company, Gulab Singh entrusted Wazir Zorawar Singh
the task of establishing his control over Ladakh, the "Roof of
the World" and the "Little Tibet of India" — a cold snowy
desert lying to the east of the Valley at an altitude of 10,000-
16,000 ft The diplomatic pretext for this expedition was that,
earlier on, Ladakh was under Kishtwar, and since Zorawar
Singh was now the Governor of Kishtwar, he was morally
justi.fied in this venture ”
The constraints, mostly natural against such a hazardous
operation were many and varied — formidable physical
obstacles of high mountain ranges, criss-crossed by numerous
rivers and streams, sub-zero temperatures even in summer,
terrain devoid of any vegetation or human habitations at
altitude above 10,000 ft, frozen water sources; and mountain
passes blocked by snow and avalanches in winter — truly, a
battle against the elements. It was in the face of such
formidable odds that the Dogra composite force of infantry,
cavalry and artillery numbering about 10,000 under
command of Zorawar Singh crossed the Zanskar Range and
entered Ladakh through Rung Pass at the head of Suru Valley
The first formal military engagement between Boti leader
Mangal commanding a force of 5,000 and Zorawar Singh
took place on 16 August 1834 at Sanku. The Ladakhi force
withdrew when they found that the Dogras had blocked their
24
Military Plight of Pal<ii,tan
line of retreat from the rear After this short and sharp but
highly successful engagement, Zorawar Singh built a small fort
and rested his troops at Suru for about a month
In September 1834, Zorawar Singh resumed his advance
to Shakher and continued through Langkarchu and Manji to
the bridge at Pushkyum. The Ladakhis again suffered a defeat
but managed to destroy the bridge Zorawar Singh was one
up on the Ladakhis and managed to make his force cross the
river using inflated animal skins locally called 'zak', and thus
continued the pursuit of the retreating Ladakhis However,
the engagements so far were mere skirmishes The major
battle of this campaign was fought at Sod where 6000
Ladakhis were taken prisoner The Raja of Ladakh, Tsepal
Namgyal Gyalpo capitulated and sued for peace
Zorawar Singh then proceeded with his force to Leh for
rest and refit After some negotiations, the Raja of Ladakh
agreed to pay an annual tribute of Rs 20,000/- to the Dogra
Raj at Jammu Zorawar Singh then fell back to Lamayurru and
then proceeded to Suru and Sod Even after this settlement,
there were a number of small revolts/rebellions against Dogra
domination, which were promptly and severely put down by
Zorawar Singh. By about 1840, Ladakh was part of the Sikh
Empire of Lahore which, with the death of Ranjit Singh about
a year earlier, was gradually weakening
Zorawar Singh's next objective was subjugation of
Baltistan, comprising of the three states of Skardu, Hunza and
Gilgit He assembled a force of 15,000 for the invasion of
Skardu since this was the first and strongest of the three The
Ladakhis augmented the Dogra force. They provided the hill
ponies without which such an operation m such a terrain
could not possibly be launched. By virtue of their location,
Ladakhi troops automatically provided a well-protected firm
base for the invading army, besides guarding its lines of
communications. The invading force moved along the Right
Bank of River Indus. During its 25 days march, it consolidated
Kargil and Drass while the neighbouring Suru had already
Cilgit The Bone of Contention
25
been taken control of during the earlier phase of this
campaign The Dogras laid siege to Skardu Fort Its water
supply was cut off Zorawar Singh's skillful use of cavalry
combined with infantry tactics resulted m capitulation of
Skardu garrison after about two weeks of fighting Ahmed
Shah, the Raja of Skardu sued for peace He was deposed
and his son, Mohammed Shah was made the new ruler who
agreed to pay an annual tribute of Rs 7,000/- to the Dogra
Raj
The quick fall of Skardu unnerved the other Rajas of the
area Gilgit and Hunza accepted the suzerainty of Dogra Raj
without a fight
The logical end result of many Trans-Himalayan military
expeditions undertaken by the redoubtable Zorawar Singh
was the politico-administrative settlements which added the
far flung Northern Areas of Chilas^'*, Gilgit, Hunza, Ladakh
and Baltistan to the "Dogra Empire". However, Zorawar
Singh did not rest on his laurels even after all these hazardous
ventures Once again, this indefatigable General left Leh in
May 1841 at the head of a composite force of Dogras,
Ladakhis and Baltis The Dogra troops were under command
of Basti Ram while the rest were under Ghulam Khan His
cavalry consisted of hill-ponies and horses provided by the
Balti and Ladakhi rulers, without which the proposed
hazardous expedition would not have been possible at all
This force entered Tibet at Tashigong and overran the
Tibetan frontier post of Rudok located at 13,300 ft Gar and
Taklala Kote were next in quick succession In this connection
It IS of interest to note that Gar, the headquarters of Eastern
Tibet was then under Chinese domination. In the face of such
spectacular advances by Zorawar Singh, the Tibetans
executed a clever and orderly strategic withdrawal They
knew their country well, and were aware of adverse effects of
the elements. As defenders, they could harness high altitude
terrain and weather to their great military advantage. When
the winter was at its height in December 1841, the Tibetan
26
Military Plight of Pakibtan
forces under General Shatra attacked Zorawar Singh and
simultaneously cut off their line of retreat. Caught in a
snowstorm, he fought bravely at a height of 15,000 ft where
he met his Waterloo Zorawar was killed in battle, and so was
most of his force The Dogra army suffered very heavy
casualties both in battle and due to frostbite Some reports
say that barely 25 Dogras managed to escape the carnage and
made their way back to Kashmir, where they narrated their
sad tale of extreme valour under the most trying conditions
Thus, for the Dogras, Lhasa remained much too far away as it
had always been, across the 15,000-ft Mariom La'
But that was not the end of the debacle for the valiant
Dogras After decimating the Dogra composite force, the
Tibetans promptly freed Ladakh from Dogra rule. Thus the
Jammu Raj was more or less back to square one. This
situation was not acceptable to Gulab Singh, who was no
mean soldier-general in his own right having successfully
fought a number of campaigns. So the next year, he sent
another force to Leh under Diwan Han Chand The Dogras
once again reoccupied Leh-Ladakh Han Chand sent the Raja
of Ladakh as prisoner to Jammu Negotiations were held
between the three parties — Dogras, Ladakhis and Tibetans
— and a tripartite agreement was signed under which it was
settled that the old traditional frontiers were to be recognized
as the international boundary between Tibet and Ladakh. The
most significant effect of this agreement was that the Tibetans
explicitly ceded Ladakh to the Dogra Raj If today Ladakh is
part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the credit for that
goes entirely to Zorawar Singh, and his valiant Dogra soldiers
Their sacrifices did not go in vain; otherwise today Chinese
claims of suzerainty over Tibet could well have been
extended to Ladakh also
It IS noteworthy that while Ladakh was de facto under
the Dogra rule, it was the Sikh Darbar at Lahore who were
the de jure masters of the newly conquered territories. All
this time, Gulab Singh was conducting these operations well
beyond his immediate domain of Jammu in the name of, for
Cilgit The Bone of Contention
27
and on behalf of the Sikh Government at Lahore In other
words, strictly speaking, since 1841 Ladakh, Skardu, Gilgit
and Hunza regions were all under the Sikh rule Further,
1840-41 was the first and last time in the history of India that
Indian forces had ventured out directly to attack Tibet and
penetrated right into Tibet proper, of course at a prohibitively
high cost in human lives, hardships and suffering
In order to remove this incongruity in the control of these
territories, two years after the death of Ranjit Singh, the
Lahore Government deputed Gulab Singh to restore order in
Kashmir Valley He accomplished the task easily As directed
by the Lahore Government, he appointed Sheikh Mohid-ud-
Din as the new Governor of the region and returned to
Lahore It is an irony of fate that the same Governor Mohid-
ud-Din, the last Sikh-Governor of the Valley was in turn to
surrender the Valley back to Gulab Singh in 1846'
Thus, "With the installation of Mohid-ud-Din as Governor
at Srinagar, Raja Gulab Singh acquired enormous influence in
the Valley From then onwards he was bidding his time to
formally annex it to his growing kingdom Gulab Singh
again deputed Dewan Han Chand with a large force in 1851
for conquest of Chilas Such forays by the Dogra Raja into the
far North continued to add to the Dogra domain
Victory into Defeat
Zorawar Singh's last foray into Tibet has received liberal
eulogy from no less a historian than K M Panikar In his
words, " Thus died Zorawar Singh, a soldier of whose
achievements India could justly be proud of. To have
marched an army not once, or twice, but six times over the
snow clad ranges of Ladakh and Baltistan, 15,000 ft above
the sea-level, where the air is so rarefied that people from
the plains can hardly live with comfort, is a wonderful
achievement To have conquered that country after
successive campaigns and reduced it to a peaceful province is
an exploit for which there is no parallel in Indian history. His
greatness will shine through the pages of Indian history as that
26
Military Plight of Pakistan
of a great and noble warrior"’® To cap it all, a military
historian of the calibre and reputation of Major General D K
Palit, VrC, has said, "Zorawar Singh, more than any body
else, laid a firm foundation for the growth and development
of Gulab Singh's army and the training and traditions started
by him have remained a proud heritage for the J & K Rifles to
the present day
Be that as it may, from a critical military appraisal of the
penultimate campaign of Zorawar Singh , it is difficult to
escape the conclusion that it ended in a complete fiasco, a
total failure resulting in complete annihilation of the
combined Dogra force of Ladakhis and Baltis along with their
precious hill cavalry Zorawar Singh outstripped his own
generalship when he walked into the trap set by the Tibetan
General Shatra, who conducted a brilliant strategic
withdrawal which, under the best of circumstances, is one of
the most difficult operations of war He then attacked
Zorawar Singh's forces at the time and place of his own
choosing — an acid test of generalship — and inflicted such a
crushing defeat that no one thereafter from this side of the
Karakoram has ever dared to invade that country again.
Zorawar Singh not only outstretched his own generalship but
also Ignored some, if not most of the fundamental principles
of war thereby inviting not only his own defeat through
reckless, almost foolhardy adventurism but also complete
decimation of his army.
This IS a classic case of Victory into Defeat. Zorawar
Singh had reached the zenith of his military career when he
undertook the last battle of the campaign. In one single
stroke of adventurism, he lost all that he had gained during
his SIX hazardous marches over these unforgiving formidable
mountain ranges. In all fairness, it must be unequivocally
conceded that, in this pan-ultimate Battle, it was the lustrous
generalship of the Tibetan Chief that stood out resplendent
Wisdom of hindsight? Nonetheless, this critical passage
does not in any way belittle, or devalue, Zorawar Singh's
Cilgit The Bone of Contention
29
Otherwise brilliant generalship unblemished till his last battle.
It IS only because of him that today India is the strategic
beneficiary of possession of Ladakh, controlling the routes of
ingress of any future Chinese, Russian, Central Asian or
Afghani incursions into the heartland of India
GILGIT COMES INTO DOGRA DOMAIN
Maharaja Ranjit Singh died in 1839 That single event by
Itself was the beginning of the end of the Sikh Empire Wild
anarchy and chaos prevailed all over Various nobles and
heirs of Ranjit Singh were vying with each other to grab as
much power and territory wherever they could
Taking advantage of the unsettled and fluid state of affairs
in the Sikh kingdom, the British forces decisively defeated the
Sikhs in the crucial Battle of Sobran fought in 1846 At that
time, Dogra Raja Gulab Singh was the Prime Minister of the
Sikh Government at Lahore and he was instrumental in the
defeat of his own government He betrayed his charge by
disposing his forces in such a way as to help the British Since
It was a closely fought engagement, his betrayal might as well
have tilted the scales "''®
The Treaties of Lahore and Amritsar
The first Sikh War resulted in a decisive victory for the
British Raja Gulab Singh negotiated the treaties between the
British and the Sikhs Two separate treaties were concluded.
First The Treaty of Lahore on 9 March 1846 under which the
Sikhs were required to relinquish Jullundur Doab, both banks
of River Sutlej, pay indemnity of rupees 1 I /2 crores, and
reduce their army strength to 20,000 infantry and 12,000
cavalry. Since the Sikhs were unable to pay the indemnity of
Rs 1 50 crores, they ceded certain additional territories to the
British — hill territories between rivers Beas and Indus that
also included Kashmir and Hazara. Since the British were not
in a position to bear this additional territorial load, they
retained only the eastern most portion comprising Kangra,
30
Military Plight of Pakii,tan
Kulu, Nurpur and Mandi, and for the rest, a second treaty
was concluded
Under the Treaty of Amritsar concluded on 1 6 March
1846, the British transferred forever in independent
possession, "some of the ceded areas including Kashmir to
Gulab Singh" Gulab Singh agreed to pay Rs 75 lakhs to the
British as part of the aforesaid indemnity on behalf of the
Sikh Darbar. Under the terms of this Treaty, the British
recognized Raja Gulab Singh and his descendents as the
rulers of Jammu and Kashmir and the adjoining territories
Raja Gulab Singh was further honoured with the title of
Maharaja "Thus, Kashmir was passed on to the Dogras in
consequence of the terms of the treaties, and not m
consequence of a 'sale deed' Furthermore, Article 1 0 of
the Treaty of Amritsar acknowledges the supremacy of the
British Government in as much as the Maharaja was required
to present annually to the British Government one horse, 12
perfect shawl-goats of approved breed (6 male and 6 female)
and three pairs of Cashmere shawls
The question naturally arises why did the British show
this generosity towards the Dogra ruler? It certainly was not a
gesture of charity, or in the nature of a pure and simple
commercial transaction. The British were not known for such
magnanimous altruism. In fact, their real intention was to
weaken the Sikh nation. In the words of Lord Harding, " . a
Rajput dynasty will act as a counterpiece against the power of
a Sikh prince, the son of the late Ranjit Singh, and both will
have a common interest in resisting attempts on the part of
any Mohammedan power to establish an independent state
on this side of the Indus, or even to occupy Peshawar."-^?
"This establishes beyond doubt that the British took away
Kashmir from the Lahore Darbar and gave it away to
Maharaja Gulab Singh not for the sake of money, but for a
major political reason i.e., to weaken the Sikh power.
Furthermore, The East India Company had suffered heavy
casualties and financial losses in the Anglo-Sikh wars;
therefore they wanted to buy the goodwill of the Dogras so
Cilgit The Bone of Contention
31
that their force would not intervene on behalf of the Sikhs In
any case, even if the British wanted to keep Kashmir in their
possession, they could not possibly retain it for the simple
reason that there was no geographical contiguity between
Kashmir and the rest of the British territories, since Punjab
was not under the British control at that time Moreover,
Calcutta was much too far away to exercise control over
Kashmir and beyond The British were therefore not
interested to directly own Kashmir at that point of time Thus,
playing with the rights of ownership of these strategic
territories was all part of political intrigues to gam time
From the foregoing account of duplicity and intrigues, it is
evident that while professing loyalty to the Sikh rulers, Gulab
Singh was secretly in touch with the British whereby he
secured a vast princely state free of the vagaries of Lahore
Darbar Along with Kashmir, Ladakh-Baltistan-Gilgit also came
under the Dogra rule based at Jammu Gulab Singh had been
well rewarded for the services rendered by him. In the
process, he became the master of what in course of time
came to be the State of Jammu and Kashmir, notwithstanding
his becoming a nominal vassal of the British by agreeing to
pay a token tribute In any case, Gulab Singh was at the
mercy of the British since Kashmir was not in physical
possession of the British when they ceded it to him in March
1846 It was merely a paper transaction in so far as the British
were concerned To cap it all, the Governor at Srinagar
resisted Gulab Singh's attempts to take over Kashmir
notwithstanding the Treaties of J.ahore and Amritsar, and he
did so at the behest of the Sikhs who had themselves already
ceded these territories to the British' It was not until 9 Nov
1846 that Gulab Singh, the new ruler could enter his capital
Srinagar, and that too only with direct military help of the
British That was the height of intrigue and duplicity, and
downright dishonest diplomacy
After the death of Gulab Singh, Ranbir Singh ascended
the Gaddi in 1857 — a rather critical time for the British
Empire Indeed, the British were in dire straits The new
32
Military Plight of Pakistan
Maharaja therefore rendered considerable military assistance
to the British by way of 2,000 state troops, 200 cavalry and
SIX guns to help them to retake Delhi The then Viceroy, Lord
Canning appreciated this gesture and reciprocated by
incorporating an amendment to the Treaty of Amritsar
Ranbir Singh was now authorised to adopt a male heir not
born to him, and his princely "pecking order" was raised by
adding two guns to the salute of 19 fired in his honour on
ceremonial occasions. His full title was also made far more
imposing and grand in that it became "Maharaja Sir Ranbir
Singh, Inder Mahinder, Sipar-i-Saltnat, General, Asakir-i-
Inglishia, Mushir-i-Khas-i-Qaisara-i-Hind, Grand Commander
of the Star of India, Grand Commander of the Indian
Empire"-'^ Nonetheless, political pressure on the Dogra ruler
continued unabated, but not without reason "Gilgit had
always been a tender spot for the British and any questioning
of their right to hold it produced a violent reaction from their
side
GILGIT GOES PARTLY UNDER THE BRITISH
Over the past many centuries, Kashmir had suffered
oppression and cruelties, abductions and rape, as well as
backbreaking heavy burden of taxation imposed by various
foreign (mis)ruiers, "the outsiders". And Dogra rule proved no
exception. It turned out to be as bad as the earlier Sikh rule
except that discrimination on religious grounds replaced
abductions and rape. A ghastly famine in 1878-79 during the
reign of Maharaja Ranbir Singh, like many others in the past
centuries,^® wrought havoc on the hapless population Mal-
administration continued to be rampant in the State as
hithertofore. Repeated famines and epidemics fueled
political unrest with the result that complaints and
memoranda against the Maharaja continued to pour in the
office of the Viceroy at Delhi. This in turn imparted rationale
to the British policy, focal point of which had always been
Gilgit and the adjoining strategic frontier areas.
Gilgit The Bone of Contention
33
The system of forced labour known, as 'begaar' whereby
villagers were called upon to do duty as porters without any
compensation was prevalent as a matter of routine. This was
the extension of Corvee System borrowed from the Tibetans
under which all available able-bodied villagers not on combat
service were required to do portage duty between villages
carrying food, fodder and armaments for an army on the
march Wages were low Food was scarce The people were
in a bad shape under a miserable rule The situation was thus
ripe for further British intrusions
British Residency at Srinagar
Well before the Dogra rule came to the Valley and
thereby to the Northern Areas, the British had their eyes on
the strategic region of Ladakh, Baltistan and Gilgit In order to
keep themselves well abreast of the developments in that
strategically sensitive area, the British had posted an Officer
on Special Duty at Srinagar in 1852, ostensibly to look after
the interests of European tourists to the Valley, but m reality
to look after the geo-strategic interests of the ever expanding
British Empire In furtherance of this objective, British Trade
Agency was established at Leh in 1867 thus usurping control
of the vital trade routes to Central Asia As usual, trade was
the stepping stone to empire building
Maharaja Ranbir Singh was not sitting idle either He
established the Russian Language School at Srinagar, the first
of Its kind in India so that trained spies could be sent to
Central Asian countries In 1860, he also sent a force under
Devi Singh for capturing the Fort of Gilgit After this success,
Devi Singh proceeded to Vasin and carved out the buffer
state of Punial between Gilgit and Yasin and appointed Isa
Bahadur as the ruler of Punial "Although the Mehtar of
Chitral had greatly improved his capacity for making mischief
on the Gilgit frontier — after he had succeeded m adding
Mastuj and Yasin to his territory in 1870 — he could not do
much against the Dogras by himself He, therefore, sought
the intervention of the British for restoration of Gilgit and
34
Military Plight of Pakr^tan
Punial to Chitral The British, however, refused to oblige, as
their interest lay in hese territories remaining under the
Maharaja of Kashmir which, with their grip over the State
tightening each day, was as good as these territories being
under their own control The Mehtar was then left with no
alternative but to accept the fact of Dogra rule in Gilgit This
desire on the part of the Iman-ul-Mulk for friendship with the
Dogras was also prompted by the threat he was facing from
the Amir of Kabul who had begun to assert his claim to
suzerainty over Chitral, it being a dependency of
Badkashan
Since the British Government wanted to secure the
allegiance of Chitral, Dir and Bajour so as to isolate them
from having any friendly relations with Afghanistan, the
British encouraged the Maharaja m his ventures in these far
flung frontier areas These manoeuvers resulted in the
conclusion of Chitial Agreement of 1878 Chitral thus
became a tributary state of the Dogra Raj Meanwhile,
Captain Biddulph who had been appointed OSD Cilgit was
keeping an eye on the British interests in the region
Maharaja Ranbir Singh's expansionist policy towards the
northern frontier areas produced a rather paradoxical
reaction from the British On the one hand they were pleased
that such strategic areas were coming under their indirect
influence, on the other they were perturbed by the Dogra
ruler's increasing control on the region They were
particularly incensed over a series of spectacular Dogra
successes achieved in 1859, when General Hushiara crushed
the revolt in Gilgit, and had vanquished the Mehtar of Chitral
by detaching Kuh, Chizer and Ishkoman. The British were all
the more peeved since these territorial expansions were
achieved without their military assistance The British
considered Gilgit region as an outpost of their Indian Empire,
vital for the defence of the subcontinent against Russian and
Chinese influence.
Russia started moving towards the southern and eastern
regions in 1864 when she occupied Chinkent, followed by
Cilgit The Bone of Contention
35
Tashkent m 1865, Kohj in 1866, Yam Kurgan the next year,
and Samarkhand the year after that Thus Russian influence
made a forceful appearance on the outskirts of Chitral, Gilgit
and the Pamirs — back doors of the British Empire for all
practical purposes In order to gain authentic information
about these ominous developments, in 1869 the British
Government deputed George Hayward on a reconnaissance
mission to the Pamirs. Mir Wall, the Raja of Yasin, killed him
near Dardkot
The continuous feuds between the principalities of Hunza
and Nagar were a constant destabilizing factor on the frontier
of Gilgit which neither the British nor the Maharaja was
prepared to tolerate The inhabitants of the two principalities
came from one stock and spoke the same language, but there
had been in the past considerable amount of ill feelings
between the two communities One reason for this was
probably religious intolerance While the people of Hunza
were Maulais (that is, followers of His Highness the Agha
Khan), those of Nagar were Shias Although both the
principalities had entered into an alliance of friendship with
the Dogras in 1870, their mutual enmity and mistrust caused
occasional disturbance on the frontier. "The immediate point
in dispute was the claim that both the states laid to Chalt and
Chaprot forts and the connecting villages that lay between
Hunza, Nagar and Gilgit . The Maharaja finding no other
alternative occupied the two forts with his troops in
conjunction with those of Nagar From then onwards right
upto 1886, Chalt and Chaprot were held jointly by the
Jammu & Kashmir and Nagar troops
The death of Ranbir Singh and accession to the Caddi by
Maharaja Pratap Singh in 1885 "coincided with the famous
Panjdeh incident which brought the British on the brink of
war with Russia". This in turn provided the British the much
sought after opportunity to carry forward their diplomatic and
political intrigues in Kashmir and Ladakh At that time the
State had a reasonably well equipped and a trained Army of
about 28,000 strong, 66 field and mountain guns and 222
^6
Military Plight at Paki<;tan
fort guns In order to exercise more effective control over
the region and its strong army, in 1886, the OSD at Srinagar
was upgraded to a full-fledged British Residency And that
was the beginning of full British control over the area Sir
Oliver St John was the first Resident to be succeeded by
Trevor Chichele Plowden, an officer of the Political
Department, in March 1888 Thus, fust having ceded the
territory of Kashmir to the Dogras for their own personal
convenience, now the stage was being reset by the British to
regain control of the strategic areas at the time of their own
choosing, and again to suit their own convenience
The young Maharaja Pratap Singh was no match against
the intrigues and plots hatched by the British Resident, T C
Plowden who went so far as to accuse the new Maharaja of
plotting to murder him. He sent numerous adverse reports to
Delhi-London against the Dogra administration. Trumped up
reports were published in newspapers to malign the Maharaja
that he was indulging in treasonable activities. All this was
part of a plot to prepare the ground to annex the State in
toto. Fortunately for Pratap Singh, Amrit Bazar Patnka
exposed the plot, all the distance away in Calcutta, The
newspaper published a secret official note thus publicly
disclosing the plot hatched to grab the State for the British.
The British were thus forced to scale down their ambitious
plan of complete annexation. Nevertheless, in 1889, they
forced the Maharaja to step down in favour of a Council of
Regency over which the Resident exercised full control. The
underlying British objective was to take exclusive control of
Gilgit and the adjoining frontier areas near the Afghan-
Russian border. That indeed remained the fulcrum of British
policy even at the lime of Partition of India, and the resultant
retrocession of Gilgit to the Maharaja.
Gilgit Agency
Fear of Russian aggression and Chinese nibbling
incursions was the raison d'etre behind excessive British
interference in the internal affairs of the State on one pretext
Cilgit The Bone of Contention
37
or the other, which in any case were plentiful during the Sikh
and later the Dogra rule in Kashmir The British OSD was in
reality an intelligence agent While in 1877, the Jammu Raj
exercised complete civil and military control over the entire
Cilgit area, the Gilgit Agency established by the British in
1889 covering an area of 15,184 sq miles assumed sole
charge of civil, military and political administration of the
district north of the Indus River The Government of India
informed the Secretary of State in London " the advance of
Russia upto the frontiers of Afghanistan, and the great
developments of her military resources in Asia, had
admittedly increased the necessity for strengthening our line
of defence, and that among the points requiring special
attention were the northern passes of the Hmdukush which
afford a difficult but not impracticable route for a force large
enough to cause excitement if nothing worse, in Kashmir and
amongst the tribes of Bajour, and perhaps at Jalalabad and on
the Punjab frontier."
"The c/e facto administration of Gilgit pa ssed into the
hands of the British officers and thus came into bemg~th^
Gilgit Agency The acquisition of administrative control,
however, was slow and imperceptible, nor was it categorically
announced It grew mostly due to the unfettered powers
enjoyed by the British Resident m Kashmir After Gilgit, the
northwestern states of Swat, Dir and Chitral were next on
the British list. However, that part need not burden us here
Soon after the establishment of the Gilgit Agency in 1889,
Captain A G Durand visited Hunza and Nagar. On 25
December 1889, a Political Darbar was held at Gilgit All
rajas and chieftains of the region were invited. Union Jack
was unfurled and all those present saluted the flag of the
British Empire Subsequently, Captain Durand, the British
Political Agent in Gilgit reorganized the defences of Gilgit and
also inducted a contingent of Imperial Service Troops to
bolster up the defence set-up m this remote inhospitable
area In 1890, a mysterious Russian party in the guise of a
"hunting expedition" appeared on the Pamirs for secret
38
Military Plight of Paki'^tan
parleys with the Mir of Hunza And that added fuel to the
fire Next year, Captain Durand informed the rajas and chiefs
about construction of a track to Chalt fort, but they declined
After a sharp and short skirmish, the British and the State
Forces together occupied the states of Nagar and Hunza
Although the joint forces in the name of the Maharaja
secured the forts of Nagar and Hunza, in reality the
expedition was m furtherance of Imperial strategic interests
The Hunza and Nagar campaigns, as well as other similar
military expeditions, like the Black Mountain and Chitral
Expeditions, were paid for from the treasury of the State of
Jammu and Kashmir, but all in furtherance of the strategic
interests of the British Empire The name was of the Dogra
State of Jammu and Kashmir, but the requirement and policy
was of the British
Political intrigues, complicated diplomacy and crafty
manoeuvering continued to be hallmark of the British regime
Mr. Jagmohan was therefore more than justified when he
dubbed the "Dogra rule over Kashmir from 1846 to 1947
more of Dogra-British rule rather than Dogra rule, above all
because of the British Government's pervasive and decisive
intervention in the affairs of J & K Their actions and
reactions were always well timed and they acted only after
careful consideration of all aspects of the problem No
wonder therefore that they waited nearly nineteen years to
avenge the murder of George Hayward by Raja of Yasin. The
British deputed Colonel Durand to complete the mission.
Chaprot and Chalt were re-occupied in August by Imperial
Service Troops. Commandant Gokal and his 150 Sappers and
Miners worked round the clock to build the road to Chalt
Fort while men of 1/5 GR helped in rebuilding the Fort.^^
In December 1891, "The army of Colonel Durand then
occupied Misghar, the most extreme point to which British
influence extended in the north. Thus, British flag reached
the crest of the Hindukush. A Political Officer was thereafter
maintained at Hunza. On 15 September 1892, "Raja
Mohammed Khan was formally installed as the Mir of Hunza
Cilgit The Bone of Contention
39
by the British Agent in the presence of two Chinese envoys
who attended the Darbar as honoured guests of the
Government of India
Concurrently, communications between Gilgit and the
rest of India, i e , North West Frontier Province were
improved A mule track and telegraph line connected Gilgit
with the Residency at Srinagar and from there to the Army
Headquarters at Delhi Gilgit Transport Service, a semi-
government concern was given the contract for supply of
rations, arms and ammunition. This set-up was also made
responsible to keep Burzil Pass open throughout the year, so
much so that at times over 1,500 labourers were engaged on
this task
The Rajas of Hunza and Nagar attended the Coronation
Darbar at Delhi on 1®“ January 1903 Since the Mir of Hunza
had a claim over Raskam and Taghdumbash districts situated
to the north of Hindukush watershed, he was allowed by the
British to continue to keep an exchange of presents with the
Chinese who had acknowledged this claim in writing
However, both the Mirs acknowledged the suzerainty of the
Maharaja and paid tributes to him accordingly
Political darbars, also called jalsas were a regular feature
of British politico-diplomacy in these far-flung frontier areas
so as to keep the various nobles under their control During
such gatherings, these chieftains were required to present
nazars m the following order of seniority
Mir of Hunza
Mir of Nagar
Governor of Punial
Governor of Yasin
Governor of Ishkoman
Governor of Kuh and Ghizar
Raja of Gilgit
Raja of Astor
40
Military Plight of Pakistan
GILGIT UNDER COMPLETE BRITISH CONTROL
In 1889, one positive fallout from the aforesaid
machinations of the British was the appointment of Sir Walter
Lawrence, an officer of the Indian Civil Service, as the
Settlement Commissioner of the Dogra State The resultant
extensive land reforms and abolition of begaar provided the
necessary impetus for developmental activities in the State in
which the Maharaja played a positive role Fallow lands were
reclaimed and model farms created Hospitals were built and
sericulture cooperative banks were established New roads
and tracks were built. Srinagar linked with Rawalpindi by
a motorable road in 1890 A fair weather road slowly went
over the Banihal Pass, which was completed in 1915 The
court language was changed from Persian to Urdu, and that
was a very welcome development for the public good. These
achievements of Pratap Singh prompted the Viceroy in Delhi
to revoke his earlier orders The Council of Regency was
abolished and full powers were restored to the Maharaja In
this connection it should be noted that the British relented
against Maharaja Pratap Singh only after his State had
contributed liberally both m men and money towards Chitral
and Black Mountain Expeditions - in the latter expedition
over 1,500 all ranks of the State Forces had participated
solely for the benefit of the British
Pratap Singh died in 1925 and was succeeded by Han
Singh who "... began his career with a sensational law suit in
London Caught in bed with a woman, he was blackmailed
for a large amount " Four years later. Sir Albion Bannerji,
his Foreign and Political Adviser lesigned in disgust after a
mere two years stint in office on account of the Maharaja's
continuing misrule His statement to the press in 1929
received wide publicity
"Jammu and Kashmir State is laboring under many
disadvantages, with a large Mohammedan population absolutely
illiterate laboring under poverty and very low economic
conditions of living in villages and practic*iHy govc'rnc'd like
Gilgit The Bone of Contention
47
dumb driven cattle There is no touch between the government
and the people, no suitable machinery for representing
grievances and the administrative machinery itself requires
overhauling from top to bottom to bring it upto modern
conditions of efficiency It has no sympathy for the peoples'
wants and grievances"
Han Singh also discontinued the practice of shifting the
State capital to Srinagar m summer Only Rajputs were
allowed to possess personal weapons Kashmiris were not
recruited in the Army Non-state subjects were forbidden
from joining government service The sole beneficiaries of
this rule were the Rajputs and Kashmiri Pandits thereby
further fueling Muslim resentment against the Dogra rule
By the 1930's the Valley was seething with political
turmoil (More on this m a later chapter) The British were
also fanning communal discontent and Muslim religious
movements for their own Imperial interests By this time
Soviet Russia had extended its hold on Tashkent, Khiva and
Bokhara Bolshevik literature and spread of communist
ideology posed a serious danger to British hegemony In
order to counter these ominous developments, a wireless
station linked with Peshawar was established at Gilgit. The
airstrip was strengthened to take on heavier aircraft, besides
being improved to make it all weather. The military
establishment was strengthened with a view to restore over-
thrown Amirs, Beys and Khans in Central Asia British
missions were also sent to these countries to block, if not to
reverse the tide of Russian influence m that sensitive region
"In the political field, much as the Maharaja was resisting
at every step, the British had after the 1931-32 agitation
secured his complete surrender With the appointment of
Colonel E S D Colvin, an Indian Civil Service (ICS) officer, as
the Prime Minister of the State in February 1932 and three
other ICS officers as ministers of Home, Revenue and Police,
the administration of the State could be said to be under the
Government of India The gaining of control over the State
42
Military Plight of PakiUan
was, however, only a means to an end — the end being, as
has been noted earlier, to gam undisputed and unhindered
control over the strategic area of Cilgit. — The underlying
British objective was to take exclusive control of Gilgit, near
the Afghan border
Lease Agreement
Maharaja Han Singh too realised none too soon that as
always, Gilgit was the British tender spot and that he would
not have any respite from British antics till he acquiesced to
their ambitious overtures in this region Not only there was
no possibility whatsoever of the British ever agreeing to his
demand for abolition of the Agency set-up for Gilgit, on the
contrary, he would have to hand over control of the entire
region to them Accordingly, administrative control of the
entire Gilgit Agency lying to the north, and Gilgit Wazarat
lying to the south of River Indus was handed over to the
British on a 60 years lease agreement dated 26 March 1935.
Thus, complete civil, military and political control over the
entire highly sensitive strategic region passed into the hands
of the British Consequently, the number of frontier outposts
required to be maintained by the Maharaja's Government
was reduced to just four only — one company at Bunji, one
platoon at Skardu, one platoon at Leh and one section at
Kargil — and no more The troops for these outposts were to
be provided from the State Forces Battalion located at
Srinagar, by rotation This severe scaling down of Maharaja's
military presence in the strategically vita! area was to have
devastating consequences twelve years later, not only for the
Maharaja but more so for the Republic of India.
The Lease Agreement further authorised the Viceroy and
Governor General of India to assume civil and military
government of the Wazarat of Gilgit, although the
Government of Jammu and Kashmir State retained mining
rights in the area. Further, "Customary salutes and honours
would continue to be paid in the territory as hitherto and the
flag of His Highness was to fly at the official headquarters of
Cilgit The Bone of Contention
43
the Agency throughout the year A classic example of
British perfidy, and its modus operand/ inconsequential
gestures of throwing crumbs after grabbing the full loaf
Cilgit alone was the sole objective of extensive political
interference in the internal administration of the State as well
as playing the 'communal card' Having succeeded in
extracting the Gilgit Lease Agreement, Lt Col E J D Colvin of
the Foreign and Political Department of the Government of
India and the then Prime Minister of the State, together with
the British Resident Colonel L E Lang, relaxed their pressure
on the Maharaja Leaders of various political and religious
movements who were till recently receiving active support of
the British were now slowly left to fend for themselves The
Anglo-Indian officers and the press in Punjab also fell in line
A semblance of peace seemed to prevail over the State and
Its neighbourhood
Notwithstanding the Lease Agreement, notional
sovereignty over the territory remained in the jurisdiction of
the Maharaja, howsoever nominal that may have been And
that was the legal-constitutional position whose
consequences we shall see later in this narrative But that was
no consolation since the wheel of fate had moved full circle
under the pressure applied through British gimmicks and
intrigues Out of what they had ceded, they took back what
they needed, when they needed!
The British conquered India through military operations,
political intrigues, conspiracies and what have you in the
mixed bag of an international trading nation, Cilgit too was
acquired by them through similar means of crafty
manoeuvering and deceit And thus they became complete
masters of the entire vast territories of Northern Areas
GILGIT IN PAKISTAN’S LAP: KIND COURTESY — THE
BRITISH
Direct British control brought development and
prosperity to the area. Post, telegraph and wireless links were
44
Military Plight of Paki'-.tan
stiengthened Hospitals and dispensaries were provided foi
public good Surface communications got a boost in as much
as besides upgradation of the airstrip, 10-ft wide roads were
constructed From Peshawai side, the Frontiers lllaqa was
connected by the following two routes
*Mardan-Saidu-Kalam-Gupis-Gilgit, (in 1947, motorable
upto Saidu only)
*Abbotta bad -Balakot- Kagan- Bab usar Pass-Chilas-Bunji-
Gilgit, (in 1947, motorable upto Balakot only)
*Srinagar was also linked to Gilgit by the following two
routes
*Srinagar-Bandipur-Gurais-Burzil Pass-Astor-Bunji-Cilgit,
(in 1947, motorable upto Bandipur only)
*Srinagar-Sonamarg-Baltal-Zoji La-Kargil-Skardu-Gilgit,
(in 1947, motorable upto Baltal only
An airstrip was also constructed at Chilas
Sometime during the mid 1930s, when Russia took over
virtual control of the Sinkiang, and the Maharaja signed the
Lease Agreement relinquishing his control over the Wazarat
of Gilgit, the British raised a para-military force of about 800
troops named as Gilgit Scouts as a wing of the Frontier
Scouts This force was officered exclusively by the British and
was administered from Peshawar in the North-West Frontier
Province now in Pakistan The State Government had no
control or connection whatsoever with this force
Retrocession of Gilgit
The Mountbatten Plan for the Partition and
Independence of India was announced on 3"' June 1947
Under this plan, control over the entire Gilgit region was to
revert to the jurisdiction of the Maharaja on or about 15
August 1947, consequent of which the Gilgit Scouts would
automatically become part of the State Forces of Jammu and
Kashmir By the same token, British officers serving in the
Cilgit The Bone of Contention
45
Gilgit Scouts would come under the service of the Maharaja
By virtue of the plan for partition of the defence forces of
undivided India, these British officers had the option to
continue m service of the Maharaja with the same loyalty and
devotion as is expected of such military officers In case their
loyalty lay else where, they had the honourable course of
opting for that Dominion, viz , Pakistan, or to seek
repatriation back to United Kingdom
On retiocession, the Maharaja was required to make
necessary arrangements for taking over the administration of
these territories Before the Lease Agreement of 1935, this
frontier region was divided into two parts as we have already
noted, VIZ , firstly the Gilgit Wazarat comprising Giigit tehsil
and the Niabat of Astor and secondly the Gilgit Agency
forming the bulk of the frontier ter'-itory comprising of the
states of Hunza and Nagar, the Shinaki Republics of Chilas
region, the Chiefships of Punial, Yasin, Kuh-Ghizar, and
Ishkoman
Obviously, the lapse of paramountcy and return of the
region to the Maharaja and establishment of the new
administration had all to be done with the least possible
dislocation of the existing administrative arrangements so as
to ensure smooth transition It was therefore necessary that
while the Wazarat woulo remain under the direct control of
the Maharaja as it used to be, the Agency parts had to be
continued to be administered through the local Mirs/Rajas/
Chieftains as was being done by the British Towards this end,
two urgent steps had to be taken firstly, appointing a
Governor for the entire Frontier Region, and secondly, for
the Scouts, who had become part of the State Forces, appoint
a Commandant whom the Maharaja could trust
Unfortunately, being fully aware of the fact that the British
officers in the Scouts had opted for Pakistan, the British
officer serving as Chief of Staff of the Maharaja's State Forces
took no steps whatsoever to take control of the Force On the
contrary, the matters were left to drift in such a manner as to
suit the imperial purpose and machinations of British policy
for the strategic region
46
Military Plight of Pakistan
New Governor for Gilgit
The British handed Cilgit back to the Maharaja on 1
August 1947, and he appointed Brigadier Ghansara Singh as
the new Governor with effect from the same date Neither
Ram Chandra Kak, the Prime Minister of the State nor Major
General (Retd) H L Scott, CB,DSO,MC, the Chief of Staff,
were in favour of this appointment In fact, both these key
players in the administration were opposed to this proposal
Moreover, since acts of disloyalty by British officers of the
Scouts had become overt, the appointment of the Governor
was merely titular in natuie, unless it was accompanied by
concrete measures to take the military situation also under
control Be that as it may, the Governor designate
accompanied by the Chief of Staff dutifully reached Gilgit on
30 July 1947 to assume his charge He took over the
administration of the territory on August from the British
Political Agent, Lieutenant Colonel Roger Bacon The British
officers of the Scouts informed everyone that, they had opted
for service in Pakistan and leaving the new Governor to his
fate, the Chief of Staff returned to Srinagar. General Scott
does not seem to have been interested in ensuring smooth
transition of command and control He neither relieved the
British officers of their commands in Gilgit Scouts, nor did he
arrange their repatriation to Pakistan, nor did he send any
reliefs to take over. Keeping those officers whose loyalty was
to Pakistan, and not to the Maharaja, was most unwise May
be, It was a deliberate decision To say the least, this
attitudinal deficiency to duty was least expected from a
British military officer of the rank of a major general.
"Having been cut off from Gilgit ever since 1935 when
the territory was leased out to the British, the State
authorities do not seem to have realised the great change that
had taken place in Gilgit since the good old days. Little
wonder that trouble for the new Governor in establishing his
control over the province started no sooner than the
formalities of the handing,'taking over ceremony — such as
the lowering of the Union Jack, hoisting of the State Flag, the
Cilgit The Bone of Contention
47
firing of the gun-salutes, the playing ot the National Anthems
and the distribution of sweets to the poor and the children
were over During the decade and more of rule over Gilgit,
the British had so controlled the area from Peshawar that the
staff in Gilgit had come to consider themselves as part of the
North West Frontier Province Administration
Consequently, while the civil employees struck work, the
scouts declined to take the oath of allegiance to the Maharaja
of Kashmir, pending consideration of their demands with
regard to increase m pays and allowances and other terms of
service But that was not all'
Soon after the Brigadier had taken up his new
assignment, some leading men of Yassm revolted against the
Raja Roger Bacon, the Political Agent arrested the leaders of
the revolt. But the local people were unhappy over this turn
of events and about 300 of them came over to Gilgit to
demand release of their leaders. They also complained
against the atrocities committed by the Raja To make matters
worse, the Mir of Chitral extended his support to the locals
against the Raja, which further complicated the tense
situation The new Governor appeared to be helpless m
resolving the dispute Neither the State administration at
Srinagar nor the Maharaja took any interest in this vital
region The State Government was in a state of limbo on
account of the uncertainty regarding the accession of the
State, as well as future political developments m the sub-
continent Hence, the Governor continued to be a mute
spectator of fast moving events, leaving him far behind In
fairness, it must be stated that he did warn His Highness that
" if the Maharaja acceded to India, the Gilgit Province
would go to Pakistan because the British officers of the Gilgit
Scouts as well as Muslim officers in the 6 Jammu and Kashmir
Infantry wanted Gilgit to go to Pakistan " At the same time,
reports of preparations for invasion of Gilgit from the
direction of States of Swat and Chitral, which had acceded
to Pakistan started pouring in
48
Military Plight of Paki'^tan
Major Brown and Gilgit Scouts
Major William Brown, a young Scott of 24 years, as
Commandant of Gilgit Scouts was legally and ethically under
the service of the Maharaja His Second-in-Command,
Captain A S Matheison was a little junior to Brown in age
Brown had earlier known Matheison when the latter was a
district officer m-charge of the Khassadars in Miranshah
Although employees of the Maharaja, their loyalty was to
Pakistan, which they had publicly acknowledged, and
ultimately to the British Crown However, Brown continued
with his command and act for and on behalf of Pakistan m a
most treasonable manner
Right from the time they were raised about 12 years
earlier, Gilgit Scouts v'ere by the British and for the British
with no sense of loyalty to the State of Jammu and Kashmir
"Brown and Matheison agreed that if the Maharaja did
accede to India they, with the help of the scouts, would stage
a coup d'etat and hand it over to Pakistan Details of the
operation were planned and the code word fixed for putting
It into operation was 'Datta Khel'"'** Subsequent events, as
well as general complicity of British officers in trving to tilt the
balance in favour of Pakistan, and the generous treatment
later meted out to Major Brown leave little doubt that the
whole plot was perhaps engineered by the Political
Department of the British Similarly, "Brown was awarded
one of the highert Pakistan awaids in 1993 for his role in
Gilgit about 46 years earlier
British Imperial sinister designs were behind these
machinations to secure this strategic piece of real estate in
the hands of a power that would meet the cold -war ends of
Western Power politics The British officers in the sub-
continent were neither mercenaries m the usual sense of the
word, nor were they altruistic in their outlook The interests
of their nation always came first and foremost in their
considerations, more so since the British, particularly the
uniformed class had not yet come to terms with
Cilgit The Bone of Contention
49
disintegration of the grand British Empire Now, it was well
known that Prime Minister Nehru was not going to be
amenable to the Western Powers, the British and the
Americans, in their quest for allies against the Soviets
Instead, Pakistan was certainly more than likely to tow the
Western line Therefore, m order to have a window towards
the Central Asian Republics of the Soviet Union, it was
Pakistan rather than India that would be more pliable
Hence, the imperative that Gilgit must not fall into Indian
hands The best solution towards that end was to see that the
whole of the State of Jammu and Kashmir goes to Pakistan
However, if that was not going to be possible, then, at least
Gilgit and the adjacent Northern tracts should remain under
Pak control That was the crux of British-American policy
And that fitted perfectly with the pro-Muslim tilt of British
overall policy-concept m the Indian sub-continent
In those days of poor communications and disturbed
conditions, essential commodities like salt, sugar, oil and
cloth were controlled ration stores in that part of the world
These commodities were a lever in the hands of the
administration, and their absence or short supply made the
administration look weak and helpless The British officers
distributed their complete stocks of all such controlled stores
without authorization from the Governor. To cap it all, these
officers were in constant touch with Peshawar to which the
wireless communications from Gilgit were linked
Desertions by 6 JAK Battalion
Besides the Gilgit Scouts, the only other military unit in
the area was 6 JAK Battalion commanded by Lt Col Abdul
Majid Khan. Its class composition was two companies of
Punjabi Musalmans, one of Dogras and one of Sikhs. One of
the Muslim Company Commanders himself was one of the
few Gilgitis in the Kashmir Army. All the Muslim officers of
the Battalion met Major Brown on 24^*’ October when they
gathered together at Gilgit to celebrate the Maharaja's
Birthday. It was then that the loose ends of the planned coup
were tied up.
50
Military Plight of Pakistan
The Battalion was disposed as under
*Company less on j platoon at Leh under Major Sher
Singh Thapa
*Company less one platoon at Skardu, North of Leh,
under Captain Nek Alam (and Captain Krishan Singh)
*Two platoons at Kargil
^Remainder Battalion and Battalion Headquarters at
Bunji, South of Gilgit.
.the two Connpanies of 6**’ Jammu and Kashmir
Infantry located at Bunji and which could be used for the
external and internal defence of Gilgit happened to be
Muslims whose loyalties were suspect ever since it was
known that they had shouted pro-Pakistan slogans on their
way up from Bandipur to Bunji. For security, therefore, the
Governor had to choose between the devil and the deep sea
The other Muslim officers in the Battalion were. Major
Ehsan All Khan, Captains Mohammed Khan Jarral and M.S
Durrani, and Lieutenant Ghulam Haider.
At about 1130 PM on 31 October 1947, Lieutenant
Haider and about 100 Gilgit Scouts surrounded the
Governor's residence and sent a delegation of two Hindu
officials, Naib Tehsildar and the Police Inspector with an
ultimatum to the Governor to surrender within 1 5 minutes
failing which all non-Muslims in Gilgit would be killed The
Muslim officers wanted that every non-Muslim be forcibly
converted to Islam, or shot The Governor had no option and
he was made a prisoner. Major Brown became the de facto
Governor. A provisional government was formed of which the
leaders were Major Brown, Captain Ehsan All, Captain
Mohamad Khan, Captain Sayeed, and Lieutenant Haider.
Subedar Major Babar Khan who had close personal relations
with the Mir of Hunza and the Mir of Nagar, was a key
member of this Provisional Government because of his local
connections.^® "The most Interesting part of this episode was
Gilgit The Bone of Contention
51
the two telegrams which Major Brown sent to Peshawar on 1
November 1947 These were
To Khan Abdul Qayum Khan, Prime Minister NWFP
From Major Brown
Date 1 Novemberl 947
'Revolution — night 31 October to 1 November in Gilgit
Province Entire pro-Pakistan populace has overthrown Dogra
regime Owing imminent chaos and bloodshed Scouts and
Muslim officers of State Forces have taken over law and
order Scouts and Muslim officers of State Forces running
administration provisionally Request higher authority be
appointed for orders immediately, and reply through wireless
— Commandant Scouts '
To. Lt. Col Roger Bacon
'Coup d'etat in favour of Pakistan in Gilgit can carry on
meantime, but can you help.'
It IS apparent from the wording of the telegram, that
Bacon was quite obviously the author of the planned coup
d'etat"*^ Incidentally, Roger Bacon did give a helping hand in
as much as he visited Gilgit in January 1948 where he met
the civil and military officials, thereby setting in motion the
plan for operations in Ladakh
On 4th November 1947 Major Brown, at a formal
ceremony, hoisted the Pakistani flag in the lines of his
command
Major Brown ordered his second-in-command. Captain
Matheison at Chi las to occupy Astor, south of Bunji so as to
block the line of retreat of the Sikh Company at Bunji
Captain Matheison secured the ferry at Jaglot, the Ranghat
Bridge on Astor-Bunji route as also the Partab Bridge on
Bunji-Gilgit route Captain Hassan of the State Forces and
Jemadar Sher Khan of the Scouts reached Jaglot on 4*”
November and the Dogra platoon there surrendered
52
Military Plight of Pakistan
Meanwhtle, Major Brown with his Scouts attacked Bunji from
the north The Sikh troops there finally surrendered Thus, all
non-Muslim elements of the Frontier Scouts and 6 JAK
Infantry were liquidated, a few survivors of the massacre took
shelter m Skardu Fort under Major Sher Jang Thapa of the
State Forces
The rulers of six principalities that formed the district of
Cilgit were divided into two rival factions While the Mirs of
Hunza and Nagar and the Governor of Yassin were inclined
towards Pakistan, the Raja of Punial and the Governors of
Koh Khizar and Ashkomand were loyal to the Maharaja
However, in fairness to these Muslim Mirs and Rajas, it must
be recorded that they had no hand whatsoever in this ghastly
tale of communal massacre Similarly, two Muslim officers of
local administration — the Revenue Assistant Raja Noor All
Khan and the Naib Tehsildar Sultan Alam — "remained most
loyal to the Governor" and suffered the same fate as their
non-Muslim colleagues
It is a matter of deep regret that although the Governor
was appointed at the earliest possible opportunity, and he
was at his post well in time for assuming his charge, he
proved to be completely ineffective in dealing with the
situation. The curtain came down m Gilgit three months after
the Governor had taken charge: And that was a long time,
time enough for a determined effort to produce positive
impact which was sadly lacking. In the end, the Governor,
the local non-Muslim population, India — all paid a heavy
price. The British had their way! And the big loser was India.
However, it must be said to the credit of Major Brown that he
did succeed in saving the lives of non-Muslim civilians and
the Governor since no physical harm came to them as might
otherwise have been expected. The Hindus and Sikhs were
removed to a refugee camp for further evacuation to
Pakistan.
Thus ended the story of treachery and intrigue in Gilgit.
The civil and military prisoners were treated very shabbily.
Cilgit The Bone of Contention
53
Their condition was pathetic and the treatment meted out to
them by their old compatriots was most deplorable They
were evacuated to Attock by Pakistan regular Army Brigadier
Ghansara Singh was also similarly taken to Pakistan and
released at Suchetgarh on 1 5 January 1949 after the Cease-
Fire Agreement
Pakistan Takes over Gilgit
The local Liberation Front in the Frontier lllaqas wanted
complete Independence after throwing out the Maharaja's
Governor. Shah Rais, an ex-Subedar of Gilgit Scouts and a
relative of the Raja of Gilgit was a prominent member of this
Front While there was no pro-India sentiment at all, there
was no urge amongst the locals to join Pakistan either But, in
keeping with the Imperial policy. Major Brown was
completely against any such move. He approached the Chief
Minister of NWFP requesting for immediate appointment of a
proper authority from Pakistan to oversee the administration
in Gilgit area He sent a third message to Peshawar on 13“’
November repeating his earlier request Accordingly, on 21
November 1947, Sardar Mohammed Alam Khan of Provincial
Service of NWFP arrived from Peshawar as Pakistan's Political
Agent for Gilgit Agency. The so-called Government of the
Republic of Gilgit quietly disappeared from the scene without
much ado. Air services between Pakistan and Gilgit were
resumed. There was a heavy influx of Pakistani civil and
military personnel in Gilgit and the adjoining areas Gilgit was
brought under direct control of Pakistan's Central
Government to be administered as a Federal Territory, and
not as a part of the so-called Azad Kashmir
In December 1947, Lieutenant Colonel Aslam of Pakistan
Army assumed command of Gilgit Scouts He merged the
men of 6 JAK Infantry and Gilgit Scouts into one entity and
organized his command into four Wings, each of 400 rifles, a
total of about 2,000 men, as follows*
*A Wing- Captain Mohammed Khan Jarral Punjabi
Musalmans ex State Forces.
54
Military Plight of Pakistan
*B Wing Major Ehsan All Khan Men from Punial, Gupis
and Gilgit
*C Wing Lieutenant Mohammed Shah Khan Men from
Hunza and Nagar
*D Wing Lieutenant Babar Khan Men from Hunza and
Nagar
This force had six 3-inch mortars and six MMGs In
addition, another 2000 locals were recruited, trained and
equipped thus making Gilgit a strong Pakistani outpost
British retrocession of Gilgit to the Maharaja at a most
critical juncture in the history of the sub-continent was part
of a deliberate plan to transfer the sensitive strategic region to
Pakistan so that it shall remain available to the Western
Powers for their military and subversive activities against the
Soviet Union After all, the Governments in London and
Washington must have been aware that Pandit Jawahar Lai
Nehru, the future Prime Minister of independent India with
his socialistic and non-aligned rhetoric, would not permit use
of Jammu and Kashmir (read Indian territory) for any
nefarious Imperialistic activities in that geo-strategic region. It
was a British conspiracy, planned and executed by British
officers The chief actor of this drama. Major William Brown,
on his return to United Kingdom was suitably rewarded for
the services rendered to the British Crown by the award of an
O.B E
The net result of these developments was that
approximately 1 7,500 square miles of highly strategic region
passed into Pakistani hands without the enemy having to fire
a shot in anger Pakistan got possession of Gilgit literally on a
platter, thereby opening the way for subsequent Pak
mcilrstonsinto Ladakh, Gurais and Tilel Valleys, Zojila, and
the capture of Skardu. Lord Curzon had written: "Cilgit is
one of the northern gates of India, through which a would be
invader must advance, if he advances at all." That gateway
now belonged to Pakistan.
Gligtt The Bone of Contention
55
The vital importance of Gilgit to Pakistan, China and their
friendly associate powers in the West can be further gauged
from the famous Sino-Pak Karakoram Highway — politically
named as the "Friendship Highway" opened on 16 May 1983
— from Kasha (Kashghar) along the Indus Valley going all the
way down to Karachi, linking Sinkiang to Pakistan The road
does not follow the 15,600-ft Mintaka Pass route, which was
the traditional route from Tashkurgham to Hunza, instead it
goes over the Khunjerab Pass to Gilgit-Chilas-Thakot-Havelian
for a distance of 774 km It is a single lane fair weather road
over the Pass and upto Cilgit, whence it is an all weather two
lane seven meters wide black-topped road all the way
through Pakistan
The construction of this highway in 1978 completely
altered the strategic scenario of this entire, otherwise bare
and bleak region, directly affecting the geo-political situation
of not only the State of Jammu and Kashmir but of the entire
Indian sub-continent This road, along with the Aksaichin
route provides major avenues of ingress to Chinese forces
into Ladakh Conversely, any power having bases in Ladakh
can effectively interfere with Tibet and Xingjiang regions of
China, besides Pakistan Thus, Ladakh, Gilgit and contiguous
northern areas constitute the hub of strategic territory for
India, Pakistan and China "The occupation of North-Western
areas of Ladakh by Pakistan have precluded a direct overland
route between Afghanistan, Central Asia and India This is a
major strategic setback from the Indian point of view"®^
The newly formed Government of independent India
cannot possibly be castigated for their failure to stem the Pak
advance in the far-flung distant corner of the old Empire
However, seeds of far reaching strategical consequences of
immense politico-military significance were lying dormant in
these gory developments Besides the international
implications for the whole of Central and South Asia, the loss
of Gilgit by India, and its gain by Pakistan, threw open the
floodgates for Pakistani advance to Skardu, and thus
occupation of the whole of Baltistan. Further advance to
56
Military Plight of Pakistan
Kargil would soon pose a direct threat to Leh-Ladakh, and
open routes of ingress to Zojila, Gurais and Tilel Valleys And
to cap It all, if Cilgit had not been thrown into the lap of
Pakistan by Major Brown, the highest battlefield in the world,
Siachin, would perhaps not have come into being As far the
Karakoram Highway — well, it is pointless to flog the dead
horse any more It was ADVANTAGE PAKISTAN all the way
NOTES & REFERENCES
1 Vohra Sahdev, "Routes and Tracks from Central Asia to Kashmir"
— article reproduced in "The Story of Kashmir Yesterday and To-
day", Volume i, edited by Verinder Grover, Deep & Deep Publica-
tions, New Delhi, 1995, pp 79-82.
2.Hassnain FM , "Gilgit, The Northern Gate of India", Sterling
Publishers, New Delhi 1 978, p 2
3 Vohra Sahdev, op cit p 79
4 Bandipur to Gilgit used to be a 17-day march including 4 days
for rest enroute The track followed Tragbal, Kurgbal, Churwan,
Peshwari, Burzil, Chillum, Gudai, Astore, Dashkin, Doain, Bunji,
Pari, and Gilgit From Tragbal to Chilas used to be 6 days march via
Misri Bukh, Kalalot, Dila, Baraj and Niat From Churwan to Rattu
used to take 4 days via Kamri, Kalapani and Shankargarh while
from Gilgit to Gupis was also four days via Sherote and Gakuch —
Brahma Singh K, Major, "History of Jammu and Kashmir Rifles
(1820-1956)", Lancer International, New Delhi 1990, pp.298-
300
5.Hasnain, op cit p 12
6 Bamazi Prithvi Nath Kaul, "A History of Kashmir: Political-Social-
Cultural from the Earliest Times to the Present Day", Metropolitan
Book Company, Delhi, 1962.
7 Sir Francis Younghusband, the British Political Resident as quoted
by Jagmohan in "My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir", Allied Pub-
lishers, New Delhi, 1991 ; p,65.
Cilgit The Bone of Contention
57
8 Kishore Singh's ancestor Raja Druv Dev had come into promi-
nence after the Indian invasion of Nadir Shah in 1738-39 Kishore
Singh had three sons Gulab Singh, Dhian Singh and Suchet Singh
All three of them found prominent positions in the Sikh Darbar at
Lahore
9 Bamzai, op cit ?
10 Zorawar Singh was born in Chaloor in Kangra in Himachal
Pradesh ml 786
1 1 Bamzai, op cit ?
12 Cunn4gham Alexander, "Conquest of Ladakh" — an article re-
produced in "The Story of Kashmir" Vol I, op cit ; pp 1 1 9-123
13 Zorawar Singh did not follow the Zojila route to reach Drass,
instead, he went up the Suru Valley and then came to Drass via
Kargil
14 The Shardaji Fort was built in 1851 on the bank of river
Krishenganga after the conquest of Chilas to check raids of
Yaqistanis The Fort was capable of holding a garrison of 100 men
The Fort came in very handy for locating the headquarters of
troops employed on anti-Kuth-smuggling operations in the area
Inside the Fort used to be 'Shardaji Ka Kund' in which an octago-
nal idol was kept and the temple of 'Amrit Kund' where sick per-
sons bathed and are reported to get cured In 1937 it was garri-
soned by 15 rank and file of Fort Guards — Major K Brahma
Singh, " History of Jammu & Kashmir Rifles", op cit., p 297
15 Bamzai; op cit p 570
16. Panikar K Avl ^ "The "^piinding of the Kashmir State", George
Allen and Unwin/-’ London, 1953, p 82. Also, "Treaty of Amritsar
and the Foundation of the Kashmir State" — article published in
"The Story of Kashmir: Yesterday and Today", op cit pp 92-1 1 3
17 Palit D.K , VrC, Major General, "Jammu And Kashmir Arms
History of the J & K Rifles", Palit & Dutt Publishers, Dehradun,
1972, p 46
18 Bhattacharjea, Ajit, "Kashmir, The Wounded Valley" UBS Pub-
58
Military Plight of Pakistan
lishers, New Delhi, 1994, p 51.
1 9 Kapur ML, "Kashmir Sold" — article published in "The Story of
Kashmir", op cit pp 55-62
20 Jagmohan, op cit p 72.
21 "Treaty of Amritsar and the Foundation of the Kashmir State"
by K M Panikar in "The Story of Kashmir Yesterday and Today",
op cit pp 92-1 1 3
22 Lord Hardinge's dispatch dated 19 March 1846 to London, as
quoted by Jagmohan, op cit p 72-73
23. Kapur ML, op cit
24 Bhattacharjea; op cit p 57
25 Bamzai, op cit p 655
26 A similar severe famine in 1746-47 is reported to have re-
sulted in the death of more than half of the population
27 Till lately, this system was also prevalent in the tribal areas of
North-Eastern India where the village headman was obliged to
provide porters to visiting government officials, e.g., in the old
Lushai Hills district of Assam, now Mizoram, the Deputy Commis-
sioner used to issue a "Lai Zaung Zaung Parwana" on the authority
of which the headman was obliged to provide the number of por-
ters demanded, of course on payment of wages at the official
rates
28 Hasnain, op. cit p 65
29 Brahma Singh K, op. cit. p,52
30 Ibid. P53.
31. Ibid p57.
32 Bhattacharjea, op. cit p.59
33 Bamzai, Prithvi Nath Kaul; op. cit. p 627
Cilgit The Bone of-Contention
59
34 Jagmohan, op cit p 75
35 Brahma Singh, op cit pp 68-69
36 Ibid p 628
37 Hasnain, op cit p 41
38 Ibid p 124
39 Ibid. R63
40 Bamzai, op cit pp 625-628.
41 Brahma Singh, op cit pp 164-65
42 Hasnain, op cit p 8
43:&rahma Singh, op at. p 218
44 Chibber, Lieutenant General, "Pakistan's Criminal Folly in
Kashmir", Manas Publications, New Delhi, 1998, p 104
45 "DATTA KHEL, was a name obviously dragged out of Major
Brown's nostalgic association with the Tochi Scouts Datta Khel
was a garrison post of the Tochi Scouts, which was constantly ha-
rassed by the Faqir of Ipi, who at one time claimed or had the
sympathies of the Indian National Congress and Badshah Khan In
May 1 942 the Faqir's Lashkar surrounded Datta Khel The garrison
post was surrounded for over three months and saw some heavy
fighting, including the shooting down of a RAF plane The siege
was finally broken, as was the Faqir of Ipi himself and Datta Khel
passed into the history of the Tochi Scouts and the memory of Ma-
jor Brown A 'Datta Khel' in reverse was now planned in Gilgit " —
Madan Vijay, Lieutenant General, "Jammu and Kashmir Opera-
tions, 1947-48 The Other Version", USI Journal, July-September
1992, pp 311
46 Chibber M.L , op cit p 55
47 Brahma Singh, op at p218.
48 Subedar Major Babar Khan was an uncle of Mir of Nagar and
his wife was a sister of Mir of Hunza.
60
Military Plight of Pakistan
49 Chibber M L , op cit pp 56-57 quoting Trench Charles
Cheevix in 'Frontier Scouts', Butter and Tanner Ltd , London,
1985
50 Hasnain, op cit p 158
51 Madan Vijay, op cit P313
52 Riza Shaukat, Major General, "The Pakistan Army 1947-49",
Natraj Publishers, Dehradun, First Indian Edition 1997, p 291
53 Karim Afsir, Major General with the Indian Defence Review
Team, " Kashmir, The Troubled Frontiers", Edited by Captain
Bharat Verma and Manvendra Singh, Lancer Publishers, New
Delhi, 1994, p 20
54 Riza Shaukat, op at p 292
2 .
THE FALL OF SKAROU
"All Sikhs Shot, All Women
Raped"
The enemy commander sent a rather pompously worded
message to Lieutenant Colonel Sher Jung Thapa/ commander
of the Indian garrison besieged in Skardu Fort,^ " in the
name of Allah, I demand they surrender and I swear by the
Holy Book that no harm would come to thee surrendereth "
But the Army Commander, Lieutenant General K M
Cariappa's decision was that Thapa must continue as long as
possible "And ultimately at 8 am on the 14**^ of August this
gallant garrison was forced to raise the white flag "
Commander of the victorious Pakistani troops reported back
to his headquarters "All Sikhs shot, all women raped
Skardu at 7,700 ft AMSL is situated at the confluence of
Indus and Shigar rivers It lies on the route southeast from
Gilgit, along the Indus, to Kargil/Leh While Leh was the
summer capital of Ladakh, the administration used to shift to
Skardu during the winter months Here the Indus valley is
known as Baltistan covering an area of 6,522 square miles Its
capital town, Skardu lies almost midway between Gilgit and
Kargil From Skardu, there were two direct routes to the Astor
valley towards the west One, over Alampi-La about 16,000
ft, and the other across Banak-La at 1 5,5000 ft AMSL through
the Pan Shing valley Virtual control of Gilgit by Pakistan,
conferred on Pakistan the added advantage of dominating the
entire region down the Indus and Astor rivers
»UNDAR}ES
The Fall of Skardu "All Sikhs
63
Skardu is a small narrow valley divided into two parts by
river Indus, which is generally fordable all along the valley
Except for the sandy belt about one mile wide along the
riverbank, the whole valley, about 12 miles long and varying
in width from one to four miles is very fertile and thickly
populated This flat stretch of land is dominated by a lone hill
at Skardu with its peak at 8,853 ft, otherwise steep, bleak
and barren high mountain peaks varying between 15,800 to
18,403 ft AMSL surrounds the Skardu valley It snows heavily
in the area during winter
After the fall of Gilgit and Bunji, as well as loss of two
companies and imprisonment of his commanding officer
Lieutenant Colonel Majid Khan in Gilgit, the Second-in
Command, Major Sher Jung Thapa assumed the command of
his Battalion He was then based at Leh and was in overall
command of State troops at Leh, Kargil and Skardu Since
Skardu was threatened, Thapa left Leh on 23 November
1947 with two JCOs** and 75 Other Ranks and reached
Skardu on 3'*' December On the way, one day before
reaching Skardu, Thapa sighted a small aircraft, a Harvard
obviously on a reconnaissance mission for Pakistan
Skardu used to be a rather big tehsil comprising of five
sub-divisions of Kharmang, Khapalu, Shigar, Skardu and
Rondu, each of which was actually a jagir under its own
jagirdar locally known as the Rajas. Baltistan is bounded on
the east and northeast by the Haramosh Range of the lofty
Karakoram Mountains, and by the Dosai Mountains on the
west and southwest Thus, Skardu was naturally so well
protected from three sides that, during winter it was
vulnerable only from the direction of Cilgit-Bunji area via
Rondu Therefore, Lt Col Thapa established his forward
defences about 20 miles north at Tsari on both banks of River
Indus. He positioned the Muslim platoon on the far bank
under Captain Nek Alam, and the Sikh platoon on the near
side under Captain Kishan Singh. Concurrently, he
constructed a rough landing strip, about 1,000 yards long in
area of Rang in the hope of receiving air supplies."®
64
Military Plight of Pakistan
Thapa appreciated that, with Cilgit and Bunji in enemy
hands, Skardu as a defensive position was untenable
Moreover, it had very little tactical and much less strategic
value He therefore sought permission from Brigadier L P
Sen, DSO, Commander 161 Infantry Brigade, who had by
then taken overall charge of military operations in Kashmir
and the Northern Sector, to withdraw to Kargil He wanted to
hold Kargil in reasonable strength rather than dissipate his
meagre resources in penny pockets along the enemy's route
of advance, more so since Kargil controlled the routes to Leh
and Zojila Pass and was therefore vital for the defence of the
entire area Like Gilgit in the north, Kargil was the key to the
defence in the south, while Skardu was " in fact nothing
more than a Flag Flying Outpost, which would one day be
forced into surrender through starvation and the inability of
the garrison to strike back in self defence
Brigadier Sen agreed with Colonel Thapa's assessment of
the situation and relayed his concurrence of the proposal to
Jammu Unfortunately, the higher military brass turned down
this obviously reasonable and militarily sound proposition
Brigadier Sen again approached Headquarters JAK Force
emphasizing that Skardu was neither of any strategic nor
tactical value to the conduct of operations in the Valley and
Ladakh, and that siege of Skardu was imminent which the
Indian army would not be m a position to lift in the
foreseeable future. Therefore, no military advantage would
accrue from holding on to Skardu and sacrificing innocent
lives besides squandering away our scarce resources Major
General Kalwant Singh's order came "Last Man, Last Round"
The State Forces headquarters at Srinagar decided to
reinforce the Skardu garrison. Accordingly, one company plus
of State troops, about 160 m all, under Captain Prabhat Singh
assisted by Lieutenants Ajit Singh and Bhagat Singh left
Srinagar by bus on 13 January 1948 to undertake a hazardous
march ov^r the treacherous 11,578-ft Zojila pass during the
thick of a severe winter. The column had to foot it out right
from Kangan itself, about 25 miles from Srinagar, due to
The Fall ofSkardu "All Sikhs
65
heavy snowfall in the area At Sonamarg, the force split into
three groups, one under each officer, to cross the Pass, a
formidable most dangerous undertaking indeed in the thick
of winter "Movement was naturally slow as each individual
had to follow the foot prints of the man in front and a step to
the right or left would throw the man chest deep in snow
Added to this was the intense cold (mercury dipping well
below minus 40° C) which the men had to bear without snow
clothing " resulting in some casualties, including one fatal,
due to cold and frostbite After an arduous journey of more
than 115 miles, the column assembled at Kargil on 1®*
February and the first group under Captain Prabhat Singh left
for Skardu on the 5*”, Naturally, the column suffered frost
bite, trench-foot, insomnia and breathlessness. The leading
elements of the column, about 20 persons covered the 95
miles from Kargil to Skardu m the usual five stages — Olding,
Bagicha, Tolti, Parkutta, and Col — and reached Skardu in a
deplorable state on 10^'’ February 1948.^
Raiders Advance to Skardu
Meanwhile, on 29 January the enemy concentrated his
force in Haramosh village, about 16 miles east of Gilgit and
made contact with Thapa's forward defences at Tsari The
Muslim platoon deployed on the far bank joined hands with
their co-religionists and, on night 9/10 February
overwhelmed the Sikh platoon deployed on the near bank
The Sikhs died fighting, of were captured and shot,
murdered by their own erstwhile comrades in arms. Thapa
did not know of the tragedy that had struck the Tsari
defences since the only means of communication was
through runners, and none escaped the horrendous massacre
to carry the sad news of the debacle.
Having decimated the forward defence line at Tsari, the
enemy force was now poised for assault on the town of
Skardu
It may be recalled that Colonel Aslam, the new
Commandant of Gilgit Scouts had reorganized his command
66
Military Plight of Pakistan
into three groups The Ibex Force comprised of about eighty
Punjabi Musalmans deserters of 6 JAK Infantry, Frontier
Constabulary, Chitralis and other tribals under Major Ehsan
All Khan and Captair Mohammed Khan along with some
Gilgit Scouts under Lieutenant Babbar Khan making a total of
about 600 well equipped troops These disparate elements
were stiffened and officered by the regulars from Pak Army It
speaks volumes for the organizing ability and leadership of
these Pak Army officers who welded together such a
heterogeneous group of highly temperamental people into an
effective and efficient fighting outfit, making sure that their
potential as guerrilla fighters adept at hit and run tactics was
retained in its entirety and fully exploited
This force attacked Skardu town on night 10/11 February
They ransacked the town, killed and looted at will. During
this orgy of rape and plunder inflicted on the hapless civil
population, the Wazir-i-Wazarat Amar Nath, Engineer B L
Gupta, a sub-insp.e(ior of police and the headmaster of a
high school were killed, besides many other non-Muslims
However, many Hindus and Sikhs managed to run into the
defensive perimeter for protection. The attack came as a
complete surprise to the non-Muslim population as well as to
the Skardu Garrison Commander, since "the fanatic Muslims
in the area were helping Pakistani forces so completely that
not a word was uttered by them about the attack on Tsan and
the massacre of the platoon " They knew that the enemy was
coming. They took all precautions to see that we were kept
in the dark and then were attacked by surprise... They
wanted the Pakistan flag to fly over them . . And to them
'Pakistan' was the sweetest word " Nonetheless, the
defenders put up a stiff fight, which lasted about six hours,
and the hostiles retreated leaving behind ten dead and one
wounded who was taken prisoner. The enemy also left
behind one MMG, some rifles, one 3" mortar and some
ammunition. This was indeed a commendable performance
by Thapa's men who suffered seven killed and 16 wounded.®
The Fall of Skardu "All Sikhs
67
The slight respite in the fighting resulting from withdrawal
by the enemy came as a much-needed relief to the garrison
Thapa withdrew all his lightly held outposts and concentrated
his unit in the Fort To make the already bad situation still
worse, 31 Muslim troops inside the Fort including three
Muslim wireless operators deserted and joined the enemy's
swelling ranks However, very fortunately, the only wireless
set remained safe in one of the rooms of Thapa's bungalow
THE SIEGE OF SKARDU
The enemy regrouped quickly On 12th February Ibex
Force surrounded Skardu The siege of Skardu had begun as
expected The mam body of the reinforcing column which
had left Srinagar on 13 January joined the Fort in two groups,
70 each, on 13th and 15th February, again in extremely poor
physical condition raising the ration strength of the besieged
garrison to 285 without any worthwhile military advantage. At
this time, 229 non-Muslim and 19 Muslim refugees and 22
Muslim prisoners were also taking shelter in the Fort
Meanwhile, the intensity and frequency of enemy attacks
increased greatly, and took a heavy toll of the men and their
ammunition stocks which, along with the rations, kept
dwindling to dangerously low levels The scale of ration per
man went down with each passing day. The number of sick
and wounded increased datty while the stocks of medicines
kept exhausting. "The men bore all these privations with
fortitude in the hope that they would soon be joined by the
Indian Army and using Skardu as a base, be able to recapture
Gilgit, for the annexation of which their forefathers had shed
so much blood.
Soon after the news of the siege reached Srinagar,
another column of reinforcements comprising of a weak
company of assorted troops, two MMGs and two 2" mortars
was organized, and that left Srinagar on 16 February 1948
Another blunder in the Himalayas was soon to be
consummated across the Himalayas!
66
Military Plight of Pakistan
The fresh reinforcements were dispatched, strangely,
under the command of Brigadier Faqir Singh as if the high
rank of the column commander would deter the elements
enroute, or the enemy at Skardu' "Even more strangely the
obnoxious practice of British days seems to have been
revived by attaching one Indian Army Officer, Major Coutts"^^
(Victor Coutts of 6 Raj Rif) The unforgiving mountains, high
altitude and the arctic cold took their usual toll as they had
done earlier for times immemorial The column crossed
Zojila under almost impossible weather conditions and
reached Kargil on 1 March After a few days' rest and
making necessary arrangements for porter's etc, the column
advanced north from Kargil on 8“*' March, They left Gol on
the 17* on the last stage to Skardu and were marching along,
but without tactically securing the flanking heights. Major
Mohammed Khan Jarral commanding A Wing of the Scouts
forming part of the Ibex Force ambushed this column near
Nurhbuchung on River Indus at the gorge of Thurgon Pan,
about 10 miles east of Skardu, inflicting heavy casualties —
26 killed, 18 wounded and 7 missing. Leaving their dead
behind, the column fell back in confusion losing much of the
booty and war materials to the raiders, a veritable cache that
Thapa was anxiously awaiting. The column returned to Kargil
in disarray on the 21* where the wounded received first aid
at the civil dispensary. Both the Brigadier and the Major
failed to follow the elementary principles of fire and
movement tactics, and this failure proved very costly to the
men of the column. The Brigadier who was also wounded
handed over command to Major Coutts and returned to
Srinagar. Thus ended the second attempt to reinforce Skardu
"The fact that the column had to turn ' ack after reaching
so close to Skardu was most tragic. The tragedy was all the
more heightened after It became known that the Skardu
Garrison had sent out two platoons under Lieutenant Ajit
Singh (accompanied by Major Thapa himself) towards Gol to
receive the relief column half way, but unfortunately this was
done on 1 8 March which happened to be a day too late"’^.
The Fall of Skardu "All Sikhs
69
not because of any fault on the part of Thapa, but primarily
because the column did not have any wireless set and
Srinagar had informed the expected time of arrival of the
column as 1 8'*’ March. "Had the column arrived on the 18'*’
as scheduled, the enemy would have been in trouble with
me on his one side and Brigadier Faqir Singh on the other."”
On S''* March Skardu reported to Headquarters 161
Infantry Brigade that about 500 armed men and 200 porters
" had arrived there from the direction of Gilgit. They had
camped the night m the vicinity of Skardu town, and had set
off the next morning m an easterly direction, presumably
heading for Kargil. This information was also confirmed by a
wireless intercept, and left no shadow of doubt that
Operation Sledge was now under way " Obviously, with siege
in place, the enemy was bypassing Skardu and heading for
Kargil which was the second major objective of Ibex Force.
The threat to Leh was looming large on the horizon. The
Brigade passed on this vital piece of information to Mr. D R
Dhar who was coordinating military operational matters with
the National Conference led civil authorities m Srinagar.
"During the discussion that followed, 'DP' evinced deep
anxiety at the prospect of Leh being attacked The Ladakhis,
he stressed, were completely unarmed and at the mercy of
the raiders The monastery at Leh would be ransacked, and
unless we did something about it, there would be serious
repercussions in the Buddhist world
In the meantime, enemy continued to make concerted
bids to break through the defences of Skardu, and the
garrison kept fighting back "The tempo was now rising On
28 March at 0300 hours the enemy launched a well prepared
and determined attack two hours later i.e. at 0500 hours
the enemy launched yet another attack, this time on a much
larger scale on all our Piquets and from all directions. A
^yrious battle developed which lasted throughout the day...
Next morning at dawn we successfully counter-attacked with
a platoon and the enemy fell back, leaving behind 20 dead.
We suffered four killed and ten wounded .. Another similar
70
Military Plight of Pakistan
bid to break through our defences on 1 7 April was again
beaten back ..The enemy, however, had succeeded in
establishing his positions very close to ours — in some cases
only 20 yards from our position. It was an eyeball to eyeball
confrontation..."^®
Last Relief Column to Skardu
The Indian high command refused to see the writing on
the wall The powers that be once again decided to to make
yet another attempt to provide succour to Skardu Another
Himalayan blunder conceived in the Himalays to explode
into failure in the trans-Himalayas However, the only lesson
learnt from previous experiences was that this time around,
the reinforcing column was proposed to be much stronger.
Code named "Biscuit Column", it comprised of two Dogra
companies of 7 JAK Battalion from Srinagar and the full-
fledged Battalion of 5 JAK from Jammu The two companies
of the 7'*’ were marched off immediately, in platoon groups,
an<^ reached Kargil by first week of April where they were
placed under command of Major Coutts. As usual, the
elements and the terrain took their toll on the men. The
Column was directed by 163 Infantry Brigade to move down
the Indus valley to Parkutta, south of the confluence of Shyok
with the Indus, and await arrival of 5 JAK Battalion
Meanwhile, 5 JAK Battalion less one company were
airlifted from Jammu to Srinagar and the remaining company
was moved to Srinagar by road. On 3 '^^ April the first batch of
5 JAK left Srinagar under command of Lt Col Sampuran
Bachan Singh of Indian Army (1 Sikh) The Commanding
Officer of the Battalion, Lt. Col Kripal Singh followed in the
third batch while the rest of the Battalion comprising of A and
C Companies made up three batches in the tail of the
column. Thus, 5 JAK was moving up the mountains in a
widely dispersed manner in six batches, which is perhaps
understandable since the route over Zejila-Drass-Kargil sector
necessitated move in smaller groups, particularly in the
Zojila-Matayan stretch As a result, on 14*'’ April while the
The Fall of Skardu "All Sikhs
71
two companies plus column under Major Coutts was about
eight miles ahead of Bagicha on their way to Tolti-Parkutta,
the first batch of 5 JAK from Srinagar was arriving at Kargil,
the second was near Drass, the third at Matayan, and the last
two at Gumri, since the sixth batch was still at Srinagar’^
Major Coutts' column reached Parkutta on 17'*’ April and
was engaged by Major Jarral's troops who had already
inflicted heavy casualties when they ambushed the earlier
column of which the Major had been a part of. While Kripal
Singh with his part of the column reached Kargil on the 30‘^
Sampuran Bachan Singh's column joined Coutts' column at
Parkutta on the 28*'’. Thus by the first week of May, the series
of relief columns sent for the benefit of Skardu were strung all
along the mule track from Sonamarg on the south of the
Great Himalayan Range to Parkutta on the other side with
detachments at Gund, Pindrass, Drass and Kargil. In
retrospect, one can both laugh and cry over the situation of
the State Forces troops who were being made a pawn in the
hands of inexperienced Indian commanders, at least one of
whom did not have the inclination to fight
Enemy's Daring Stroke.
It was the enemy commander Major Jarral who had the
last laugh' He had fairly accurate intelligence reports about
the widely scattered relief column and decided to act boldly.
Recasting his earlier plans, he left about two hundred men
under Colonel Shahzada Mata-ul-Mulk, the brother of Mehtar
of Chitral, who had earlier been an officer in Subhash
Chandra Bose's Indian National Army during World War II, to
continue with the siege of Skardu and also to block the
advance of Indian troops stuck at Parkutta He divided his
remaining force and planned to send them out in batches for
a right hook against the Indian line of communication from
Sonamarg to Kargil The base for this right hook was to be
Chilam Chowki on the mam Gilgit-Snnagar route and the
objectives were Gund, Pindrass, Drass and Kargil, all
simultaneously on the same date, viz. 10*'' May 1948 — "a
72
Military Plight of Pakistan
brilliant and daring stroke, designed to destroy the Indian
forces before him, capture Kargil itself and make the fall of
Skardu virtually certain "
The defence potential at Kargil had been dissipated to
such an extent that by the end of April 1948, Kargil garrison
had been reduced to just one platoon of 7 JAK under Captain
Lachman Das Silwal The enemy column of about 150 men
with two 3 mortars advanced down the Shingo river,
completely surprised a section of the troops guarding the
Kharal bridge across the Shmgo about 10 miles from Kargil,
and then attacked the Kargil post on night 9/10 May 1948
The question of putting up a fight just did not arise since
there was hardly any one left to put up a fight The small
garrison retreated to Kokarnag accompanied by the local
Hindu civil officials, thus Kargil fell into enemy hands on 10*
May 1948 without a fight And that indeed was a bright
feather in Major Jarral's cap, the crowing piece of a daring
plan
The main relief column strung between Kargil and
Parkutta was attacked piece-meal by the enemy in front, and
the enemy in the rear, and suffered many casualties
Sampuran Bachan Singh and Coutts managed to save their
lives by swimming across the Indus They reached Khalatse
on 13* May and thence Leh where their arrival considerably
lowered the civil morale
On 10* May the situation became still grimmer vvhen the
enemy surrounded the State Forces two-platoon garrison at
Drass commanded by Captain Kashmir Singh This small
contingent of 5 JAK Battalion held on till the end of the
month while a company plus of the same Battalion under
Captain Rachpal Singh was then at Machoi When Kashmir
Singh could not hold on any longer because his stocks of food
supplies and ammunition had exhausted, this garrison slipped
out of Drass on night 6/7 June in an effort to join the Machoi
garrison The enemy chased them In the sharp engagement
that followed at Pindrass, the Captain and all the JCOs were
The Fall of Skardu "All Sikhs
73
killed A few lucky survivors managed to reach Machoi on
11“'’ June 1948 Thus Drass too fell into enemy hands
However, the saving grace was the company plus garrison of
5 JAK at Machoi under Rachpal Singh that was still holding
out as a sort of outpost against the hostiles attempting a bee-
line down the Zojila towards the Valley
Abortive Attempt to Recapture Kargil
The fall of Kargil and Drass seems to have had a
devastating effect not only on those who were facing the
bullets, but on the higher command too A wireless order was
issued on 16 May 1948 ordering the commander of the ill
fated garrison of Skardu to break out of the enemy's shackles
and withdraw to Olthing Thang along with the refugees, and
from there assist in the recapture of Kargil. Besides being a
humanly impossible assignment, this was a most unrealistic
order, which clearly showed that the commander(s) and staffs
at Srinagar-jammu-Delhi were completely divorced from the
ground realities of the situation Evidently, they do not seem
to have appreciated the impact of a long drawn siege on the
minds and bodies of the defenders, their physical conditions
and the privations endured over a prolonged period of about
four months, shortage of rations and ammunition, et a/
Above all is the question of morale The adverse effect on the
psyche of troops whose comrades in arms with whom they
have served together for years suddenly turn as their enemies
can be devastating, to say the least. All these factors seem to
have been lost sight of while issuing such a stupid order And
at the receiving end, such an order could only add to the
mental anguish and helplessness of the besieged commander
who flashed back the following message.
" May I bring to your kind notice One, two days after we
were attacked at Skardu we said we could not hold Skardu and
that It was easy to withdraw tis enemy had not occupied line of
withdrawal and plenty transport available Jammu & Kashmir
force ordered to hold to last man last round Two We are
holding for more than three months are left with no mortar
74
Military Plight of Pakistan
ammunition and other ammunition practically exhausted With
that we have to fight back about 80 miles route, all held by
enemy in well prepared positions and having all supporting
weapons and plenty ammunition Three, we have eight
wounded stretcher cases In addition some indoor patients and
male and female and young all unfit to move No coolies to
evacuate above Four, two routes open for us to follow one
through Gol-Parkutta and second via Satpura Both very strongly
held by enemy m great depth Simply impossible to pass
through If moved then fifty percent casualties of troops and no
, less than 80 percent refugees certain Five, not a single coolie
for ration etc Six, there are no troops at Kargil, Olthing Thang,
Bagicha Major Coutts etc having reached Leh Troops at Tolti,
Parkutta, are one strong battalion and have not been able to
clear opposition and reach here We are hardly two companies
with any mortar ammunition and cannot fight back such a long
distance all vital points held by enemy Seven, Troops from
Srinagar could come much quicker than collection of scattered
garrisons here and recapture Kargil If SF troops are not
available lA troops be pushed Suggest and request Alpha
ammunition be dropped immediately Bravo, more troops be
pushed from Srinagar to capture Kargil Charlie, troops in Tolti
area may not be withdrawn Dog, if our withdrawal is
imperative suggest troops at Tolti, Parkutta be pushed here and
we all fall back collectively Lastly to avoid disaster of this
garrison and refugees request you please reconsider your order"
If Skardu had to withdraw and escape to Kargil, that
should have been done at least three months earlier when
Thapa had made a specific request to that effect. Now that a
lot of more water had gone down the Indus, it was much too
late to talk of a withdrawal. HQ Sri Division now intervened
decisively to save the situation, to salvage whatever they
could The impugned order was indeed reconsidered and
cancelled. 'Mt was instead decided to stock up Skardu
Garrison and use Colonel Kripal Singh's troops for the
recapture of Kargil and orders were issued accordingly. Here
again it was not appreciated that without porters the
The Fall of Skardu "All Sikhs
75
Battalion would have to shed its heavy equipment, supporting
weapons and much of its ammunition, and bereft of these
and without a firm base, it would hardly be in a position to
recapture Kargil from a well-armed and well-equipped
enemy Nevertheless, the orders were obeyed and after
destroying its heavy equipment the 5*’’ and 7 ^*' Battalion
combine started its trek back to Kargil on the night of 18/19
May Kripal Singh's column of about 600 men, thus made
light, marched cross-country towards Marol at the confluence
of Suru and Indus, bypassing and thus avoiding enemy
concentrations along the mam track, with a view to recapture
Kargil from that direction A tall order indeed, if ever there
any was, and much too late in the day!
Much as Kripal avoided being ambushed by the enemy.
Major Jarral was keeping a close tag of Indian movements.
"By 1400 hours on 1 9 May the column had closed in at
Kharmang. The village was deserted and there was no sign of
the enemy being present anywhere around and there being a
few hours of daylight still left, Colonel Kripal Singh decided to
push on to Bagicha No sooner had the column prepared to
move than the whole area became live with enemy fire from
all sides" resulting in sixty killed and equal number wounded
The firefight lasted the whole afternoon during which enemy
reinforcements arrived and the column was completely
encircled. "Colonel Kripal Singh then sought to take
advantage of the darkness of the night for sneaking out of the
cordon by batches. This column was able to concentrate at
Bagicha by 0300 hours on 20 May Unfortunately, however,
three platoons lost their way in the night and they never
turned up at the rendezvous e^t Bagicha." Now that the
column was badly mauled — having suffered more than 200
casualties in killed, wounded and missing, as well as shorn of
its supporting weapons, and to cap it all being without a firm
base in enemy held territory — Kripal decided to make his
way in penny pockets over mountain goat-tracks to the safety
of Drass, which he believed to be still held by own troops.
This body of 400 men without rations, living on 'sattu',
crossed Tohunwas on 23'^'* May where they were caught in a
76
Milftary Plight of Pakistan
snow blizzard, and reached Kiniyal the next evening Here
"the villagers, unaffected by the connmunal virus, were most
co-operative and willingly sold their 'Sattu' to the troops "
The column had similar pleasant experience at Matiyan,
which they reached on the 25“’ Thereafter, the column
reached Franshot at 8 a m on the 27'“ with the intention of
crossing river Shingu Finding the bridge destroyed by the
enemy, they moved onto Gultari to cross the river upstream
at the other cradle-bridge up there, which they found intact.
"The column had never been in luck so far and nor was it on
this day Just when two companies of the 7'“ Battalion and
about 1 5 men of the 5'“ had crossed over, the bridge gave
way and the whole structure fell into the river taking with it
the three men who were in the process of crossing " The
column thus got split into two halves and each half had to
adopt a different route for reaching Drass; the companies of
the 7'“ Battalion via the 14,300 ft Marpo La and those of the
5'“ with Kripal via the 13,590 ft Karobal Gali.
The two companies of the 7*“ Battalion reached Drass on
5*“ June, a couple of days too late Since they were not aware
of the fate that had met Captain Kashmir Singh and his Drass
Garrison, they walked straight into the enemy's trap and
were decimated. A few who managed to escape the enemy
dragnet, marched over unknown mountain tracks and passes
and trickled into Srinagar in ones and twos to tell their sad
story.
The other column under Kripal Singh also had a hard
time crossing the hazardous Pass. By the time they crossed
the Pass on 2"“ June, they had lost 35 men in a blinding
snowstorm. They reached Badoab on 3'“ June where the
Muslim inhabitants were very co-operative. They not only
gave them some rations but also informed them of the enemy
plan to ambush them at Raman nullah track junction. With
the help of guides from the village, the enemy position was
located and in a surprise attack three of the enemy were
killed. Having traversed a sparsely used footpath along the
Mashkoh Nullah, and bypassing the track Junction going
The Fall of Skardu "All Sikhs
77
down to Gumri, this column of five officers and 145 ORs
under Lt Col Kripal Singh came down the mountain range
and reached the safety of Sonamarg on 7'*’ June 1948 By
this time the enemy strength in the area was estimated at
about 500 around Drass and another 300 near Matayan
Thus ended in a fiasco the tragic story of repeated
pathetic and futile Indian attempts to relieve the beleaguered
garrison of Skardu resulting in avoidable heavy loses of
precious human lives, huge quantities of arms, ammunition
and military equipment which fell into enemy hands This
enabled him to overcome his major shortcoming since they
did not have the benefit of a regular supply and maintenance
system to back up their operations
Both Srinagar and Jammu had definite information as
early as 3"*' March 1948 that an enemy column, about 500
strong supported by 200 porters was operating in the area
south of Skardu The question therefore arises why the
reinforcing columns were allowed to move forward of Kargil
in small penny pockets, inviting defeat in detail. The force
should have been ordered to concentrate at Kargil under one
commander, carry out route reconnaissance, gather
information about enemy movements, and then move
forward in a tactically sound military manner, rather than
marching ahead in tidbits as if going on a route march. "The
mission failed not because of shortage of manpower or
paucity of arms, ammunition or equipment. The resources
were more than adequate. Dispersal of forces, absence of a
tactical approach, confusion in command and control,
uninspiring leadership and less than competent handling by
the Commander of 163 Infantry Brigade, were the factors
responsible for the misery and calamity which befell this
force.
The severe arctic winter conditions and high altitude took
a heavy toll in all these infructuous attempts at reinforcing
Skardu which would not have been held in the first place if a
proper military assessment and overall strategic defence plan
78
Military Plight of Pakistan
had been formulated right in the beginning Gems of
hindsight? Well, all it really means is that the military brass
should not have rushed headlong blindly into taking ad hoc
decision on a day to day basis, press panic buttons without
proper assessment of the overall situation, and consequences
thereof
A serious threat to Srinagar from the North was now
developing This route had to be plugged as a matter of
extreme urgency But that is a different story for a later
chapter. All that is relevant here, in that context, is the
commendable achievement by a small, well organized, well
led enemy force of heterogeneous elements adding upto
approximately two battalions worth of troops, that managed
to secure a vast stretch of strategic territory in the Northern
Areas for Pakistan, and thereby for the long term benefit of
Western imperialist powers. This was all the more so since
the enemy forces did not enjoy the advantage of air power of
their country However, they certainly enjoyed a big
advantage accruing from shorter and easier lines of
communications, as well as a head start provided by Major
Brown and the British complicity in the plot m its totality
Moreover, the hostiles belonged to the soil. They were part of
the environment and needed no acclimatization whereas
Indian troops were alien both to the terrain and the climate.
Besides these military advantages, the enemy also enjoyed
immense special moral and psychological assets by way of
religious fanaticism, holy-war slogan, lure of loot and women
as well as the heady mixture of excitement of combat against
Hindu-India. The Pakistani commanders fully exploited these
advantages to the hilt, and made the best use of innate
mobility of mountain-tribals and their proverbial capability in
irregular guerrilla warfare.
The Noose Tightens
With the capture of Kargil in early May and Drass in early
June, with the siege around Skardu successfully tightening the
noose — Pakistan's flag in the vast strategic region of
The Fall of Skardu "All Sikhs
79
Northern Sector from Gilgit to Nubra, and from Karakoram to
the Zojila and Gurais was flying at its zenith Srinagar was
threatened from the north, and so was Leh. The hostiles' grip
on Skardu became firmer than ever before
It IS indeed unfortunate and somewhat ironic too, that
the strategic importance of holding Kargil vis-a-vis the
tactically insignificant outpost of Skardu was not appreciated
by Indian military command. Kargil was the key to geo-
political access to Central Asia It had been a key point on
the ancient trade route over the centuries and continued to
occupy that position of prime importance It dominated the
Srinagar Leh route Moreover, Indian claim over Aksaichin
would have been untenable if Kargil was in hostile hands.
Without Kargil, Ladakh would not have been in Indian hands,
at least in so far as the situation in 1947-48 was concerned
But still the higher military command continued to reinforce
Skardu, and completely ignored Kargil However, it is difficult
to reconcile to the idea that the Indian senior commanders
were so naive as not to be able to place Kargil in the correct
military perspective. No, that is most unlikely. Our
commanders and their staffs were sharper in appreciating the
military value of what should be held, and what should be
discarded m the face of limited resources
In the meantime, enemy attacks on Skardu continued
unabated The siege of the Fort was complete and conditions
inside were becoming next to impossible. The ration scale
was down to 1 80 grams of atta and 30 grams of dal with no
ghee at all.^*
With Gilgit and Bunji m the north, and Kargil and Drass in
the south in enemy hands, the noose around Skardu got
further tightened. However, more than Skardu, the problem
for India was Leh the loss of which was going to be politically
most devastating and strategically suicidal. In order to avoid
such a catastrophe, a plan under code name "Op Snipe" was
evolved. This projected operation Involved early recapture of
Gurais; and with that as the firm base, one brigade group to
80
Military Plight of Pakistan
advance over the Burzil Pass, through the Deosai Plains, and
on to Skardu thereby killing more than two birds with one
stone. The plan envisaged for the brigade group to be
maintained by air for at least one week If successful, this
operation would have eliminated the existing threat to
Bandipur and hence from the north to Srinagar too, raised
the siege of Skardu thereby cutting off the enemy's L of C to
Kargil, Drass and Leh The ultimate aim of securing Leh being
achieved without having to take the fight to the vicinity of the
Buddhist monasteries Unfortunately, this bold and
beautifully conceived operation never saw the light of the
day, perhaps because of non-availability of additional forces
during June 1 948 Or did it look too audacious?
May be, a brigade group level operation from Curais over
the Burzil Pass to Skardu appeared to be an over ambitious
hazardous venture at that point of time in the distant past
Further, air maintenance of a brigade group for one week or
so may not have been within the then available air-resources
But how about a battalion group making a rapid advance in
that direction and be maintained by air for about ten days or
so, when the enemy was on the run. The trouble is we did
not exploit our success in Gurais in the direction of Skardu at
all. Fate had consigned Skardu, and thereby Baltistan to the
Pakistani fold!
While the aforesaid attempts at providing succor to the
beleaguered garrison were ending irt failure one after
another, the conditions inside the Fort were becoming almost
unbearable. Although the siege commenced on 12 February,
the first determined assault by the enemy came only on 25''’
March. It was launched against the piquets guarding the Fort
and the defenders put up a stiff resistance Similarly, the
defence was vigorous and successful in repulsing the attack
against Point 8853 and the piquet commander; Captain Ajit
Singh was awarded VrC for the heroic effort. However, by
then the garrison was restricted to an area barely about 1 ,500
X 600 yards and the forward elements of the two sides were
at eye to. eye contact, at just about 50 yards apart, the
The Fall of Skardu "All Sikhs
81
defenders being at the mercy of those who had been their
comrades in arms a few weeks earlier Such was the irony of
fate
“ALL SIKHS SHOT. ALL WOMEN RAPED”
On 2"^* June, close air support by Tempest aircraft of
Indian Air Force (then RIAF) succeeded in marginally
improving the morale of the besieged garrison Air supply by
fighter aircraft was also resorted to, but this did not prove to
be a viable solution because, besides being much too
expensive in terms of men and money, the level of casualties
in retrieving the supplies in the face of enemy was
unacceptable. And in the process, the enemy also stood to
gam from the supplies lost in the drop. It was indeed a
piquant cleft-stick situation.
Relief from the skies was a mere short-term respite from
the menacing hordes just a few yards away from the outer
perimeter defences. When the two warring groups are in eye
to eye contact, that had to be so. And the final psychological
blow was dealt by the enemy on IZ'** June when Sepoy Amar
Nath who had been taken prisoner at Parkutta, approached
the garrison holding a white flag with the following message
from the enemy commander. Colonel Shahzada Mata-ul-
Mulk, "Commander, Azad Central Forces Skardu":-
To. The Officers and Men of Kashmir State Forces,
Skardu Crn.
From. Colonel Shahzada Mata-UI-Mulk, Comd Azad
Chitral Forces, and Skardu.
One (.) All attempts to relieve your Crn by Brigadier Faqir Singh,
Lt Cols Kripal Singh and Sampuran Bachan Singh have resulted
in absolute failure in numerous killed and prisoners taken Azad
Forces are now operating in Kangan, Sonamarg and Bandipur
area also in some cases within 15 miles of Srmagar( ) Two( ) You
have done your duty as every soldier should do Now that it is
clear that no relief can reach you in this mountainous area there
82
Military Plight of Pakistan
IS no doubt about the ultimate fate of your garrison and I am
quite determined about it It is no use to carry on a struggle,
which will result in ' our total annihilation ( ) Three( ) I therefore
advise you to lay c own arms and I take full responsibility to give
protection to one and all You must believe me and trust me, as
I am not only a soldier but also possess royal blood I have given
instructions to my officers and men that any one approaching
with a white will not be fired at but taken into safe custody ( )
Four( ) Lastly as a proof of my goodwill I wish to inform you that
not a single Sikh or Hindu resident of Chitral has been hurt and
not a single non-Muslim property looted or damaged and until
now they carry on their business as if nothing at all had
happened I therefore advise you again to lay down arms and
thus save your lives An officer should accompany back the
white flag if you consider my word sincere and honest ( )
It goes to the credit of the enemy commander that it was
a well reasoned, well meaning communication in which he
advanced compelling rationale why the garrison should
surrender Of course. Colonel Thapa did not respond to this
offer which was therefore deemed to have been rejected
While Leh had been made reasonably safe, the situation at
Skardu had become all the more critical after failure of Kripal
Singh's column and unsuccessful attempts to maintain the
garrison by air By the middle of June there was never any
doubt that the fate of this brave Garrison was doomed,
notwithstanding the strafing of Point 8853 by two Tempests
on 19* June inflicting casualties on the enemy The fighting
albeit one sided, continued unabated day after day with the
ultimate result staring the defenders in their mind's eye
While the intensity and ferocity of enemy action increased
day after day, the ability of the garrison to resist "diminished
in a somewhat inverse proportion
The situation had taken a turn for, the worse during the
first week of August when the enemy brought forward two
3 7" Howitzer to decide the issue once and for all At that
time besides the acute shortage of ammunition that the
The Fall of Skardu "All Sikhs
83
Garrison was faced with, the vitality of the men had reached
Its lowest ebb due to prolonged under-nourishment
bordering on starvation. While the number of sick persons
was increasing, there were practically no medicines at all
"After a continuous barrage of SOS requests for dropping
medicines, an air drop took place What fell within our
defences had only 12 phials of penicillin that too were date
expired What a pity>"^^ nevertheless, with a superhuman
effort the Garrison beat back the enemy attack on 1 2 August
even though it was the heaviest attack that he had made so
far " By then, " with not more than ten rounds of ammunition
remaining with each man, the successful defence on 12
August also marked the end of the ability of the Garrison to
resist any further and with the men on the verge of complete
starvation and with nothing to fight with, it was left with no
alternative but to surrender"
The finale came on the 14''’ of August 1948 when the rest
of India was preparing to celebrate the first anniversary of
their Independence It was great heartening news for Pakistan
on their National Day when, with all resources exhausted,
the beleaguered Indian garrison raised a white flag at 8 am
atop the Fort giving rise to cheers and jubilation amongst the
enemy troops
Frightful revenge was inflicted on the defenders of
Skardu Mass murders and rapes were galore. Many women
committed suicide. All Sikhs were put to sword. Captain
Ganga Singh, Adjutant of 6 JAK "was tied, laid on the ground
and shot", by his erstwhile comrades-in-arms for his "crime"
that he was a non-Muslim "The only Sikh who escaped was
Kalyan Singh who was my Orderly and was staying with me."
It was outright murder of innocent people, a massacre on a
horrendous scale of which the Indian and international press
hardly took any notice. Lieutenant Colonel Sher Jung Thapa,
Captains Prabhat Singh and Ajit Singh and other survivors of
this holocaust were taken prisoners. Luckily, they were not
killed, not because of any act of mercy on the part of the
enemy forces, but all because of General Gracey who issued
84
Military Plight of Pakistan
Strict "orders to stop any further killing of prisoners of war"
They were sent to Attock Fort in Pakistan It was there that
Thapa met General Douglas Gracey after a lapse of almost 25
years and came to know how his old benefactor Gracey had
saved his life, and lives of many others "After General
Gracey 's visit, the attitude of Pakistani captors changed and
we were treated very well they were repatriated to India
in May 1 950.
The Gorkha officer of the Jammu and Kashmir State
Forces, Colonel Sher Jung Thapa was awarded MVC for the
heroic defence he and his men had put up in the face of
grave personal danger in an entirely unequal fight
In the ultimate analysis, the British officers, particularly
Major William Brown OBE, Commandant Gilgit Scouts, and
Muslim officers and men of 6 JAK Infantry Battalion, must be
held responsible for the inhuman atrocities perpetrated on
the hapless women and children as well as the defenders of
Skardu, in as much as they were responsible for the massacre
at Gilgit and later at Bunj'i, Tsari and finally at Skardu in
flagrant violation of Geneva Convention and ordinary human
decency. In any case, Pak Army has never considered itself
constrained by such refinements of humane behaviour
Skardu fell as a result of lack of appropriate strategic
appreciation by the Indian political leadership, "hamhanded
relief operations" and inability of the Air Force to provide
requisite support.^®
At this stage, Kashmir Valley was open to Pakistani attacks
both from the North as well as the East, and to cap it all, the
lines of communication between Srinagar and Leh over the
Zojila Pass had also been disrupted after the fall of Kargil. The
situation at Skardu had been impossible right from the start
after Gilgit and then Bunj'i fell into enemy hands. Skardu was
reinforced again and again and yet again at the expense of
Kargil whose strategic importance in the overall context of
defence of the trans-Himalayan region was not appreciated,
or effected for that matter.
The Fall of Skardu "All Sikhs
85
In retrospect, the course of action that should have been
adopted appears quite simple and straightforward — Hold
Kargil in strength, with that as the firm base, launch
operations down the Indus Valley, relieve the siege of Skardu,
and then advance to Bunj i-Gilgit, subject to available
resources.
Pakistani capture of Skardu in Baltistan in August 1948
after about six months of a grueling siege provided the enemy
with a forward base up on the Indus for their subsequent
operations in this theatre. However, Pak advance was
eventually checked resulting m the State of Jammu and
Kashmir being virtually cut into two portions
NOTES AND REFERENCES
1 . Sher Jung Thapa was born at Abbottabad, now in Pakistan, on
18 June 1908, son of Honorary Capt Arjan Singh Thapa, Sardar
Bahadur, Order of British India (OBI), Indian Distinguished Service
Medal (IDSM), Subedar Major of 2/5 Royal Gorkha Rifles He had
his college education at Dharmsala Captain Douglas Gracey, Adju-
tant of 1 Gorkha Rifles Training Centre at Dharmasala encouraged
Thapa to Join Jammu and Kashmir State Forces in which he was
commissioned on 1 September 1932 — Chibber M L , Lieutenant
General, "Pakistan's Criminal Folly in Kashmir", Manas Publica-
tions, New Delhi
1998, p 100
2 The Skardu Fort is situated on a hill overlooking the town of
Skardu Originally it was the headquarters of the Rajas of Skardu
When this hill tract was conquered by Wazir Zorawar Singh the
Fort Itself defied all efforts of the Dogras to capture it because of
Its naturally very strong location and it was only treachery on the
part of Its defenders that betrayed it into Dogra hands The Fort
was then razed to the ground. Reconstruction of the present fort
was commenced in 1857 under orders of Maharaja Ranbir Singh
and under the supervision of Mehta Mangal and completed in
86
Military Plight of Pakistan
1884 The River Indus runs round the three sides of the hill on
which the fort stands On the eastern side of the fort a pompously
worded inscription in Persian in eulogy of the Maharaja, his Prime
Minister Diwan Anant Ram and another minister Shiv Saran is to
be found engraved on a stone In 1937, the Fort had a garrison of
ten Fort Guards — Brahma Singh K Major, "History of Jammu &
Kashmir Rifles 1820-1956", Lancer International, New Delhi,
1990, p.297
3 A radio intercept quoted by Major K Brahma Singh on page 268
of his Book, "History of Jammu & Kashmir Rifles" op cit , and also
recorded in his Book by Lieutenant General S K Sinha, "Opera-
tion Rescu'' Military Operations in Jammu and Kashmir 1947-49",
Vision Books, New Delhi 1977/1997; p 85
4 The undivided Indian Army had three tier basic ranks structure
— Officers, VCOs (Viceroy's Commissioned Officers) and OR
(Other Ranks) which also included the NCOs ( Non-Commissioned
Officers) The VCOs were ranked as Jemadar (now Naib Subedar),
Subedar and Subedar Major. The VCOs are now called JCOs The
same system of ranks prevailed in the State Forces too
5 Lieutenant Colonel Thapa quoted by Chibber; Op cit. p.1 10
6 Sen L.P. Lieutenant General, "Slender was The Thread",
Longman, New Delhi, 1969, p 192
7. Brahma Singh K. Major,op cit pp 258-59
8 Thapa, Sher Jung, op cit pp 1 1 2-1 3.
9. Brahma Singh, op. cit p 259.
lO.lbid, p 261
11. Ibid, p 261
12 Ibid, p 261
1 3. Thapa Sher Jung,op cit. pp.1 1 5-1 8
1 4. Sen L P op cit pi 94
15. Thapa Sher Jung, ibid; pp 122-23
The Fall of Skardu "All Sikhs
87
1 6 Brahma Singh, op cit p 263
17 Prasad S N Dr and Dharm Pal Dr, "History of Operations in
Jammu and Kashmir — 1947- 48", History Division, Ministry of
Defence, India, 1 987, p 291 , also Thapa Sher Jung op cit p 1 25
18 "There is also evidence available that Maj Coutts did not have
the inclination to fight" — Bloeria Sudhir S Dr, "The Battles of
Zojila",Har Anand Publications, New Delhi, 1997, p 6
1 9 Thapa Sher Jung, op cit p 129
20 Prasad S N and Dharm Pal, op cit p 298
21 Palit D K Major General, "Jammu & Kashmir Arms — History
of the J& K Rifles", Palit and Dutt Publishers, Dehradun, 1972 ,
pp 240-41
22 Brahma Singh, op cit pp 261-267
23 Bloeria Sudhir S Dr op cit, p 70
24 Thapa cit pp 118-19
25 Prasad S N and Dharm Pal, op cit pp 349/367
26 Thapa Sher Jung, op cit 137-39
27 Ibid p 141
28 Ibid pp 141-43
29 Madan Vijay Lieutenant General, Jammu and Kashmir Opera-
tions 1947-48, The Other Vision, USI Journal New Delhi July-Sep-
tember 1992, p 314
3
POLITICAL
DEVELOPyVIEMTS:
PRE-IISIDEPENIDENCE
"Jewel of the North, Kashmir nestles in the bosom of the
Himalayas. The State of Jammu and Kashmir consists of
Jammu, the masculine land of Dogra chivalry, which forms
part of the outer hills of the Himalaya, the Kashmir Valley
with its feminine charms of cascades, flower gardens and
placid lakes, and Ladakh, the rugged land of the Lamas and
monasteries which forms about 70% of the total area of the
State."’’
Most of the State is mountainous except for a small
stretch along the Punj'ab border in the southwest corner. The
valleys are wide, fertile and well populated. The great
mountain ranges in the north link the Pamirs and Hindukush
Mountains in the west, and- with the Himalayas in the east.
The Pir Panjal Range running In the southeastern corner of
the State separates the Kashmir valley from the Jammu and
Poonch regions. This range is much lower than the Himalayas
and the Great Karakoram. Its crest line lies at an average of
12,500 ft while individual peaks are around 15,000 ft AMSL.
The Himalayas and the Karakoram have some of the highest
peaks in the world, like the Mount Everest at 29,028 ft and
Mount Godwin Austen (K2) at 28,250 ft, the second highest
peak in the world lying In the Baltistan visible while flying to
Leh, an awe inspiring beautiful sight.
90
Military Phght of Pakistan
There is a narrow strip, a 'sliver' of Afghan territory lying
between the Hindu Kush Range in the south and the Pamir
Mountains m the north in Tajikistan. The western part of this
strip borders Pakistan while the eastern part abuts the old
Jammu and Kashmir State border It is India's only window to
the erstwhile USSR whose Central Asian Republics are its
close neighbours The erstwhile Soviet province of
Badakhshan is only a short distance to the north. On the
southwest and south, it is contiguous with Himachal Pradesh
and Punjab There are a large number of mountain passes,
the most important of which are Zoji La 11,578, Banihal
9,290 and Haji Pir 8,652 ft
There are four mam rivers, which have a direct bearing
on military operations. -
* River Indus with its source in Tibet flows from east to
west cutting right across the state in a great arc through
Skardu-Bunji and flows through Attock in West Punjab to the
Sindh province of Pakistan
*' River Kishenganga (Neelam, in Pakistan) starting
from North of Sonamarg cuts through Tithwal valley and flows
into river Jhelum at Domel.
* River Jhelum starting from Wular Lake flows east to
west through the Valley at Baramula to Domel - Mirpur -
Mangla and Jhelum in Pakistan.
* River Chenab with its source near Kulu in the Lahaul
region of Himachal Pradesh flows through Kishtwar-Ramban-
Akhnur m the Jammu region, and thence into the plains of
Pakistani-Punjab.
Two other rivers of special interest in this particular area
are: -
* River Mahl passing through Bagh, Mong Bajri and
flowing into river Jhelum.
* River Poonch passing through Poonch, Kotli and
flowing into Mangla reservoir near Mirpur m Punjab-
Political Developments Pre-Independence
91
In 1947, the State covering a total area of 85,805 sq miles
(2,22,236 sq km) between 32° 1 7<I: and 36°58<: north and
73° 26(1: and 80° 30(1: east, was the largest of all the princely
states with a population of about forty lakhs It was divideid
into the following regions -
Kashmir Division: The Kashmir Valley lies between the
Pir Panjal and the Central Himalayas at an average elevation
of 5,300 ft AMSL, with an average rainfall of only 30". The
Valley and Muzzaffarabad district together occupy an area
6,156 sq miles (15,945 sq km) Nestling between the inner
and the outer Himalayas, and drained by the rivers Jhelum
and Kishenganga, the Kashmir Valley lies in a south-east to
north-westerly direction, about 80 miles long and 31 miles
wide The Valley is dotted with numerous lakes of which the
Wular, Dal and Nagin are the most famous. River Jhelum
enters Wular Lake at Bandipur and leaves it at Sopore. Rivers
Lidder, Sind, Sandran and Vishwa are the major tributaries of
river Jhelum
Jammu Division contiguous with undivided Punjab
(along Mirpur, Kotli and Poonch) and Himachal Pradesh has
an area of 10,152 sq miles (26,293 sq km).
Ladakh and Baltistan has Leh and Skardu as the main
centres of population Ladakh, a high altitude desert at an
average elevation of 17,000 ft, area 36,930 sq miles (96,701
sq km) The average temperature at Leh during summer is 8°
C (in August) and in winter it is minus 16° C The Buddhists
constitute about 51% of the population while the Muslims are
46%. Ladakhi Muslims are distinct from Kashmiri Shia
Muslims but are akin to Muslims of Baltistan who are known
as Twelver Shias
Gilgit Agency under lease to the British, and the Gilgit
Wazrat.
Frontier Illaqas
Thus, geographically, the State is comprised of four
completely diverse regions ranging from a cold snow desert
and bleak barren mountains devoid of any vegetation to lush
92
Military Plight of Pakistan
green valleys, and low level hot plains This geographical
diversity naturally led to considerable cultural variations and
disparities m economic development, which may appear lop
sided at first sight No wonder then that Lord Birdwood had
to say, " the delimitation of a line on the map of Central
Asia on political considerations enclosed a completely
artificial area, a geographical monstrosity, which then
assumed the name of the Jhelum Valley, Kashmir"^
As on January 1949 when the Cease Fire came into
force, India controlled 57,000 sq miles of the State territory
out of which 12,000 sq miles was later seized by China,
while Pakistan controlled 32,200 sq miles Out of this,
Pakistan constituted 27,000 sq miles to form the Northern
Areas comprised of Gilgit, Astor, Skardu, Hunza and others
under direct Islamabad control, some of which was later
ceded to China, and 5,236 sq miles was placed under the
Azad Kashmir Government ^
The population of the State: The 1941 census records
total populations of 40,21,616 out of which Muslims were
31,01,247. Thus Muslims constituted about 77% Muslims
while 20% were Hindus, and the rest Sikhs, Buddhists, and
others About 35 lakhs lived in villages. Kashmiri Pandits
dominated the civil services and business Doigras dominated
the army and police About 30% of the rank and file in the
State Forces were drawn from Muslim Ra)puts tribes of
western Poonch and there were about 60,000 ex-servicemen
in the region that had served in the British Indian Army
during the Second World War.
COMMUNICATIONS
In order to appreciate the military operations in their
correct perspective, as also the political and social
developments in the State, it is necessary that we have a clear
picture of surface communications as they existed at the time
of Indian Independence.
Political Developments Pre-Independence
93
The Dogra rule came to the State through kind courtesy,
first the Sikh Darbar at Lahore and then of the British Since
Lahore was the socio-political centre of both these powers, it
was a simple matter of developmental evolution that the
communication net-work should have its hub at Lahore, and
by the same token, its base at Rawalpindi. Moreover, by the
time the Dogra Dynasty established itself, British Empire was
fast progressing towards its zenith in the Indian sub-
continent The Dogras were politically subservient to the
British Government Above all, the nature of the terrain —
the major geo-physical factor that dictates the basic technical
considerations for development of surface communications
— pointed to the Punjab plains as the starting point of road
and rail net-work leading into the State of Jammu and
Kashmir. No wonder therefore that in the old Moghul days,
their elephant caravans for the royal summer vacations went
through the Punjab plains via the Tosamaidan and Pir Panjal.
The same holds good for the old trade routes to Western Asia
via the Zoji La pass and Ladakh, and to old Gandhara (Kabul
valley) through the Jhelum valley in the general area of
Muzaffarabad
It will thus be seen that geo-political considerations alone
dictated the trend of development of surface
communications into the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and
the same trend was to continue in the days to come
River Jhelum flows in a northwesterly direction down the
Uri gorge and takes a sudden 300 degrees swing whence it
flows southwards, towards Punjab marking the State
boundary Two metalled roads connected the State with the
rest of undivided India and both branched off from the main
Delhi-Lahore-Peshawar Grand Trunk Road, and converged at
Domel on the State border One. Rawalpindi-Wahe-
Abbottabad-Manshera-Garhi Habibullah-Domel and up the
Jhelum valley along the south bank to Srinagar The other,
from Rawalpindi rising up the Murree Hills, then dropping
down to Kohala, over the bridge to Barsala and thence
parallel to the Jhelum river on the east bank onto Domel-
94
Military Plight of Pakistan
Srinagar The scenic drive from Domel along the river Jhelum
went via Chinan, Chakhoti, Uri, Mahura on to Baramula,
whence the black tarmac ribbon lined with tall chinai trees
went through the Valley Beautiful right upto Srinagar
The southern tarmac road access into the State was fiom
Wazirabad on the mam. Grand Trunk Road to Sialkot-
Suchetgarh border post and onward to Jammu A forward
road for 79 miles connected Mirpi r-Kotli-Poonch, and
another one of 36 miles linked Poonch with Uri in the Jhelum
valley over the Haji Pir Pass Another fair weather road
connected Jammu-Akhnur-Naushera-Jhangar
It will thus be seen that the only viable lines of
communications to the State were through what later came
to be Pakistan, and still later partly as Pakistan Occupied
Kashmir (POK) territories, thereby conferring a distinct
strategic advantage on Pakistan in its attempt at forcible
annexation of the State The road network connecting West
Punjab with the State was not only good but was also much
shorter, thereby conferring a definite military advantage of
shorter lines of communication to Pakistan
With what was later to become independent India, the
only surface link was a "Tonga Road", a purely fair weather
dirt track, motorable of sorts, from Pathankot via Madhopur-
Kathua-Samba-Jammu, a distance of about 64 miles. There
were a number of unbridged rivers and causeways, which
became unfordable with the slightest of showers and turned
into mud ruts Ravi, Ujh and Basantar were the maj'or
unbridged river obstacles of which the Ravi was the most
formidable A motor ferry used to operate over the Ravi
during the non-monsoon season, but barely for three months
in a year. A round trip from Pathankot to Jammu and back
over this dusty dirt track used to take about three grueling
days.
From Jammu., a forward fair weather road to Srinagar via
Udhampur, Ramban where >t crossed river Chenab over a
rickety suspension bridge, thence over tlae Pir Bahjal range Wit
Political Developments Pre-Independence
95
the 9,290 ft high Banihal Pass (The present tunnel was
constructed in 1955) and passing through Anantnag went
upto the capital Srinagar situated at a comfortable 5,200 ft
This road was snow bound during the winter months and had
very little utility as a motorable road because of its poor
general condition and numerous natural obstacles enroute
Except for light vehicles, this road was used more as a route
for the mules/ponies caravans
The Partition of India in 1947 left all the three metalled
roads in the territory of Pakistan, and since these were the
lifelines of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the control over
the supplies of essential goods and commodities rested
entirely in Pakistan hands And as we shall see later, this lever
was applied by Pakistan to throttle life in the State to coerce
Maharaja Han Singh to accede to Pakistan, by hook or crook,
through what came to be known as the Economic Blockade
All other roads in the State were fair weather, mostly
shingle-surface, narrow winding barely allowing single way
traffic. The following shingle roads in Jammu region had a
bearing on the conduct of military operations. -
* Jammu-Akhnur-Beri Pattan- Naushera- Jhangar- Kotli-
Poonch-over the Haji Pir Pass to Uri in the Jhelum valley
* Naushera- Rajauri- Mendhar- Poonch.
* Naushera-Jhangar-Mirpur.
* Jammu- Akhnur-Manawar- Bhimber-Mirpur on to
Kotli-Poonch
* Gujrat in Pakistan to Bhimber.
0 Rawalpindi to Kahuta in Pakistan- Palandri- Poonch
motorable upto Kahuta only
A small branch line of 27 miles broad guage railway built
in 1890 connected Sialkot and the rest of the Punjab plains
with Jammu. About 18 miles of this rail line was in Pakistani
Punjab, and only 9 miles is in the State territory.
96
Military Plight of Pakistan
As for the air services and airfields none at all except
fair weather landing strips at Satwari near Jammu and at
Damodar Karewa near Srinagar (Badgom), both runways were
un-metalled No concrete runways at all And these two
airstrips were meant primarily for the personal aircraft of the
Maharaja There were no support services whatsoever — no
navigational aids, fueling facilities, not even fire tenders
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
It may come as a pleasant surprise to most Indians,
Hindus in particular, that "Kashmir, originally called Kasmira,
can boast of a recorded history going further back than the
Mahabharata It is the history of evolution of a people
isolated by geography in a narrow valley that became reputed
for Its natural beauty throughout the world Its great rulers
patronized scholars and poets, painters, singers, craftsmen
built monumental temples, laid out cities and terraced
gardens extended their domain deep into India,
Afghanistan and Tibet" * Kashmir has been a centre of
civilization for a very long time and has experienced a truly
" epic history, having been a cultural centre of intellectual
and spiritual adventure and the object of considerable envy
one after the other
Over the centuries, the biggest problem faced by the
Kashmiris was 'how to keep the outsiders out of the Valley
Beautiful' which has attracted repeated incursions by the
most rapacious neighbours And howsoever hard they have
tried, outsiders have always had an upper hand in guiding the
destinies of these otherwise 'timid and docile' (?) people who
seem to have undergone a metamorphosis after the agitations
of the1930's for their democratic rights and economic
development
The entire garnwt of political, social, cultural and
commimal deveiopmapts in the Valley during the recent
history of the State have been central to two outstanding
personalities who guided tts destintes thfough thick and thtn
Political Developments Pre-Independence
97
VIZ , Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah and Maharaja Sir Han
Singh
Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah
The Sheikh was born in 1905 at Sorah near Srinagar in
the family of a poor pashmina dealer. The family was
originally Kashmiri Brahmins who had converted to Islam in
the 1 8^*’ century Abdullah's father died- two weeks before his
birth His widowed mother and uncle who was also in the
shawl trade brought him up His early education was^-in a
Muslim Maktab and his ambition was to become a doctor He
passed his intermediate science examination from Sri Pratap
College, Srinagar and entered Punjab University, Lahore for
graduation. In 1928 he joined Aligarh Muslim University, "the
intellectual centre of Muslim aspirations" founded by Sir Syed
Ahmed Khan, and got his MSc In chemistry in 1930 — the
first Kashmiri Muslim to obtain a Masters in Science.
On return from Aligarh, Abdullah took up job as a
government teacher at Rs 60/- per month and applied for a
gazzetted job in the State Civil Service Although apparently
well qualified for the job, the State Civil Service Recruitment
Board did not accept him He resigned his teacher's job in
protest And that was the starting point of explosive anger
and deep resentment tinged with animosity against the rule
of discrimination by the ruling minority against the
preponderous majority, more so since Abdullah considered
himself more qualified for the job than the many that had
been selected It is believed that none of the Muslim
candidates was offered the coveted gazzetted appointment
from that batch of candidates, and hence the redoubled
resentment. It is one of those great "ifs" of history — if only
Sheikh Abdullah had been accepted in the State Civil Service
... may be, perhaps, if only the entire subsequent history
of the State would have been different!
Be that as it may, the fire in a fiery personality had been
kindled. The rejection was just the right spark to ignite the
flame for a batrte of lifetime to emancipate the community
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Military Plight of Pakistan
from the ruler's tyranny — perceived or real was not the
point at issue His first semi-political initiative was to set up
the Fateh Kadal Reading Room in Srinagar, which soon
became the focal point 'or meetings of like-minded Muslims
Since It was a mere rea» mg room, at least in designation, the
administration could i ot act against these get-togethers even
though assembly of such persons was otherwise prohibited
Soon the Valley had what was unofficially the "Reading Room
Party" at whose meetings fiery speeches exposing the
prevailing injustices being inflicted on the hapless citizens
was the order of the day Being well-built and 6 ft 4 in tall, he
literally towered above his people in such meetings
Although Abdullah was a devout orthodox Muslim, at
heart he was a staunch Kashmiri too, more secular in outlook
than communal Mirwaiz Mohammed Yusuf Shah took a
liking for this young educated hotheaded man, and the two
made a good team for agitations against the Dogra regime
One of the factors leading to Abdullah's secularism in his
early life was his marriage to Akbar Jehan in October 1933
She was the daughter of Harry Neidou, the eldest son of the
European proprietor of Neidou Hotels chain of which
Srinagar's Hotel Neidou was part of Harry had married a
Gujjar girl and converted to Islam This marriage naturally
conferred none too considerable financial advantage on
Abdullah who thus achieved a fair degree of economic clout,
an essential pre-requisite for success in politics In spite of
her mixed parentage and earlier married life in cosmopolitan
Bombay, Akbar Jehan was a devout Muslim but secular in
outlook, so much so that m her later life she not only took
active part m her husband's political work but also recited
Quran dunng one of Gandbiji's prayer meetings By the same
token. It IS doubtsful if she would have felt comfortable in the
stifling Muslim orthodoxy represeiHed by Mohammed Yusuf
Shah Hence a streak of secularism and nationalism early in
the life of Sheikh Abdullah
Sheikh Abdullah first met Pandii lawabaKls!! Nehru m
1 938 and accompanied him on a tour of Northwest Frontier
Political Developments Pre-Independence
99
Province where he came m contact with Abdul Ghafar Khan,
the Frontier Gandhi His subsequent involvement with
Congress politics and contacts with various leaders of the
Indian independence movement including Kashmiri leaders
like Prem Nath Bazaz, another staunch opponent of
Maharaja's autocracy, strengthened his secular all India
nationalistic approach to State politics. This was more so
when the Congress politics were extended to Princely States
at the time of out break of the Second World War Thus it
was that young Abdullah clamoured for communal amity,
religious tolerance, and for transfer of power to the people
Sheikh Abdullah's emphasis on socialistic approach to
economic development, social justice and land reforms was
obviously the outcome of Nehru's influence and Congress's
secular political philosophy. While Mr. Mohammed All Jmnah
turned about from secular politics to communal, Abdullah
moved from communal to the secular front However, it must
not be forgotten that Islamic component of Kashmiri politics
was, as always, a key factor in future developments of
relations between Jammu and Kashmir on one hand and the
rest of India on the other
Another important feature of Sheikh Abdullah's political
character, which had a profound influence on development
of political equations in the sub-continent, was his innate
ability to modulate his views to suit the occasion, the
circumstances as they unfolded. He was a clever, intelligent
man who easily read other people's character and their
weaknesses. No wonder therefore that when Abdullah was in
the company of congressmen, particularly Nehru and
Maulana Azad, he talked the language of secularism,
nationalism and of close association with India. When he was
in the company of personalities of the western world, he
dreamt and talked of an Independent Kashmir, a sort of
Switzerland of the East. However, in his usual back home
environment of Kashmiri politics, he conveyed the impression
of a devout Muslim besides being a staunch Kashmiri
nationalist who would accept nothing short of full
indeoendence for his State.
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Military Plight of Pakistan
Around 1 944 Sheikh Abdullah held a view visualizing the
Valley as an Asian Switzerland, or an independent Kashmir,
may be a semi-autonomous dependency, perhaps in alliance
with India He had a secret meeting with the US Ambassador
to India, Loy Henderson who reported after his secret visit to
Kashmir in 1950 " in discussing the future of Kashmir
Abdullah was vigorous in restating his opinion that it should
be independent, that an overwhelming majority of
population desired this independence, that he had reason to
believe that some Azad Kashmir leaders desired
independence and would be willing to cooperate with the
leaders of National Conference if there was reasonable
chance such cooperation would result in independence
All said and done, his primary loyalty was to Kashmir,
with complete exclusion of other regions, which were only
peripheral to his vision of a great Kashmir His resentment
against Dogra dynasty was deep rooted, again with complete
exclusion of any other compromise solution On the contrary,
for Pandit Nehru national interest was supreme, it came first
always and every time notwithstanding his love for his roots
in Kashmir This divergence of perspective was the primary
cause of clash of personalities and consequent frequent strain
m relationship between these two giants on the Kashmiri
scene, which later on was to have a profound effect on the
socio-political developments m the entire sub-continent
Maharaja Sir Hari Singh
Han Singh was born in 1 895 and was the son of Raja
Amar Singh of Jammu The Raja died in 1909 leaving the
future Raja hari Singh at the tender age of fourteen The
British Indian Government, who took a keen interest in the
education and upbringing of the future Maharaja, appointed
Major H K Barr as his guardian He entered Mayo College,
Ajmer in 1908 where English teachers supervised his
education After completing his course of studies at Ajmer,
Han Singh received military training in the Imperial Cadet
Corps at Dehradun In 1915, Maharaja Pratap Singh
Political Developments Pre-Independence
101
appointed him as Commander-in-Chief of the State Forces m
which capacity he was responsible for training and equipping
of the State Forces units, which were loaned to the Imperial
Government for duties during the First World War Later m
1922, he was appointed as Senior Member of the State
Council, formed to assist Maharaja Pratap Singh in
administration of the State It will thus be seen that Flan
Singh got good grounding in civil and military spheres to
prepare him for his future role as the Maharaja.
Maharaja Pratap Singh died in 1925 without a male heir.
His nephew, Han Singh ascended to the Gaddi and formal
Raj-tilak ceremony was held at Jammu in March 1926. The
beginning of his reign as Maharaja was embroiled in scandal,
and controversy. As reported by Leonard Mosley in The Last
Days of British Raj, "The Maharaja of Kashmir was so rich
that he bought hundreds of concubines and dancing girls at
20-25,000 pounds sterling apiece and once paid 150,000
pounds (in black mail) for one hour with a female crook in a
London hotel bedroom " That unfortunate episode apart, the
young Maharaja had a reputation for secularism, equality and
justice for all his subjects, Hindus and Muslims alike Taxes,
customs and excise duties were reduced to reasonable levels,
irrigation facilities were extended, hydro-electric plants were
installed at Mahura and Jammu, and general administration
was given a boost. During his early reign, he promulgated the
Agricultural Relief Regulation, Compulsory Primary Education
Act, Prevention of Infants' Marriage Act, etc Besides such
progressive legislative measures, the young Maharaja also
decreed the definition of 'State Subject' and issued directive
for their exclusive appointment in government jobs which
measure, unfortunately, benefited only the Dogras, Rajputs
and the Pandits to the disadvantage of the Muslim majority
population. Though all these legislative and administrative
measures were of considerable social and cultural
significance, the day to day administration continued to
remain moribund. Discrimination against the Muslims
continued to be the order of the day, leading to Sir Albion
Banerji's resignation.
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Military Plight of Pakistan
Another positive streak in the young Maharaja's character
came to light when, in his mid-30/s, while attending the
Round Table Conference in London, in 1930, he is reported
to have remarked, "As Indians and loyal to the land whence
we derive our birth and infant nurture, we stand as solidly as
the rest of our countrymen for land's enjoyment of a position
of honour and equality in the British commonwealth of
Nations This was more than enough incitement in the
1930's for the British and Anglo-Indian press in Northern
India, particularly in Punjab and U P, to go out of their way
to foment agitations and communal propaganda against the
Maharaja so as to limit his aspirations in, and control over the
State It IS therefore all the more paradoxical that the same
Maharaja behaved in an entirely different manner at the time
of Indian Independence when the question of his accession
to a Dominion awaited his decision for more than three
months resulting in complete destabilization of the socio-
political and military situation in the entire sub-continent
May be, by then he was a mature middle aged man aspiring
to become a sovereign ruler of an independent "Switzerland
of the East", enjoying direct personal and diplomatic relations
with the Russians, Chinese, Tibetans, and Afghan
governments amongst others King size dreams no bounds
And this perhaps was the only point on which the Maharaja
and the Sheikh were in agreement with each other, albeit for
entirely different personal reasons
General Situation in the 30's
The rural populace bore a serious grudge against the
government machinery for the nefarious practice of begaar
whereby the villagers were called upon to do porter duties
for the government without compensation High rates of land
revenue, feudal system of land-holdings, excessive taxation in
trade and industry tike 85% 'ad valorem' duty levied on
textile industry, exclusion of majority Muslim community
from army and government service, et al, added to the
general discontent and resentnnent Poverty, unfemolovment
and mal-ad ministration were the order of the day So was the
Political Developments Pre-Independence
103
complete absence of a press, or any other vehicle for
expression of public opinion, which was an anathema to the
Ruler(s) over the past many decades Magazines and
newspapers were completely banned Suspicion and
suppression was so prevalent that a sanyasi of Ramakrishan
Vivekananda Mission was ordered out of the State at the
behest of the British Resident on the flimsy grounds that the
man looked suspicious'
Silk Factory Strike
The Silk Factory in Srinagar employed about 500 workers,
mostly Muslims who felt neglected and oppressed by the
prevailing working conditions Labour unrest in the Factory
had been brewing for quite some time because of very low
wages, average 5 1/2 annas per day, approximately a third of
a rupee of those times.Their strike caused a furore, and on
the advice of the British Resident, the Viceroy, Lord Reading
visited Srinagar in October 1924. Possibly, it was just an
excuse to blow out of proportion an otherwise limited minor
labour problem, which certainly was not such a cataclysmal
event as to call for personal Viceroy's logical intervention. Far
from It, the British Resident's intentions were certainly
suspect.
The leading lights of the Valley, mostly Muslim clerics
presented a memorandum to the Viceroy highlighting various
aspects of Muslim grievances against the Dogra
administration with particular emphasis on employment,
education, forced labour and land reforms. All this was sweet
music to the Political Department of the Government of
India, which had overall responsibility for conduct of British
Crown's relations with the Princely States They were now
convinced that there was something seriously amiss in this
otherwise sensitive area of considerable strategic British
global interests They imposed on the Maharaja the services
of a senior ICS officer. Sir Albion Banerji appointed in 1927
as Senior Member of the Council of State, a position
equivalent to that of a Prime Minister of the State. However,
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Military Plight of Pakistan
Sir Albion Banerji resigned in March 1929 when another
British official, G.E.C. Wakefield took his place The net result
of all this was increased British interference in internal
administration of the State, particularly in the Valley and the
areas to the North.
The Crisis of 1931
The Salt Satyagrah of Mahatma Gandhi and his
subsequent arrest were the inspiration for rise in political
temperature of the State English and vernacular newspapers
from India carrying news of Gandhiji's non-violent agitation
were reaching all parts of the State. The reaction to these
developments was spontaneous peaceful demonstrations and
hartals in Jammu, Srinagar and other towns all over the State,
except of course Ladakh and Baltistan regions. The
heightened political activity in British India provided a fillip
to the Kashmiri middle class who have had exposure to
higher education in the colleges and universities of British
India. The foremost amongst these were Sheikh Abdullah,
Mirza Afzal Beg and Ghulam Mohammed Sadiq who formed
the new focus of opposition to the autocracy of the Maharaja.
They, along with some progressive Pandits like Prem Nath
Bazaz sought to guide the infant political movement in a
secular democratic direction. However, the rank and file of
the Reading Room Party along with many newly educated
Muslim youths who were in contact with Muslim vocal
elements of Punjab and U.P., were spreading canard of
extremist propaganda of Pan-lslamism and communal
disharmony. They had let loose a whispering campaign
against the Dogras and the Hindu elite, particularly the well
entrenched affluent Pandit community, with the tacit
approval of the British Indian Government and the English
Ministers in the State , with the objective erf destabilizing the
Maharaja's rule.
The annual sesskwt of All Kasfrmfr Muslim Conference was
held at Lahore in December 1 930. The matni Theme of the
speeches was denunciation of the Maharaja and Ddgra Hindu
Political Developments Pre-Independence
105
rule in the State. Speaker after speaker called for agitations in
the State to launch a campaign of vilification against the
Dogra Ruler And when there was a lull in the proceedings,
the bogey of "Islam in Danger" was resorted to, to keep up
the tempo The Mir Waiz died in March 1931 His funeral
was attended by almost the entire population of Srinagar and
surrounding areas The new Mir Waiz, Yusuf Shah was himself
a student from the Theological College at Deoband in U.FJ a
hotbed of fanatical Islamic fundamentalism He was in
complete agreement with the philosophy and precepts of the
Reading Room Party, far from a secular outfit. And that Party
at that time was the most visible and active political entity in
the State in conjunction with the Muslim Conference
The Abdul Qadir Incident
Sometime during June 1931 it was reported that a small
mosque in Riasi in Jammu region had been demolished by
the Hindus with the tacit connivance of the local
administration for which the rabble-rousers held the
Maharaja personally responsible. An Imam was reportedly
prevented by the local authorities from delivering the khutba,
the usual religious sermon, and some pages of the Holy
Quran were allegedly desecrated in the process. All sorts of
stories and rumours were doing the rounds resulting in fiery
denunciations from the mosques. Public meetings were held
and processions taken out all over the State inciting the
people to violence. One particular case was of a cook, a non-
Kashmiri Muslim from the North Western Province who had
come with a visiting European as his domestic help His name
was Abdul Qadir. On 21 June 1931, he delivered an
extraordinarily fiery speech in the Khanqah of Shah Hamdani
advocating violence and sedition against the Maharaja's rule
He was arrested on 25*'’ June, and that sparked further
protests and demonstrations on a large scale, leading to
considerable tension and unrest in the Valley as well as in
Jammu region.
Abdul t^adir was, put to trial at the Sessions Court m
Srinagar on 6 July 1931 A large crowd of agitators collected
106
Military Plight of Pakistan
outside the Court and it became virtually impossible to
continue with the trial The venue of the trial was therefore
shifted to the Central Jail where it restarted on 13'*^ July An
irate mob of about 4-5,000 people collected at the Jail gate
They were in a menacing mood, demanding withdrawal of
the case and release of the accused Stones were thrown at
the police who tried to control the situation Simultaneously,
there was a revolt inside the jail where prisoners resorted to
violence against the wardens and other prisoners, and cut off
the telephone lines When the situation got completely out of
control, the District Magistrate ordered the police to open
fire Twenty-two persons including one policeman were killed
and many wounded in the police firing and subsequent
violence both inside and outside the jail One company of
Maharaja's Bodyguards Cavalry was deployed to restore
order, and hundreds of persons were arrested Serious clashes
took place Protests were held all over the Valley and m
various districts of Jammu Division As was to be expected,
communal riots did break out even in the otherwise peaceful
environs of the Valley in which three Hindus were killed, and
many Hindu shops were looted and set on fire
The Maharaja appointed a committee under Sir Barjor
Dalai to enquire into the causes of the riots, but the Muslims
boycotted its proceedings Thus, 13“’ July 1931 became a
landmark in the history of Jammu and Kashmir peoples' fight
for political freedom and democratic rule It came to be
observed as the Martyrs Day, and Abdul Qadir suddenly
catapulted to a celebrity status He became a 'cult figure' in
the Kashmiri mind set That day and this man have come to
be deeply etched in the "Kashmiri Muslim collective psyche"
Maharaja Han Singh suspected his English chief
executive, Mr Wakefield for having engineered the Abdul
Qadir incident, and dismissed him Sir Han Kishan Kaul was
appointed as the new Prime Minister of the State, a new title
for the chief executive officer of the State
In the Valley where amity, tolerance and goodwill
between the communities were a centuTles old tradition, the
Political Developments Pre-Independence
107
reaction to communal flare up leading to Hindu-Muslim riots
was sharp and swift The new Prime Minister managed to
reach a truce with the leaders of Muslim public opinion on
26 August 1931 as result of which all agitations ceased Peace
once again r-eturned to the Valley and the rest of the State
Hindu-Muslim goodwill, a hallmark of the Valley, reasserted
Itself with the realization that movement for political
freedom, democratic rights and socio-economic justice
would have to be channeled along healthy secular lines
However, peace and communal harmony in the Valley
was an anathema to the Muslims of Punjab Their interest lay
in destabilizing the Hindu Ruler Accordingly, the All India
Kashmir Committee formed in British India loudly denounced
the truce arrangement lest the nascent movement gets out of
their control, and falls into the hands of moderate liberal
secular leadership whose roots were in the Valley proper
Subsequent developments in the State gave ample evidence
that the July 1931 events were a British plot whose long term
objective was to force the hands of the Maharaja with a view
to secure control of the strategic Northern region of Gilgit
However, in so far as the Kashmiris themselves were
concerned, they stuck by the truce brokered by the new
Prime Minister, and there were no further communal riots, or
agitations for that matter
Glancy Commission
While the communal conflagration in the Valley had
cooled down to slow burning ambers, the situation m the
south-western part of the State, which abutted on Punjab
where communal propaganda was at its loudest continued to
be difficult Here too the Hindus were the victims of Muslim
atrocities in the Mirpur district, albeit for somewhat different
reasons The peasantry m Mirpur utilized the opportunity
offered by the communal disturbances and unrest in the State
to settle scores with the Hindu moneylenders whose property
becarpe the target of Muslim wrath The root cause m Mirpur
was thus economic exploitation rather than communal in
708
Military Plight of Pakistan
nature However, the Muslim reaction was not only
communal in its outburst but was also so violently expressed
that the local administration was not at all in a position to
control the situation This was more so because of the active
support the Muslim fundamentalists were receiving from
across the State borders in British India In desperation, and
in order to avoid further bloodshed, the government of
Jammu and Kashmir requested the Government of India to
send British troops to bring the situation under control As a
result, one company of British troops was deployed in Mirpur
and two companies in Jammu area on B'** November 1931
Thus, the British Government was gradually gaming more and
more ground in the day to day administration of the State
resulting in increased pressure on the Maharaja to succumb
to British demands In fact, immediately after the police firing
in Srinagar, the British Government had demanded that the
Maharaja accept the following terms within 24 hours -
* Take definite steps to remedy the alleged Muslim
grievances,
* An impartial inquiry by a British officer into the
demands of the Muslim community,
* A European ICS officer to be appointed as the Prime
Minister of the State
It will thus be seen that the British were playing the
'Muslim Card' from way back in the early 1930s, if not from
still earlier times
Ultimately the Maharaja did yield to pressure — from his
own people below and the British Indian Government above,
as a consequence of which he was forced by circumstances
to appoint an impartial Commission of Enquiry, impartial in
the sense that a Britisher had to be the head of the
Commission It was on 1 2 November 1 931 that the Maharaja
appointed Sir Bertrand J. Glancy, a senior English officiaj from
the Foreign and Political Department of the Government of
India as Chairman of the Commission of Enquiry It had four
Politfcal Developments Pre-Independence
109
other members, one Hindu and one Muslim each from the
Valley and Jammu Division One of the Hindu members later
resigned but the other, the famous historian of Kashmir, Prem
Nath Bazaz continued with the Commission till the end
The Muslims did have a number of grievances and the
Commission's recommendations went a long way in
redressing the same The Muslim religious buildings taken
over by the State Government were released Educational
facilities were improved and employment opportunities
widened Minimum qualifications for entry into civil service
were relaxed to give more representation to the people at
large. Landholders were to be granted proprietary rights. The
system of begaar, that had been banned earlier but continued
in one form or the other, was completely abolished in as
much as payment for the services rendered was made
obligatory. However, one single major fallout of the Clancy
Commission was the introduction of a Constitution to govern
the State granting a certain degree of franchise to the people,
howsoever limited in application and scope
The 1 934 Cor>stitution ordained formation of a Legislative
Assembly of 75 members out of which 33 were elected
members — 21 seats reserved for Muslims, 10 for Hindus
and two for Sikhs. Although the electorate was restricted and
barely 3% of the population was enfranchised, the new
Assembly provided at least some forum for expression of
public opinion, a safety valve for airing of grievances to
release the pent up emotions. However, women were
completely excluded from participation in the electoral
process, or from political affairs of the State. Whatever be the
shortcomings of the new Constitution, the process of
democratization had at last taken some slow and halting
steps.
Soon after the appointment of Clancy Commission, in
February 1932 Lieuter^ant Colonel E.j D. Colvin of the
Foreign and Political Department of the Government of India
was appointed the new P^me Minister in February 1932. He
770
Military Plight of Pakistan
was to be assisted by three ICS officers as Ministers of Home,
Revenue and Police Thus day to day administrative control
of the State machinery quickly and entirely passed out of the
Maharaja's control into the hands of the British Hereafter, for
all intents and purposes, it was no longer the Maharaja's rule'
The National Conference
The involvement of Reading Room clientele into political
activities led to the formation in October 1932 of the first
political party of the State, All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim
Conference It was a sort of evolutionary process, a loose
gathering of like-minded persons graduating into a formal
political organisation with Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, the
founder of the Reading Room Forum as its first President The
main objective of the new party was simply social, cultural
and economic betterment of the Muslim community, with the
primary objective of securing a larger share of jobs in the civil
and military echelons of the State Government
The first annual session of the newly formed Muslim
Conference attended by Chaudhari Ghulam Abbas from
Jammu, Mirza Afzal Beg, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed and
many other leading lights of the State was held at Srinagar in
October 1932 under the Presidentship of Sheikh Abdullah
By 1934, It was a well-established political party But
unfortunately, there were deep-rooted divisions and factions
amongst the Muslims themselves, verging on violent political
rivalry During that first annual session, Sheikh Abdullah
remarked in his presidential address, " our country's
progress is impossible so long as we do not have amicable
relations between the different communities "® While the
Muslim Conference wore a communal tag, its approach and
spirit was certainly secular in character, at least in so far as its
founder president and the senior leaders were concerned
Their vision was not restricted to the boundaries of thetr State
only, and in March 1933, the Muslim Conference crfjserved
Civil Disobedience Movememt as wm done in the rest oi the
country
Political Developments Pre-Independence
777
The first ever election in the State, under the new
Constitution promulgated as a result of Clancy Commission
recommendations was held in 1934 in which the Muslim
Conference captured 1 9 of the 21 elected seats reserved for
the Muslims
Colonel Colvin relinquished the office of Prime Minister
of the State in early 1936 and Sir N Gopalaswami Ayyangar
succeeded him. The Muslim Conference observed
"Responsible Government Day" on 8 May 1936 when Sheikh
Abdullah appealed to Hindus and Sikhs alike to join the
political mainstream of the Valley to secure a democratic set-
up for the Entire State Thus, political mercury m the State
continued to touch new highs and in 1937, a huge
procession of labourers led by Bakshi Chulam Mohammed
and G.M Sadiq, the two foremost labour leaders of the State,
was taken out in the streets of Srinagar The processionists
shouted slogans against retrenchment and unemployment,
and for better wages, improved working conditions and a fair
deal for the working class. This procession and the labour
movement in general were above communal politics It
embraced all sections of the society and several Hindu and
Sikh leaders including Prem Nath Bazaz spoke at the
meeting.
The sixth annual session of the Muslim Conference was
held on 26 March 1938. In his presidential address, the
Sheikh exhorted the members saying — "We must end
communalism by ceasing to think in terms of Muslims and
non-Muslims when discussing our political problems. We
must open our doors to alt such Hindus and Sikhs who like
ourselves believe in the freedom of their country from the
shackles of an irresponsible rule."^°
The Working Committee of the All Kashmir Muslim
Conference met at Srinagar on 28 June 1938. It was an
epoch making meeting in which heated debate regarding
opening thre members(hip of the Party to alt people
"irrespetlive of ttiew caste^ creed or religion" lasted for a total
172
Military Plight of Pakistan
of over 52 hours The initiative for this proposal came
strongly from Sheikh Abdullah and Maulana Sayeed Masoodi
whose views ultimately prevailed, and membership of the
Party was thrown open to all communities However, serious
differences of opinion amongst the members of the working
committee saw the beginning of division of political
movement in the State along secular lines by a large group of
the leaders and the rank and file, while a small minority
continued to nurse the old communal ideas The root cause
of the division was the clash of personalities at the top rung
of the leadership, and the Mirwaiz The next year, on 11**'
June 1939, in the face of stiff opposition from some die-hards
who persisted in keeping the old party and name alive, the
name of the party was changed to All Jammu and Kashmir
National Conference But the mam stream of political activity
now vested with the newly christened National Conference
while the old residual Muslim Conference kept tottering
along However, in so far as Sheikh Abdullah was concerned,
he had officially dissolved the original Muslim Conference
and replaced it by its new all embracing secular incarnation
whose main objectives were issues like democratic
government, political freedom, socio-economic
development, land reforms etc , rather than an Islamic
agenda Thus, on the eve of Indian Independence there was
a profound divide between the National Conference on the
one hand and the Muslim Conference on the other which,
with the passage of time, got further accentuated
Meanwhile, the Muslim Conference received a shot in the
arm through the communal politics of Mr M A jinnah and
his All India Muslim League to whom secularism as a political
concept in the Indian sub-continent had always been an
anathema
While the nationalist leaders of India's freedom
movement were struggling for Independence, Mr
Mohammed All Jmriah's Muslim League had jumped into the
political arena with their "Pakistan Resolution" based on "’Rai'O
Nation Theory" passed in 1940 This did appeal to the
Political Developments Pre-Independence
113
majority of Kashmiris since they had lived in peace and
complete harmony between the two communities for
centuries This was abundantly evident during Pandit Nehru's
visit to his 'land of birth' in 1940 that evoked widespread
enthusiasm for his political philosophy and secular ideals,
which instantly endeared him to the people of Kashmir. A
Kashmiri hero for the Kashmiri people. It was Kashminyat all
the way down the Jhelum, which created a wave of "spiritual
sympathy for the Indian National Congress" amongst all the
people of the State irrespective of religious affiliations or
regional considerations.
In early 1942 the British Government dispatched Sir
Stafford Cripps on a peace mission to help in creating
favourable civil environment for prosecution of war effort
Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad, the then Congress President
conducted the negotiations on behalf of the Congress The
Cripps Mission did not make any headway for various
political reasons The Quit India movement in August 1942
put an end to further negotiations until late 1944. The
National Conference whole-heartedly endorsed the Indian
National Congress stand on this issue.
The Second World War was difficult times for the British
and their Allies all over the world, particularly during the
initial years. They were therefore most unhappy with the
Indian National Congress for having launched their "Quit
India" movement during that critical period. However, the
reaction of the alithorities was strong and swift. The leaders
of the movement were put behind bars and large scale
repression let loose with thousands of arrests all over the
country. The Princely States were no exception either; and
the Maharaj’a of Jammu and Kashmir too did his bit — which
was quite a big bit — not only by suppressing the nationalist
movement f^r reforms and democracy in the State, but also
took an active part in organizing military support for the
British war efforts by placing units of the State Forces at their
disposal for service in NWFP as well as in overseas theatres.
The War years thus saw the Maharaja and the British
114
Military Plight of Pakistan
Government hand in glove m so far as suppression of
peoples' movements was concerned For his unstinted
support, he was appointed on the Imperial War Cabinet in
which capacity he vis'ted various units in the Middle East
theatre of operations
The dissolved nd more or less defunct Muslim
Conference had been revived in the Valley during 1941
through the efforts of Mr Jinnah's All India Muslim League As
President of the League he visited the Valley in the spring of
1944, ostensibly for rest Jinnah was accorded a public
reception in Srinagar by the National Conference in which it
was said, "We Kashmiris today receive you as a prominent
Indian despite ideological differences we have with you " to
which Jinnah replied, "I am happy to see all classes and
groups combined here to receive and honour me" But
scarcely one hour after that, in another reception accorded
by the Muslim Conference, he said, "Muslims have one
platform, one kalma and one God I would request the
Muslims to come under the banner of the Muslim
Conference and fight for their rights The National
Conference issued a sharp rejoinder to these utterances of
Mr jinnah who in turn called the National Conference a
'band of gangsters' This clumsy outburst from a visiting
dignitary from British India was too much to stomach and
resulted m jinnah's Baramula visit ending in a fiasco
The wave of secularism-nationalism in the State,
particularly in the Valley was so powerful that Mr Vinayak
Damodar (Veer) Savarkar, a leader of the Hindu Maha Sabha
during his later visit to the State was bluntly told by the
President of Yuvak Sabha, Pandit S N Fotedar that his ideal of
'Hindu State', as defined by him in his book 'Hindutva', was
not acceptable to the people of Kashmir No doubt, Veer
Savarkar (1870-1957) was a staunch nationalist and patriot m
his owns right, and bad suffered imprisonment in the
Andamans of kala pant notoriety for fighting against British
rule His non-secular philosophy of Hindutva was not
acceptable in the VaU«ey even by sofne staunch Hindu
Political Developments Pre-Independence
115
organisations, even though the Jammu region people and
parties had a soft corner for him as was evident during his
earlier visit in July 1942
"Quit Kashmir Movement"
In Its annual session held at Sopore in September 1944,
the National Conference adopted the all embracing "Naya
Kashmir" manifesto of the Party laying great stress on the
socialistic ideology and democratic values which the Sheikh
had obviously imbibed from his close contacts with great
leaders of India's freedom struggle This was a comprehensive
ambitious document, which included human rights, right to
work, land reforms, equality of opportunity, free universal
education, democratic form of government with universal
franchise, et al — every thing under the sun for the asking'
The Indian political leaders jailed in the aftermath of
"Quit India" movement was released in June 1945 on the eve
of talks for transfer of power And they were conspicuous by
their presence at the annual session of the National
Conference held at Srinagar in August 1945 The then
Congress President Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad, Pandit
Jawahar Lai Nehru and the Frontier Gandhi, Khan Abdul
Ghaffar Khan, amongst others, attended the session to show
their solidarity with the politics of Sheikh Mohammed
Abdullah, and to strengthen his hands in the Valley against
the divisive communal forces The meeting of the Standing
Committee of the All India States Peoples' Conference under
the presidentship of Jawahar Lai Nehru was an important
feature of this session A number of far reaching decisions
towards breaking the feudalistic structure of the Princely
States were taken at this meeting And one thing emerged
loud and clear Political and social ideology of the people of
Jammu and Kashmir as represented by the National
Conference and Sheikh Abdullah was in complete accord
with that of India, as represented by its leaders of the
freedom struggle
116
Military Plight of Pakistan
These hard times saw a number of Prime Ministers come
and go in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. After
Gopalaswami Ayyangar came Raja Sir Maharaj Singh followed
by Colonel Sir K N. Haskar, Sir B N Rau who left in the
summer of 1945, to be succeeded by Pandit Ram Chandra
Kak He was married to an English lady and was well up with
the British establishment. Later, when the Maharaja suspected
his loyalty in as much as he was reported to have assured the
accession of the State to Pakistan, he was dismissed as Prime
Minister.
The end of the War saw renewed hectic activity towards
granting of self-government to India The British Cabinet
mission arrived in Delhi in March 1946 to set the ball rollin'g
Mr Afzal Beg who had earlier become Minister for Public
Works Department the State, resigned on 1 7 March 1 946
ostensibly on grounds of differences with other members of
the Government, biit primarily on account of frustration and
• being ham-strung in functioning of even his own department
A month later, on 10 May 1946, the Nationaf Conference
launched its "Quit Kashmir" movement for transfer of power
to the people, thereby bringing the problem of Princely States
and their future status in Independent India to the forefront
of the Cabinet Mission, In fact, this agitation had its genesis in
the Cabinet Mission announcement that, on the granting of
Independence to India, the rulers of Princely States ^hall
revert to having full ruling powers as they were before the
establishment of the British Empire. Naturally, some of the
rich and more powerful rulers of larger states like those of
Jammu and Kashmir, Hyderabad, Travancore and Cochin, et
al, started dreaming of full independence.
It so happened that in 1946 Sheikh Abdullah was the
President of All India States' Peoples' Conference — an
umbrella organisation of peoples of the Princely States and a
counterpart of the Indian National Congress in British India.
This position held by the President of the National
Conference further strengthened the "Quit Kashmir"
movement. However, Mr. Jinnah was most unhappy on this
Political Developments Pre-Independence
117
turn of events and described this movement as an "agitation
carried on by a few malcontents who were out to create
disorderly conditions m the State Jinnah's overt hostility
towards Sheikh Abdullah and Maulvi Yusuf Shah on the one
hand, and Sheikh Abdullah's charismatic personality and his
great personal rapport with the senior leaders of the Indian
National Congress on the other, went a long way in guiding
the subsequent politico-military history of the State While
Jinnah, an awoed secularist moved towards communal
politics. Sheikh Abdullah traveled the political path from
communal to secular
The "Quit Kashmir" movement was modeled on the
"Quit India" movement of the Congress except that, white
the Congress was for expulsion of the British from the whole
of India, the National Conference was dead set against the
Dogra Dynasty, primarily because of Sheikh's political
philosophy and his deep rooted personal animosity towards
Maharaja Han Singh Thus the stage was now set for a clash
between the Maharaja and the Sheikh, although in one
respect, however, " Abdullah and Han Singh thought on
similar lines both preferred independence, if feasible, or the
maximum autonomy available, to becoming full part of the
Dominion of India or Pakistan, now that partition seemed
near
Sheikh Abdullah was arrested There were wide spread
disturbances in the Valley inclucling sabotage of
communication facilities Abdullah's trial was fixed for 21
June 1946 and Pandit Nehru decided to defend his Kashmiri
friend at the trial court in Srinagar But he was refused
permission to enter the State On his persistence to defy the
prohibitory orders, he was detained in Uri dak bungalow on
20 June 1946 This bizarre turn of events did not seem to
make sense at all After alt, serious negotiations for transfer of
power were in progress at Delhi, the scene of major political
activities and epodi making developments And Pandit Nehru
was slated to lead the Interim Government as Prime Minister
of the country, but be had voluntarily left the scene to spend
778
Military Plight of Pakistan
time m virtual detention Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad acted
decisively and summoned Nehru back to Delhi Nehru,
having realised the rash impetuousness of his actions, meekly
complied However, in order to smoothen ruffled feelings.
Lord Wavel later interceded on behalf of Pandit Nehru who
was then allowed to visit the Valley and meet his friend.
Sheikh Abdullah in prison in July 1946. But the Maharaja
refused to meet Pandit Nehru citing diplomatic ill health' This
unfortunate sequence of events was to leave an indelible
mark on the minds of the major actors of this drama which
was to have far reaching consequences for the entire sub-
continent at a later stage. The minds of men who mattered
had been soured forever.
Sheikh Abdullah was jailed for three years. However,
Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed and G M. Sadiq had managed to
escape to Punjab. Muslim Conference did not support this
"Quit Kashmir" movement which soon petered out. By the
enjJ of 1 946, fresh elections were held to the Praja Parishad,
the State Legislative Assembly established under the 1934
Constitution. Since National Conference leaders were
embroiled in agitation against the Government and the
Sheikh was held in prison, there was no question of them
participating in the election process. Consequently, the
Muslim Conference won 16 of the 21 Muslim seats. On 15
July 1947, the Muslim Conference passed a resolution
advocating the State's accession to Pakistan while some
factions were in favour of independence. On the other hand,
the National Conference and Pandit Nehru believed that the
bulk of population of the State was with them in their shared
goal of secular independent India, while Mr. Jmnah was
convinced that the majority of the population, being Muslim,
was with the Muslim Conference, and hence for Pakistan.
The great Urdu poet. Sir Mohammed Iqbal who at one time
was in the forefront of commurval agitation in the State and
was also of Kashmiri origin, shared the latter view. However,
on 10 May 1947 Choudhary HamiduHah Khan, the then
President of Muslim Conference urged Che Maharaja to
declare himself independent.
Political Developments Pre-Independence
779
At the request of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, Mahatma
Gandhi visited Kashmir in July 1947 The people at large
were quite delirious with joy over Gandhiji's visit whose high
point came with the announcement l?y the Maharaja that he
had dismissed Ram Chandra Kak whom the people
associated with a repressive regime, and had appointed a
former Revenue Minister, Major General Janak Singh as the
new Prime Minister in his place
To sum up the political landscape, it would be
appropriate to list the "Forces and Actors on the eve of Indian
Independence" as under’'*: -
* The National Conference: Active and dominant in
the Valley but very little influence in Jammu and Ladakh
Friendly with Indian National Congress and Nehru but hostile
towards Jinnah's Muslim League.
* Mir Waiz Moulvi Yusuf Shah commanding wild and
fanatical following in downtown Srinagar.
* The Muslim Conference. Little following in the Valley
but strong amongst Muslims of Jammu region because of their
ideological affinity with Muslim League across the Punjab
border
* Maharaja Sir Hari Singh and the Dogra Rajputs The
relationship between Nehru, Sheikh Abdullah and Maharaja
based on mutual distrust and dislike.
* The Maharaja was indecisive Jinnah was impatient
Pandit Nehru was caught in between his idealism and the
stark realities of the situation.
During the period 1931-46 of active political struggle in
India for Independence from the British, there was clear cut
dichotomy in the Valley: one faction under Sheikh Abdullah
was propagating independence, while the other under Mir
Waiz Mohammed Yusuf Shah and the Muslim Conference
was keen on jpining Pakistan. Below the surface of calm
Kashmiri-brotherhood, there was distinct strain in the
relationship between Pandit Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah
720
Military Plight of Pakistan
Although their objectives were apparently the same, in
essence and development they were different in as much as
while Nehru was keen on fitting Kashmir in the frame-work
of a secular India as a shining example of communal
tolerance and equality, the Sheikh wanted to see the end of
centuries of oppression and exploitation of the Kashmiri
people by 'outsiders' — to him the Dogras were also
outsiders
Such were the divergent political viewpoints in the State
of Jammu and Kashmir when India was precariously perched
on the threshold of Independence
NOTES & REFERENCES
1 Karan Singh, Dr, " Kashmir", Rupa & Co , New Delhi, p 178
2 Lord Birdwood ("Two Nations and Kashmir", Robert Hale, Lon-
don, 1956) quoted in "Kashmir The Troubled Frontiers", by Major
General Afsir Karim with the Indian Defence Review Team, edited
by Captain Bharat Verma and Manvendra Singh, Lancer Publishers,
New Delhi, 1994, p 27
3 Madhok B R , "Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh", Reliance, Delhi,
1987 These figures in slight variance from the data collected by
the Indian Defence Review Team — 78,114 sq kms (30,160 sq
miles) with Pakistan, 5,180 sq kms (2,000 sq miles) ceded by Paki-
stan to China, 13,297 sq kms (5,134 sq miles)under POK, 37,555
sq kms (14,500 sq miles) under illegal occupation by China The
data in the Encyclopaedia Britanica,1974, Vol X shows the total
area as 86,023 sq miles (222,798 sq km) out of which Pakistan
captured 32,358 sq miles (83,806 sq km) while 53,665 sq miles
(138,992 sq km) remained with India The 1971 census figures on
population show 4,600,000 in the Indian portion and 1,300,000
in the Pakistan portion whose capital is Muzzaffarabad
4 Bhattachaqea Ajit,"Kashfnfr - The Wounded Valley", UBS Pub-
lishers Otstnbutors New Delhi,! 994, p 19
Political Developments Pre-Independence
121
5 Francis Brunei, "Kashmir", Rupa and Co , New Delhi, p 66
6 Major General Afsir Karim, op cit, p 72 quoting Alastair Lamb,
"Kashmir - A Disputed Legacy", Karachi, 1993,pp 189-90 quot-
ing US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1 950, Vol V, The North East, South Asia and Africa, Wash-
ington DC 1978, pp 1433-35
7 Palit, D K , VrC, Major General, "Jammu And Kashmir Arms His-
tory of the J & K Rifles", Palit & Dutt Publishers, Dehradun,
1972, p 119
8 Bhattacharjea, op cit pp 68-70
9 Bamzai, Prithvi Nath Kaul, "A History of Kashmir Political-So-
cial-Cultural from the Earliest Times to the Present Day", Metro-
politan Book Company, Delhi, 1962, p 661
1 0 Ibid p 664
11 Ibid p 667
12 Ibid p 669
13 Bhattacharjea,op cit p 79
1 4 Jagmohan,"My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir", Allied Publish-
ers, New Delhi, 1991, p 82
4
PARTITION AND
INDEPENDENCE
THE PRINCELY STATES
In the undivided India of 17,77,438 sq miles of territory,
there were 562 Princely States They were under the British
Indian Government's Political Department headed by Sir
Corfield, who was earlier working to set up a separate
Commonwealth by grouping these states together These
states, big and small co^vered an area of 7,11,032 sq miles
having a total population of 68,652,974 ’ The largest was
Hyderabad with a population of 16 million, and the smallest
on record was Vejanoness boasting of less than 1/3'^* of a
square mile, population 200 and revenue Rs 500/- per
annumi
Of the 562 states, 1 08 were the macro-States, fairly large
whose rulers were members of the Chamber of Princes in
their own right and were categorized as "fully empowered"
enjoying full legislative and jurisdictional powers at least in
principle 127 were mini-States which fell in the
intermediate bracket whose rulers were represented by
twelve members of their order elected by themselves and
who exercised fairly wide but certainly not absolute powers
The remainder 327, were in the micro category — mere
small states, estates and jagirs whose rulers had limited
powers of jurisdiction ^
The Viceroy was concurrently the Governor General of
India and also the "Crown Representative " The rulers of the
Partition & Independence
123
Princely States were considered as part of the British Empire
by virtue of their having acknowledged Paramountcy of the
British Crown which acknowledgement having been
'voluntary' in nature, therefore, technically the states had not
been annexed by the British in the name of the Crown
However, the States had neither external sovereignty nor any
status in International Law The Paramount Power exercised
exclusive rights over their external relations as well as their
relations with one another.
Memorandum by the Cabinet Commission
The Cabinet Mission presented a Memorandum dated 12
May 1946 to the Chancellor of Princes in India in which the
question of future of the Princely States was defined " all
the rights surrendered by the States to the Paramount Power
will return to the States Political arrangements between the
States, on the one side, and the British Crown and British
India, on the other side, will thus be brought to an end."
Thus, with the division of British India into two sovereign
independent Dominions and dissolution of the British Indian
Government, Paramountcy of the Crown was to lapse as was
made clear in this Memorandum Therefore, technically, all
the States would become independent entities on the
midnight of 14 August 1947, and the option to join one
Dominion or the other was left to the respective Princes
There was no provision, let alone any compulsion, or even a
modicum of necessity for the rulers to consult their subjects
in the matter of accession. The Ruler of a State had absolute
powers in this regard and his signatures on the dotted line of
the Instrument of Accession was all that was required to
decide the matter one way or the other. However, provision
existed for a Standstill Agreement with both the Dominions
whereby he could defer or delay his decision and continue
with the arrangements as existing at the time of ushering in of
Independence. Further, in the absence of Accession, Union
of India was responsible for the defence and protection of
such States sinceTt was to be the successor government to the
British Coverdment which position was also recognised by
124
Military Plight of Pakistan
the United Nations Organisation, in as much as the new
Government of India was accepted as the Successor State to
the pre-Independence State by allowing it to continue its
original membership Pakistan was admitted as a new
member State on her filing a fresh application. Once a Ruler
signed the Instrument of Accession, there was no going back
on It, although for the "Empowered States" it was limited to
matters of defence, external affairs and communications
Earlier, the Cabinet Mission had recommended a
Constitution which gave India a three-tier system of
government with a weak Centre, by granting maximum
autonomy to the Provinces, thereby at least preserving the
unity of the country as a "historic, geographical, cultural
entity known as India". The Central Government was given
control over external affairs, defence and communications In
the second tier came the Muslim majority provinces enjoying
complete autonomy in internal governance, leaving the rest
in the third tier Since this was not the Jinnah's concept of
Muslim Rule in their own areas, the Muslim League observed
Direct Action Day on 1 August 1 946. This led to an orgy of
communal frenzy m Calcutta for the next three days leaving
5,000 dead and 20,000 injured m the aftermath of a
horrendous communal conflagration, triggering communal
violence in the rest of the country too. In September 1946
Pandit Jawahar Lai Nehru took over as the head of an Interim
Government with Liaqat All Khan as the Finance Minister.
When the Finance Minister refused to release funds to other
departments, this experiment in joint governance soon
became a cropper. One thing led to the other, and soon
there were signs of simmering discontent in the Defence
Services bordering on mutiny thereby accelerating the pace
towards the inevitable Partition.
In the first place, undivided India could have, and would
have become a strong world power standing in competition
against the Western Powers. But the British (and the
Americans) wanted to make sure of their control over the
Indian Ocean in general, and the Arabian Sea in partiodUr/ ^
Partition & Independence
125
as to retain their stranglehold over the oil wells of Middle
East And this could only be done through a small and weak
country rather than a huge monolithic Indian State "The
creation of Pakistan was a geo-strategic necessity for the
British control of oil wealth of the Gulf because, as Sir Olaf
Caroe, ICS observed later in his book, 'The Wells of Power',
'the Persian Gulf opens directly at Karachi, in a real sense it's
terminus' In the ultimate analysis, very briefly this was the
raison d'etre for the creation of Pakistan *
The British therefore managed to create a piquant
situation whereby Partition was seen as the only workable
solution to resolve the otherwise apparently intractable
problems. In fact, the seeds for partition of India were sown
as early as 1857 "The crux of new British approach was the
policy of 'Divide and Rule' whose first impact was on the
Indian Army, which was restructured on the basis of units and
sub-units being composed of ethnic, caste and religious
groups, so that one could be used against the other if ever
there was a need Its final impact was on the political life in
the country when Hindus and Sikhs versus Muslims were
pitched against each other with intense ferocity. .
Now, this constitutional nicety of lapse of paramountcy
was introduced to further weaken India after it attains
independence.
The Indian Independence Act was passed by the British
Parliament on 17 July 1947 This Act in conjunction with the
Government of India Act of 1935 formed the legal basis for
independence of India, and also provided that a State could
accede to the Dominion of India or Pakistan by an Instrument
of Accession executed by the Ruler Partition of India into two
self governing sovereign Dominions therefore became a
certainty with the date of Independence to be advanced from
June 1948 to 15 August 1947 as per the Mountbatten Plan for
the Transfer of Power announced on 3 June 1947 Ironically,
this date of 15 August also happened to be the second
anniversary of V-J Day, Victory over Japan in the Second
726
Military Plight of Pakistan
World War' This Plan gave just 73 days to partition a sub-
continent of the size of Europe (less the Soviet Union) having
eleven provinces under direct British rule and 562 Princely
States under indirect British rule Indeed, this time frame was
much too tight to resolve the numerous complex issues —
geo-political, socio-economic, administrative, military,
division of assets of all types, et al However, by 1 5 August
1947, all States geographically contiguous to India had signed
the Instrument of Accession with the exception of the States
of Jammu and Kashmir, Hyderabad, Junagarh and some States
in the Kathiawad peninsula.
Boundary Commission
The conceptual basis for the Partition of India was the
British inspired, and Jinnah propounded "Two-Nation
Theory" The Muslim majority areas were to go to Pakistan
and the rest would remain as India, a secular entity where
Muslims would continue to enjoy the same rights and
privileges as the majority Hindu population. The immediate
requirement therefore was to delineate on paper the -line
separating the two Punjabs and the two Bengals. Here we are
concerned only with the partition of Punj'ab This assumed
extraordinary significance because of the basic rule of
geographical contiguity as the deciding factor as to which
Dominion a particular State may go to.
A British jurist, Sir Cyril Radcliffe was appointed
Chairman of the proposed Boundary Commission with two
local members, Mr. justice Mehar Chand Mahajan of the
Punjab High Court was one of them. Mr. Mahajan hailed
from Kangra and as a young lawyer he had practiced in
Gurdaspur District Courts.
Sir Radcliffe arrived in Delhi on 8 July 1947. He had
never been to the Indian sub-continent earlier, and it is
generally believed that he was quite ignorant about ethnic,
social, cultural, political and above all, religious diversities
and communal divicle of undivided India. With practically no
knowledge of the Country and its people, he had to carry out
Partition & Independence
127
a " most complex and potentially explosive act of socio-
political surgery in history" in a matter of barely five weeks
The task "to demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of
Punjab on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority
areas of Muslims and non-Muslims In doing so it will take
into account other factors." — a task which he, along with his
fellow Hindu and Muslim judges was required to carry out in
complete secrecy
The three eastern tehsils of Curdaspur district of Punjab
were the key to provide, or not to provide geographical
contiguity to the State of Jammu and Kashmir with India, and
thereby the option for accession to the Dominion of India
Without Curdaspur there would have been no land route
from India to the State of Chamba, the districts of
Dharamsala as well as to Kulu, Manali, Lahaul and Spiti. The
Upper Ban Doab Canal also ran through Curdaspur to irrigate
the districts of Amritsar and Ferozepur besides being the only
source of water to the 'Sarovar' (Holy Lake) surrounding the
holy Sikh Colden Temple of Amritsar. Curdaspur was
therefore to be legitimately awarded to India, more so in the
light of the terms of reference of the Commission which
stipulated that, besides the population mix and geographical
contiguity, while giving the Award, the Commission was
required to take into consideration such other factors as
disruption of rail communications, water systems etc In the
end, the three eastern tehsils of Curdaspur were awarded to
India thereby giving land access to the State of Jammu and
Kashmir from the Indian Punjab, and hence the admissibility
of Its Accession to the Indian Union a distinct possibility.^
The Radcliffe Award was made public, not before, but three
days after Indian Independence, on 18* August 1947 in
order to avoid any bad blood during Mountbatten's visit to
Karachi to take part in the festivities connected with the birth
of Pakistan on 13-14 August. However, Jmnah was not
prepared to accept this position so easily. He attempted to
visit Kashmir on 28* August but Maharaja Han Singh refused
to give perrrtission. Thus, relations between the two soured
from day one.
128
Military Plight of Pakistan
There is no doubt at all that the Gurdaspur Award was
the key, the single most crucial element in deciding the future
course of politico-military events m the sub-continent It
generated intense heat on both sides of the Radcliffe Line in
Punjab at that time leading to great controversies with
accusations of political manoeuvering, conspiracies and
behind the scene manipulations giving rise to scandalous
charges against Pandit Nehru and the Mountbattens These
charges and counter-charges which have been discussed
thread bare by various authorities on the subject are rooted
in the personal relationships of the various key actors in the
drama; Nehru and the Mountbattens on the one hand, and
Mr. Jinnah and Lord Mountbatten on the other — the former
warm and friendly, the latter cool and hostile.
THE MAHARAJA DITHERS
Right from the day Sir Stafford Cripps visited the state,
and thereafter the Cabinet Mission, Maharaja Sir Han Singh
started nurturing dreams of grandeur, of crowning himself as
the King of an independent State. His flirtations with ideas of
complete independence from both India and Pakistan was, to
an extent understandable, in as much as besides these two
immediate neighbours, his State, almost the size of British
Isles with a population of four millions spread over an area of
nearly 86,000 sq miles had common land borders with
Afghanistan, Tibet, Chinese province of Sinkiang To cap it
all. It was very close to the Soviet Union from which it was
separated by a thin narrow Wakhan tract of Afghanistan and a
small section of Sinkiang in the Taghdumbash Pamir. To
further confound the already complex situation, Hari Singh's
closest companion, Victor Rosenthal — a white Russian who
fled his homeland in 1917 in the wake of the Bolshevik
Revolution — and the Maharaja's adviser, Raj Guru Swami
Sant Dev leading a life of luxury at State expense in the
palatial Chashmeshahi Guest House had planted in my
father's mind visions of an extended kingdom sweeping
down to Lahore itself, where our ancestor Maharaja Gutah
Partition & Independence
129
Singh and his brothers Raja Dhyan Singh and Raja Suchet
Singh had played such a crucial role a century earlier "®
Unfortunately for all concerned, that was Han Singh's modus
Vivendi and there is nothing that his Son, or any body else
could do about it
In any case, the long term political ambitions and the
grandiose dream in the mind of Maharaja Sir Han Singh had
already become crystal clear from his pronouncement on 15
July 1946, "We look forward to taking our due place in the
new constitutional structure of India But our concern for
the progress of India does not imply acceptance by us of
dictation in our internal affairs This declaration and some
correspondence and pronouncements of Prime Minister Kak
seem to have provoked the then British Resident in the State,
Lieutenant Colonel Webb to have sent a rather alarming
report to the Viceroy, Lord Wavel on 14 November 1946,"
I am seriously inclined to think that the Maharaja and Kak are
seriously considering the possibility of Kashmir not joining the
Union if It IS formed Kashmir will be free to ally herself
with any power, not excluding Russia
Lord Louis Mountbatten was installed as the last Viceroy
of India on 24 March 1947 The various acts of commission
and omission on the part of the Maharaja and his Prime
Minister in the context of the then prevailing political
situation could not have gone un-noticed by the new
Viceroy, nor would he have been unaware of the contents of
above dispatches by the then British Resident to the Secretary
to the Crown Representative (the Viceroy's title in relation to
the Princes)
In order to nip the evil in the bud. Lord Mountbatten, the
Lady, and the Chief of Staff, Lord Ismay flew to Srinagar on
17 June 1947 and stayed there for full five days till 23 June
This was a rather longish absence from Delhi for the Viceroy,
more so in the light of far reaching developments in those
momentous times when history was being created at fast-
forward speed
130
Military Plight of Pakistan
Despite 5-6 days of stay in the Valley, the Viceroy could
not hold any substantive discussions with the Maharaja who,
on one pretext or the Either, deliberately avoided any serious
conversation with th" visitors His Son, Dr Karan Singh has
aptly summed up the henanigans of his Father on page 48 of
his Autobiography.
"A typical feudal reaction to a difficult situation is to avoid
facing It, and my father was particularly prone to this Instead of
taking advantage of Mountbalten's visit to discuss the whole
situation meaningfully and trying to arrive at a rational decision,
he first sent the Viceroy on a prolonged fishing trip to Thricker
(where Mountbatten shocked our staff by sun-bathing in the
nude) and then — having fixed a meeting just before his
departure, got out of it on the plea that he had suddenly
developed a severe attack of colic Thus the last real chance of
working out a viable political settlement was lost
A Peep into Junagarh
The micro-State of Junagarh m the Kathiawar Peninsula
was a mirror image of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. While
the latter was a Muslim majority area with a Hindu ruler,
Junagarh was a Hindu majority state with a Muslim Nawab,
Sir Mahabat Khan Rasulkhanji who had a strong passion for
dogs of whom he had a veritable kennel 'club' of 150 Like
Maharaja Han Singh, the Nawab Sahib also did not decide
on the matter of Accession before 15 August 1947; and
hence the problem.
Other States of the Kathiawar region, which had already
acceded to India, bounded Junagarh on three sides, and on
the fourth side was the Arabian Sea. It was the largest
amongst the numerous States in the region, covering an area
of 3,400 sq. miles with a population of 671,000 of which
80% were Hindus. The State was not geographically
contiguous to West Pakistan, nor could it claim land access
therewith; however, by the maritime route from its seaport of
Veraval, Karachi was 325 nautical miles away. To make
Partition & Independence
131
matters still more complicated, Junagarh had enclaves in
bordering States of Gondal, Baroda and Bhavnagar, all of
which had acceded to India, and in turn had their own
enclaves embedded inside Junagarh State' Therefore, in all
fairness and in conformity with the rules of the game, all the
Kathiawar States had to accede to the Union of India as a
whole, and that was also the legal position But the Nawab
decided to cast his lot, and that of his subjects with Pakistan.
However, the Dewan of the State, Khan Bahadur Abdul Qadir
Mohammed Hussain repudiated any suggestion to join
Pakistan Since the Dewan was a sick man — real or
diplomatic — Shah Nawaz Bhutto (Father of Zulfikar Ah
Bhutto and grand father of Benazir Bhutto, the future Prime
Ministers of Pakistan) was appointed as the new Dewan who
immediately announced the accession of the State to
Pakistan, notwithstanding geographical and communal
arguments to the contrary. This clandestine act of accession
was intimated to India on 18 August 1947, and Pakistan's
acceptance of the same was conveyed to India on 13
September 1947. Lord Mountbatten sent his Chief of Staff,
Lord Ismay to Karachi to convince Pakistan of the
incompatibility of this Accession, but to no avail Possession is
the nine points of faw. Pakistan's argument was that the Ruler
of the State had the sole right and privilege to decide as to
which Dominion his State will accede to, and the Nawab had
decided in favour of Pakistan: And that is where the matter
ended in so far as Pakistan was concerned.
The Khan of Manavadar State having an area of barely
1 00 sq miles and contiguous to Junagarh State on three sides
also announced his choice for Pakistan but the Sheikh of
Mangrol, a tiny State adjoining Junagarh signed in favour of
India, and so did the Raja of Babanawad The Nawab of
Junagarh refused to accept this position asserting that since
Mangrol was an "Attached State" to Junagarh, it could not
independently exercise its right to accede to India. The same
situation arose in respect of some other 'estates' and the
Nawab of Junagarh despatched his State troops to enforce his
132
Military Plight of Pakistan
authority to decide about the matter of accession of such
"Attached States" In September 1947, a delegation from
Junagarh reached Karachi and held meetings with officials of
Defence and Foreign ministries The Defence Secretary of
Pakistan, Colonel K M Iskandar Mirza in consultation with
the Foreign Secretary, Mr Ikram Ullah deputed Lieutenant
Colonel K M Sheikh, GS01 in Headquarters 8 Division to
visit the State, and to report on the Indian military threat in
the area A Pakistan Navy Corvette about a mile off shore
dropped Colonel Sheikh with two military signalers from
Veraval, the site of the historic Som Nath Temple The party
landed about 3 am and managed to reach Junagarh at about
2 00 pm'2
India moved 7 Infantry Brigade and some armour to
Rajkot for deployment in Kathiawar region to protect those
States, which had acceded to India The matter was discussed
in the Joint Defence Council on 1** October 1947 but no
compromise solution could be reached However, on 30
September 1947 itself, rightly or wrongly. Pandit Nehru had
accepted the idea of a Plebiscite to resolve the crisis
In the meantime, the general conditions in Junagarh
deteriorated considerably There was all round civil unrest
and resentment against the Nawab for his unilateral decisions
and actions against India, as well as the neighbouring sister
States of the Kathiawar region Finding the situation getting
out of control, the Nawab with three out of his four wives
and some dogs fled in a Dakota to Karachi Colonel Sheikh
and party were evacuated by boat The Dewan, Sir Shah
Nawaz Bhutto handed over power to the Government of
India on 9 November 1947 While taking charge of the
situation, the Government of India informed the Government
of Pakistan that they were doing so to avoid disorder and
chaos The changeover was completely peaceful As promised
by India, after normal conditions had been restored, a
referendum was held on 20 February 1948 Out of an
electorate of 200,000, 190,000 votes were cast of which only
91 were for Pakistan In the adjornwig esta^, 31,434 vnrti»s
Partition & Independence
133
were cast and only 39 were for Pakistan. And, thus ended the
.fiasco of Junagarh and its "Attached States"
Sardar Patel who had overall responsibility for integration
of the Princely States into the Indian Union was most
unhappy about Pandit Nehru's offer of a referendum in
Junagarh A very wrong and undesirable precedent had been
set providing a lever to Pakistan, and other interested parties
In the fiasco of junagarh, Jinnah lost the territory of that State
but gained a significant diplomatic victory with the
acceptance by India of the principle of referendum to
ascertain the wishes of the people as a deciding factor to
determine the validity of accession, even though all along
Pakistan was earlier insisting that the Nawab of junagarh was
the sole arbiter of his State Furthermore, there was no such
stipulation either in the Cabinet Mission Memorandum, nor
in any other act or legislation which required a ruler, or the
Dominion to which he acceded, to ascertain the wishes of
the subjects of that State Pandit Nehru had thus introduced a
new and unnecessary element in the otherwise already
extremely complex fluid situation, to the detriment of India,
even though it was otherwise in good faith and in keeping
with Nehru's political temperament of idealism.
Conversely, junagarh proved to be a trap for Pakistan in
which Mr jinnah willy-nilly got himself entangled voluntarily
If a Hindu majority State with a Muslim ruler could
legitimately accede to Pakistan, and jinnah readily accepted
that accession as final and irrevocable, obviously, a Muslim
majority State with a Hindu ruler could equally accede to
India Therefore, there would be no earthly reason for
Pakistan to object to that Accession This was most significant
fallout from junagarh in so far as India and the State of
jammu and Kashmir were concerned.
Another noteworthy fallout from Junagarh was a note
from the three British Chiefs of Staff of India's Armed Forces
that they, the British officers would not participate in a war
between India and Pakistan In other words, the dark clouds
134
Military Plight of Pakistan
of Indo-Pak war were already discernible on the horizon so
soon after the division of the sub-continent'
Yet another important development arising out of
Junagarh events was that the Governor General of India, Lord
Louis Mountbatten had come to chair the meetings of the
Defence Committee of the Indian Cabinet The implications
of this constitutional deviation were to make their impact on
the forthcoming military events in due course
A Glance at Hyderabad
In the Nizam State of Hyderabad too the Ruler was a
Muslim while the population — the largest amongst all the
Princely States at about 16 million — was predominantly
non-Muslim Since Indian Territory surrounded the State on
all sides, the question of its opting for Pakistan did not arise
So the Nizam of Hyderabad chose complete independence
as his goal As a matter of fact, as far back as April 1 946, the
President of the Executive Council of Hyderabad had told the
then Viceroy that the Nizam was m favour of declaring
Independence as and when the British withdrew from India
And on 15 August 1947, the Nizam announced the status of
an independent sovereign State, which was promptly rejected
by the Government of India
A number of meetings took place between the
representatives of the Nizam and the Government of India A
number of draft agreements were prepared but the resolution
of the problem was no where in sight The state of
uncertainty with respect to the status of Hyderabad, together
with the developments in Junagarh acted as a tonic to
Maharaja Sir Han Singh who continued to toy with the idea
of independence for his dream of "Switzerland of the East"
PARTITION & ITS AFTERMATH
On 15 August 1947, the State of Jannmu and Kashmir was
technically independent under the rule of Maharaja Sir Han
Sipgh
Partition & Independence
135
At this time most of the political leaders of the Valley,
both from the National Conference and the Muslim
Conference were in prison In so far as the State Legislature
was concerned, the Muslim Conference had a strong
presence there while the National Conference did not
occupy a single seat since this Party had boycotted the
elections However, the National Conference was otherwise a
well-organised well-knit party with a very large following in
the Valley, and to some extent in Jammu region too The
intelligentsia of the State were generally with the National
Conference while the Islamic fundamentalists ruled the roost
in the Muslim Conference, which had a strong following in
western Jammu region as well as in some pockets of
downtown Srinagar There was complete uncertainty as to the
future of the State No body knew which way the balance
would tilt — Pakistan or India, for all practical purposes,
there was no third option
The Maharaja's dilemma continued and In the heart of
his heart, he yearned for Independence. And so did Sheikh
Abdullah, albeit for altogether different reasons. And for both
the end product was an Asian Switzerland. But how? That
was the million-dollar question. And security risk was the
major constraint in this beautifully green scenario. Who
would guarantee the security of an independent State of
Jammu and Kashmir; how would that guarantee is enforced;
and how effective would that guarantee be?
At this point of time, resistance to Maharaja's rule
amongst his subjects had already reached a fairly high point
with the Poonch Rebellion making matters most difficult for
him If Hari Singh opts for Pakistan, it was more than likely
that in the final analysis he would end up with sweet nothing
— neither independence, nor autonomy, nor the dynastic
constitutional hereditary rule. In fact, his own gut feeling and
the opinion of his close advisers was that in Pakistan, he
would soon lose his Gaddi. On the other hand, if he opted
for India, he would have to countenance Sheikh Abdullah
and Pandit Nehru with both of whom there was no love lost
736
Military Plight of Pakistan
Both these options were fraught with one danger or the
other And that made the decision all the more difficult So
the stalemate continued
The Pakistanis, in particular the Punjabi Musalmans, and
many Muslims of the State specially in the Jammu region
started having serious doubts about the ultimate fate of this
strategic territory of nearly 85,000 square miles The Pakistani
establishment also felt that military security of Pakistan would
be easily jeopardized in the long run if Indian troops come to
control the western borders of the State, since the
Rawalpindi-Lahore road-rail corridor could thus be easily
threatened by the Indian Armed Forces. The location of
Mangla-Headworks within the State of Jammu and Kashmir,
as well as its close proximity borders added to the security
concerns of the nascent State of Pakistan.
The Prime Minister of the State, Mr. Ram Chandra Kak
was dismissed and placed under house arrest Major General
Janak Singh, a kin of the Maharaja took over as Prime
Minister on 12 August 1947. And on that date, identical
telegrams were sent to the Governments of India and
Pakistan stating that, " . Jammu and Kashmir Government
would welcome Standstill Agreement with Union of India on
all matters. It is suggested that the existing arrangements
should continue pending settlement of details and formal
execution of fresh agreements." Pakistan accepted the
suggestion and entered into a Standstill Agreement with the
Government of Jammu and Kashmir on all matters regarding
communications, supplies, post and telegraph arrangements,
economic and trade relations, etc., as provided in the Indian
Independence Act of 1947. But the Government of India
wanted further discussions before taking a decision. As later
events proved, Pakistan signed the Agreement only towards
its total infringement, and right from the beginning had no
intention what^ever of complying with it in any way
whatsoever.
Partition & Independence
137
Communal Riots
Large-scale communal riots had started all over Punjab,
U.P, Bihar and many other parts of India, particularly
Northern and Eastern India well before August 1947. By the
time the two Dominions came into being, communal
violence in its intensity, ferocity and savagery of atrocities
inflicted on innocent men, women, children and infants
reached a crescendo unheard of in the annals of civilized
society. Law and order had completely broken down on both
sides of the Punjab border and the Sudhan tract adjoining the
State of Jammu and Kashmir Mob violence was the only rule,
the only law. All round disturbances made the task of
establishing the new Dominions extremely difficult, well nigh
impossible The Kashmir Valley was perhaps the only island of
sanity in the whole of Northern India, free from communal
frenzy, which prompted Mahatma Gandhi's pronouncement
m his Prayer Meeting on 29 December 1947, "My sole hope
and prayer is that Kashmir would become a beacon light in
this benighted sub-continent The situation was further
exacerbated by Mr Mohammed All Jinnah, the first Governor
General of Pakistan and his Prime Minister, Liaqat All Khan
both feeling completely betrayed by the Radcliffe Award
which gave the three eastern tehsils of Gurdaspur district to
the Indian Punjab.
The worst aspect of the communal conflagration was
complete breakdown of local civil administration in both
parts of Punjab as well as Delhi. Large scale exodus of
minority communities from "the two halves of the two
provinces" where they were forced to abandon their
ancestral lands, properties and means of livelihood to seek
shelter and safety in the other half, giving rise to long winding
columns on foot, bullock carts, lorries of sorts, railway trains
packed like sardines inside as well as atop the roof, facing
untold hazards enroute, fleeing into the unknown future.
Transmigration of entire populations on a gigantic scale
unheard of in the history of the world was taking place m the
wake of much awaited and sought after Freedom It was
138
Military Plight of Pakistan
confusion and savagery galore. With the civil administration
completely paralysed, the military had to step m to sort out
the numerous complex problems, to put a stop to the rot
Poonch Rebellion
Ethnically, culturally, linguistically and religiously, the
Poonchis — as the Muslims of Poonch area of Jammu region
were known as — were closer to the Muslims of West Punjab
than with those of the Valley In fact, although the Sudhans of
Mirpur-Kotli-Poonch belt contiguous to West Punjab formed a
big chunk of population of the State, they had very little in
common with the Kashmiris except the bond of Islam The
Valley Muslims were far too tolerant and secular in their
outlook besides being Shias who reacted to the Ahmediyas in
a rather friendly acceptable manner, whereas the Punjabi
Musalmans were largely Sunnis and highly fanatical m their
outlook
The trouble in Poonch started in June 1947 with the "No
Tax" movement launched by the economically weak Muslim
community. With communal riots brewing up in the
neighbouring areas of Punjab and imminence of Partition, this
agitation soon escalated into a secessionist movement The
situation became all the more tense and sensitive with the
induction of nearly 60,000 recently demobilized veterans of
the Second World War — young, energetic, well trained men
for most of whom the days hung much too heavily with
nothing much to do, or to look forward to, to keep
themselves busy or amused
Ever since the British declaration of their intent to
partition India and create two Dominions on the basis of
"Two Nation Theory", most Poonchis, many Muslims in the
rest of the State and the Muslims of Punjab had come to take
it for granted that down the road, Jammu and Kashmir would
become part of Pakistan, on the obvious assumption that
more than 75% population being Muslirns. However, just as
the Radcliffe Award had depressed the top lea-ders of
Pakistan, so were the Poonchis and others whose hopes and
Partition & Independence
139
aspirations were now thrown in jeopardy They started having
serious doubts about the future status of their territory, not
knowing which Dominion they would end up in — in their
minds, the choice was between Muslim Pakistan, or Hindu
India, the idea of a secular India not being entertained by
most of them.
In defiance of the Dogra Rule, 14 August 1947 was
observed as "Kashmir Day" in the Valley and in the rest of the
State as it had been ever since 1931 This coincidence with
the birthday of Pakistan and Indian Independence the next
day added fuel to the fire The Poonchis tried to celebrate
that as "Pakistan Day" On 15^*' August they raised Pakistani
flags inviting harsh retribution from the authorities, leading to
serious communal problems at Rawalkot on 22"*' August
Muslim crowds attacked non-Muslims in Bagh-Rawlakot area
One thing led to another, and the result was severe violent
clashes between the Poonchi Muslim crowds and the Hindu
Dogra State troops who had been deployed to quell the
disturbances There was large number of civilian casualties,
which further aggravated the already tense situation
As a reaction to communal riots in the Pakistani Punjab
from where Hindus and Sikhs in lakhs were being driven out
like cattle from their stables with untold savage atrocities
inflicted on them, the Hindus in Jammu under the
organisational leadership of Rashtriya Svayamsevak Sangh,
and the Sikhs by the Akalis started taking revenge upon the
Muslims of Jammu, driving out nearly 50,000 of them
towards the west to Pakistani Punjab. Their plight and sight
further exacerbated the already grave situation in Poonch
area
In order to control the latest developments, the State
authorities ordered the people of Poonch to surrender their
personal arms. The forced surrender of personal weapon was
deemed an affront by the Poonchis and resulted in
considerable resentment against the State administration
which was all the more pronounced amongst the ex-
140
Militaiy Plight of Pakistan
servicemen who formed a significant portion of the vocal
population. The Poonchis and Punjabi Musalmans were not
prone to tolerate such personal indignities Soon reports
started circulating that the confiscated arms had been
distributed amongst the Hindus and Sikhs of Jammu City and
suburbs for use against the Muslims of the town Besides
increasing the unrest considerably, this led to a clamour
amongst the Poonchis for arms and ammunition which
demand was readily met from Northwestern Frontier
Province where there had always been a thriving market in
illegal arms and ammunition A regular supply line for arms
and ammunition was soon established with the connivance of
the local civil authorities of that Province and the newly
established government of Pakistani Punjab
With so much at stake and so much of resources being
poured into it, the Poonch movement soon graduated into a
full fledged rebellion against the authority of the State
Muslim officers and men of the State Forces units deserted,
almost in toto and joined the so-called volunteers from across
the border, which included some INA officers and men
released after the Second World War Sardar Mohammed
Abdul Qayyum Khan, a young landlord of Poonch, later to
become "Prime Minister" of "Azad Kashmir" was in the
forefront of this agitation Another prominent leader was
Mohammed Ibrahim Khan, a young lawyer who had been
elected to the Praja Parishad (Legislative Assembly formed
under the 1934 Constitution) on Muslim Conference ticket
and went over to Pakistani Punjab, where he established an
unofficial 'command post' at Murree to guide, control and
support the resistance movement.
However, the Valley Beautiful continued to remain
beautifully unblemished by this virus of communalism, and
became all the more pristine after the Qabailis started
knocking at the doorsteps of Srinagar "One might form an
impression from these incidents in Jammu and in
Muzzaffarabad, Domel area that the Muslims in the State had
risen against the Government and wished to join Pakistan.
Partition & Independence
141
Nothing could be further from the truth Thousands upon
thousands of Muslims in the Government, the State Forces
and in the National Conference, the political party led by
Sheikh Abdullah braved death in stemming the invasion
Many Muslim officers and men of the Jammu and Kashmir
State Forces were later absorbed m the Indian Army
Soon after assuming charge as Chief of Staff, Brigadier
Rajinder Singh took a series of measures to control the
situation. As a first step, about 3-5 miles wide belt of territory
all along the border was cleared of all civilians State troops
were deployed in defensive positions at Bagh, Rawalkot,
Poonch, Kotli, Mirpur, Jhangar and Naushera As these
defensive measures were in the process of being
implemented, hostliles attacked small State Forces garrisons
at Thorar, Tam and Mang On night 8/9 October the
hostilities started in Mirpur sector and soon spread all along
the southern borders from Akhnur down to Kathua area.
By October 1 947, the town of Poonch along with its
garrison of State Forces was surrounded by the Sudhans
under command of Major Bostan Khan and Captain Hassan,
both of whom had deserted from the State Forces along with
most of their co-religionists. The hostiles were actively
assisted by batches of men in Pakistan regular army uniforms
using light machine guns and radio coinmunication
equipment. The State Forces bad to evacuate Fort Owen on
15''’ October resulting in Kotli-Poonch route being cut off
The hostiles further intensified their activities in Bhimber,
Mirpur and Kotli. These activities were part of a well-
coordinated plan by Pakistan to split the State Forces
garrisons into penny pockets all along the border areas so that
they become ineffective as an organised fighting force.’®
Economic Blockade
The State and its Government were under intense
pressure from all sides. But it seems the Maharaja was
completely oblivious of the developments around him' He
continued to dither, remained indecisive in the vain hope
742
Military Plight of Pakistan
that some magical power would come to his rescue to save
the kingdom for him and his dynasty.
Pakistan started to tighten the noose in a well-planned
manner, gradually, but steadily and consistently, to pressurise
the Maharaja to accede to Pakistan even though the Muslims
of the Valley, barring some exceptions in downtown Srinagar,
were not at all in favour of Pakistan. The only ground routes
for carriage of essential supplies like food, petrol and
lubricants, salt, cloth, kerosene oil etc., both for the Valley
and Jammu Division were through Pakistani Punjab and the
Government of Pakistan withheld these supplies on one
pretext or the other, to throttle the States' life and economy
Road, rail, postal, telephone and telegraph
communications to the State were all routed through Pakistan
, and these were all cut or disrupted at the border posts on
the Pakistani side resulting in strangulation of the State.
Traders and transporters were afraid of venturing into the
customs posts areas for fear of mob violence and robbery,
toot and murder with the result that customs revenue at
Domel post which used to be about Rs 30,000/- per day
dropped down to barely a few hundred rupees.
The State was dependent for banking services on the
banks located at Lahore, Rawalpindi and Sialkot. As a result
of the undeclared economic blockade imposed by the
Government of Pakistan, Lahore Currency Office placed
restrictions on remittances of money to Imperial Bank,
Srinagar resulting in great financial hardship to the public at
large The economic and commercial blockade imposed by
Pakistan caused untold misery and difficulties to the hapless
citizenry of the State, irrespective of their religious
affiliations
All these measures imposed by the authorities in Pakistan,
directly or indirectly, discreetly or otherwise, were intended
to force the accession of the State to Pakistan, by hook or by
crook. Pakistan wanted Kashmir at all costs. It was an
obsession, which Pakistan could iH afford to relinquish. After
Partition & Independence
143
all, the very basis of Pakistan was the communal divide, and
that alone justified in their conscience all the steps, right or
wrong, taken in that direction
Joint Military Command
The Partition of India was not a mere geographical
exercise, it involved all facets Every single part of the original
monolith had to suffer the pangs of drastic surgery. And the
armed forces were no exception However, in order to
stabilise the military structure of the two Dominions, Field
Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, GCIE, GCB, CSI, DSO, OBE,
Commander-in-Chief India was redesignated as Supreme
Commander with effect from 15 August 1947 for the Joint
Defence Council of the two Dominions. The composition of
the Joint Defence Council was. the two Governors General,
the two Defence Ministers, and the Commander-in-Chief
India who had no authority for law and order, nor any
operational control, nor any power to move troops within the
borders of either Dominion Thus, contrary to earlier noble
intentions and expectations, it soon became apparent that for
all practical purposes, his authority over the armed forces of
the two Dominions was merely notional, more on paper than
in reality Initially, the Government of India had accepted the
formation of Supreme Headquarters for a period of four
years with effect from 15 August 1947. But the military
developments immediately after Independence rendered the
existence of such a set up completely redundant. Resultantly,
leave alone four years, the Supreme Headquarters did not
last even four months; the same was closed down on 30
November 1947 at the initiative of the Government of India.
One of the major facto: s leading to this decision was Sardar
Patel's clear perception of the pro-Pakistan attitude of British
military officers holding key positions m India.
Notwithstanding the initial establishment of the Supreme
Headquarters, both countries had their separate heads of the
three services Lieutenant General Sir Rob Lockhart, KCB,
CIE, MC, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of Indian
144
Military Plight of Pakistan
Army Again his command too was rather short lived, till 31
December 1947 only At the request of the Government of
India General Sir FR Roy Boucher, KBE, CB, MC was
appointed the new C-in-C, Air Marshal Sir Thomas Elmhirst
headed the (Royal) Indian Air Force while Rear Admiral J TS
Hall was Chief of the (Royal) Indian Navy. Similarly, Pakistan
had Its own three Chiefs of the three military services
Lieutenant General Sir Frank Messervy was the first Chief of
Pakistan Army till 15 February 1948 when he was succeeded
by his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Sir Douglas Gracey
Punjab Boundary Force was another joint military set-
up, comprising of both Indian and Pakistani troops,
established to facilitate law and order in the two halves of
Punjab, particularly in the newly formed borders of the two
countries. This experiment too proved unworkable right from
the^start and was dismantled as early as 1“ September 1947
when both the Dominions assumed direct responsibility for
law and order in their respective parts of the Punjab
Another somewhat joint military structure that came into
being in the wake of Partition and the communal
conflagration was the MEO, the Military Evacuation
Organisation commanded by Major General S.B S. Chimni
which was responsible for evacuation of civilian refugees
from one part of Punjab to the other. That is to say, to
undertake escort duties for Hindu and Sikh refugees
emigrating from Pakistani Punjab to India, and for the Muslim
refugees from India to Pakistani Punjab. However, the
number of refugees coming into India was far more than
those going in the other direction. It is estimated that the
minorities that were to migrate to Indian Punjab formed 47%
of the population. The General commanding the MEO
informed on 7 October 1947 that, till that date, 16 lakh
refugees had been evacuated, 4.5 lakhs were on the move
and 20 lakhs more were awaiting to be moved to India.
Division of Armed Forces
Armed Forces Reoonatiturtion Committee <AF*RC) was yet
another organisation, an expert committee under the
Partition & Independence
145
Partition Council entrusted with the task of dividing the
military establishments and defence assets between the two
new Dominions The Supreme Commander was the
Chairman of this Committee Sir Chandu Lai Trivedi who had
been Secretary of War Department for three years during the
Second World War was invited to serve on the AFRC. A
strong plea for preserving the unity of undivided Indian Army
"came from the Indian officers, whose members, the
brigadiers, earnestly represented the case for a combined
army, serving both dominions". Brigadier Cariappa then felt
that It would take at least five years before we could do
without British officers Field Marshal Auchinleck was of the
view that it would take 5-1 0 years to divide the Indian Army
The Army, Navy and the Air Force were the three Sub-
committees under the AFRC. Deputy Chief of General Staff
Major General S.F. Irwin was Chairman of the Army Sub-
Committee with Brigadiers K.M. Cariappa, S B.S Chimni,
K S. Thimayya and N A.M. Raza as members, amongst others,
with Lieutenant Colonel G G Bewoor as Secretary from the
Indian side The first meeting of this Sub-Committee was held
on 1 July 1947 and it was dissolved on 30 November 1947.^°
Delhi & East Punjab Command with its FJead quarters at
Delhi was established in September 1 947 Major General Sir
Dudley Russel, KBE, CB, DSO, MC, General Officer
Commanding 5 Indian Division, who along with his Division
had returned to Ranchi a few months earlier from Allied
Forces occupation duties in Japan, was appointed the first
General Officer Commandmg-in-Chief of the new Command.
In this connection it should be noted that the Punjab
Emergency Act conferred wide powers of search and arrest
on the Indian Army.
The division of Defence establishments of undivided
India unfortunately resulted in a completely step motherly
treatment right from day one to what came to be "Army
Headquarters India". Pakistan Army Headquarters under its
novy Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant General Sir Frank
146
Military Plight of Pakistan
Messervy, KCSI, KBE, DSO established itself in the premises
of erstwhile Headquarters Northern Command of undivided
India It started funct Dning quite effectively at Rawalpindi
without any loss of ime because of the existing command
and control infrasL ucture facilities built in the old
headquarters Army Headquarters India had just no place to
park themselves in to get their act together, none whatsoever
really, although this was the most important military
headquarters in so far as the national and military interests of
India was concerned in the wake of Pakistani designs in
Jammu and Kashmir The newly formed Supreme Command
Headquarters was in location in the Army Headquarters of
undivided India And that was a Joint Command
Headquarters, not the Indian Army Headquarters The
existing command set up, communications systems, offices
etc, all were under the control of the Supreme Command
Headquarters Army Headquarters India was thus left high
and dry to fend for itself They were asked to establish
themselves in the old Red Fort that was most unsuitable for
any such organisation
Communications are the lifeline of command and control
in a military organisation, more so in times of war, or war like
conditions The new Army Headquarters did not have that
facility in any real sense Army Headquarters Signal Regiment
provided full communications support to the Supreme
Command Headquarters including communications to
Pakistan Army Headquarters, but none to the Indian Army
Headquarters'
The intelligence set up was also in a mess in so far as
India was concerned With the breakdown of civil
administration in Punjab, responsibility for all intelligence
work fell on the ill equipped and ill-staffed Directorate of
Military Intelligence. Unfortunately, this Directorate, lacking
in basic intelligence facilities communications, staff and
intelligence network, was severely restricted in performing its
role at a time when military information about activities
across the borders, particularly with regard to Jammu and
Partition & Independence
147
Kashmir were of vital importance to the security of the
country
Division of Military Assets
The Division of military assets of undivided India
between the two Dominions was another complex and
difficult problem Like the Boundary Commission, the Army
too had Its terms of reference laid out for partitioning of the
Force As of July 1947 the undivided Indian Army comprised
about 500,000 men An unofficial estimate of the communal
composition of the Service at this time, in percentages of
officers and men was
Hindus 47 8 and 55.7,
Muslims. 23 7 and 33 8,
Sikhs 1 7.3 and 7 5,
Others. 12.2 and 3.0.
The procedure for division of military assets was finalised
on 30 June 1947 giving just 45 days for bifurcation of a
mammoth force of more than 500,000 The basic rule was 2/
3"'^ to India and 1/3"'’ to Pakistan, based not on the
geographical dimensions of the two Dominions but according
to the geographical-territorial origins of the rank and file
However, this was easier said than done, more so since
enlisted men of a large number of fighting units had purely
Indian origins, and that was not the case for Pakistan, For
instance, out of a total of 152 infantry battalions in undivided
India, demobilization after World War II left not a single one
that was with 100% Pakistani enlisted personnel. There was
not a single purely Muslim unit. Pakistan's highest
contribution was 50% in 55 infantry battalions, 75% in six
and the remainder 91 infantry battalions were either 100%,
or predominantly Indian in origin. The same was the bottom
tine in other fighting arms, and the services too.^^
The division of the Army on the basis of principle of 2/3"^
to India and 1/3'"* to Pakistan gave India a total of 2,80,000
148
Military Plight of Pakistan
personnel of all categories The allocation of combat arms to
the two Dominions was- -
* Fifteen infantry regiments including all the Gorkha
Rifles (1“, 3'’'', 4*^, 5*, 8‘^ and 9**’) making a total of 88
infantry battalions to India Pakistan got eight infantry
regiments organised into 33 infantry battalions
* Thirteen armoured regiments to India, Pakistan's
share one heavy, three mediums and two light, making
a total of six armoured regiments
* Eighteen regiments of artillery, all types to India,
Pakistan's share two medium, three field, one anti-tank,
one heavy and one light anti-aircraft making a total of
eight artillery regiments, plus one survey battery
* Sixty-one engineer units of all types organised into
Madras, Bengal and Bombay Engineer Groups to India,
Pakistan's share 34 units of all types, (major portion of
original Bengal Group went to Pakistan)
* About 7,000 all ranks of various trades from the
Signals to Infdia. Existing static layout in both Dominions
was left in tact.
As on 7 ^ November 1947, movement of all the units from
one Dominion to the other was completed except for one
infantry battalion from Pakistan to India, and nine engineer
companies from India to Pakistan. The Muslim contingent
from the Indian Military Academy, Dehradun moved out in
November 1947.”
In so far as the Air Force was concerned, India's share
came to be six Rghter ^uadrons and one transport squadron
against Pakistan's' two and one respertively. Pakistan also got
a flight each of Harvards for cx^mmurvications and Austers for
Air Observation Posts, and sixteen Tiger Moths for training
purposes. Itifnay be noted here that although Pakistan Air
Force did not intervene in th© Kashmir \Afeir with fighter
Partition & Independence
749
aircraft, they claim to have flown 437 sorties dropping 500
tons of supplies at Bunji, Skardu, Gilgit and Chilas
From the above it is evident that the division of the
Armed Forces conferred on India a definite superiority of well
over two to one But it is an unfortunate fact of history that
India did not make use of this advantage during the first
Indo-Pak War (1947-48) to extract a definite favourable
decision, which it could have, and should have Further, such
a favourable strategical superiority, both in terms of numbers
and deployment, has never occurred, and is unlikely to ever
occur in the foreseeable future.
Unfortunately, the political leadership of the country, and
Prime Minister Nehru in particular later in conjunction with
Mr Krishna Menon, ICS, looked at the armed forces through
self-tainted coloured glasses. Just about a month before
Pakistan was to launch the first salvo of first Indo-Pak War,
"On 16 September 1947, Prime Minister Nehru directed
strength of the Army should be preferably 1,50,000, but in no
case beyond 1,75,000 since 'we foresee no military
threats Couldn't have been more naive* In the same
token. It might as well be added that while India was fighting
Its first war, pay and allowances of Indian Commissioned
Officers were drastically reduced under the New Pay Code
thereby perpetuating and further accentuating the disparity
between the Indian and King's Commissioned Officers (ICOs
and KCIOs), that too in the same Army, of the same Country,
and in the same theatre of active operations!
Indian Army in a Ffux
Since the class composition of sub-units was generally
based on religious or territorial connections of the soldiers, a
number of units were in the process of being split, moved to
the other Dominion, generally to Pakistan for reforming into
new units for Pakistan Army. However, a small number of
sub-units were also under move from Pakistan to revert to
India to join Indian units. For instance, 7 Cavalry which was
soon to play a highly significant role in the two most
150
Military Plight of Pakistan
important battles fought m the Kashmir Valley — the Battle of
Shalateng in November 1947 and the Battle of Zojila in late
1948 — was in the throes of break up and reformation m
October 1947, just a couple of weeks before being engulfed
into the main stream of the first Indo-Pak War in Jammu and
Kashmir. 'B' Squadron of 7 Cavalry, a Punjabi Musalman sub-
unit, which was in transit from Japan to Ranchi, was to go to
Pakistan. In its place, the Regiment was to get 'A' Squadron,
comprising of Jat soldiers, from 6'** Doc Lancers (6'^ Duke of
Connaught's Own Lancers) from Kohat to be redesignated as
B Squadron of 7^’’ Cavalry Regiment This latter Squadron
under the command of Major I.J. Rikhye arrived at Ambala
only in October 1947 from Kohat in North West Frontier
Province of Pakistan, having lost its "moorings and traditions"
to j'oin a new parentage This is just one case out of many,
quoted here just to illustrate the point. There were numerous
more sub-units with 100% Indian nationals who were on duty
in Pakistan territory and were now on the move, bereft of
their traditional support systems, to Join Indian units and
formations.
Such was the state of the Indian Army, the Indian Armed
Forces, soon after the Partition, a state of complete flux. At
this point of time, it was an unbalanced Force —
organisationally, administratively, deployment-wise, and as
well as in terms of its command structure All the three
Service Chiefs were British, Chairman of the Defence
Committee was a British (The Governor General, Lord Louis
Mountbatten) and so was the Supreme Commander of the
Joint Defence Council. Most of the senior and sensitive
appointments^ were held by the British officers, loyalty of
some, if not most of who was suspect, to say the least, as
would be evident from tire subsequent narrative The lower
formations and units were split, under move, trying to find
their feet, deployed on tasks of civilian nature for which they
were neither organised nor trained for A large number of
Indian officers had got accelerated promotions and placed in
senior positions of command and responsibility for which
Partition & Independence
151
they were ill prepared, and some of them were indeed
neither fit nor matured for such high positions
In retrospect, how one wishes if that was all' But it
wasn't About 75% of officers and men of the Army came
from Punjab which was embroiled in unparalleled savagery of
man against man, sinking to depths of ferocity and
degradation unheard of in human history These men of the
Army had a fair share of their family problems — kith and kin
missing, killed, raped and murdered, property looted or
reduced to ashes Service personnel themselves were
rendered displaced persons In the face of such adversity,
morale is bound to be the first casualty A number of officers
and men had to be away from duty to sort out their family
problems And the last proverbial straw came with the first
drastic cut in pay and perks, as a sacrificial compensation m
celebration of Independence All said and done for
nationalism and patriotism, this one step by their very own
government so soon after ushering in of Independence was
tantamount to hitting the Defence services below the belt
Indian Army was thus poised for active military
operations under the most unusual and adverse conditions
imaginable And to cap it all, the commanding generals and
senior staff officers — all British could not even visit the
areas of operations, let alone conduct the same, because of
the policy decision taken by the British Imperial Government
in London They were thus required to perform their duties
through remote controj only, a most unsatisfactory situation
to fight any war even under the most favourable of
conditions Again, that was not alP The Service Chiefs of the
two soon-to-be warring nations were in constant regular
telephonic contact which facility existed for some senior
British staff officers too Therefore, the possibility of leakage
of operational information at least inadvertently could not be
ruled out Indeed, it was a distinct possibility
752
Military Plight of Pakistan
NOTES & REFERENCES
1 Harnam Singh, "Kashmir and the Indian Polity" — article repro-
duced in "The Story of Kashmir Yesterday and Today", Volume I,
edited by Verinder Grover, Deep & Deep Publications, New
Delhi, 1995, pp 130, 142
2 Ibid, p 142
3 Chibber M L, Lieutenant General, "Pakistan's Criminal Folly in
Kashmir", Manas Publications, New Delhi, 1998, pp 57-58
4 It IS of interest that the first thought of dividing India on commu-
nal lines was first put forward by Bhai Parmanand Chibber in a
small booklet in 1923 followed in 1924 by a few articles by Lala
Lajpat Rai published in The Tribune of Punjab It was much later
that some Muslim thinkers put forward the concept of Two-Nation
Theory and creation of a separate homeland for the Muslims to be
called Pakistan However, ironically, the largest number of Muslims
continue to be in India, the second segment is in Bangladesh and
the smallest one is in Pakistan' — Chibber M L , op cit , pp 47-
49
5 lbid,p 45
6 Lord Mountbatten announced the Partition Plan at a memorable
press conference in New Delhi on 4* June 1947 At the end of the
conference, an Indian newsman asked him the date of transfer of
power But the Viceroy had not, in fact, picked a date However,
he was convinced that only a few weeks remained between India
and chaos Suddenly he thought of a date so linked in his memory
to the most triumphant hours of his own existence, that his deci-
sion was instantaneous His voice constricted with sudden emo-
tion, the victor of the jungles of Burma announced "The final
transfer of power will take place on August 15, 1947" — Larry
Collins Dominique Lapierre, "Freedom at Midnight"
7 Similar "other factors" guided the Commission in its award on
Ferozepur and Zira tehsris in Punjab while Chittagong Hill Tracts in
Bengal was awarded to Pakistan although it was a non-Muslim ma-
jority area
Partition & Independence
153
8 Karan Singh, "Heir Apparent An Autobiography", Vol I, OUR
New Delhi, 1982, revised edn 1984, pp 13 & 37-40
9 Bhattacharjea, "Kashmir The Wounded Valley", UBS Publishers'
Distributors, New Delhi, 1994, p 99
10 Ibid p 101
1 1 Karan Singh, op cit p 48
12.Riza Shaukat, Major General, "The History of Pak Army 1947-
1949", Natraj Publishers, Dehradun, First Indian Edition 1997,
p 265
13 Tendulkar DC , "Mahatma Gandhi", Vol VIII, Publications Divi-
sion, Government of India, New Delhi, 1954, p 123
14 Sen L P, DSO, Lieutenant General, "Slender Was the Thread
Kashmir Confrontation 1947-48", Orient Longman, New
Delhi,1 969/1 994; p 36
15 Brahma Singh K. Major, "History of Jammu and Kashmir Rifles
(1820-1956)", Lancers International, New Delhi, 1990, pp 221-
224.
16 General Sir Frank Messervey, KCSI, KBE, DSO, was commis-
sioned in the Hudson Horse of Indian Cavalry m 1913 He com-
manded 13 Lancers in 1938-39 In North Africa and Burma he
commanded 4 and 7 Indian Divisions
1 7. General Sir Douglas Gracey was commissioned in 1914 and
commanded 20 Indian Division in Burma during the Second
World War in Burma.
18 Irwin S.F, Major General, "The Indian Army in Partition", as
quoted by Lieutenant General S L Menezes, "The Indian Army",
Viking, New Delhi, 1993; p 422 Major General Irwin was the
Deputy Chief of General Staff and was the Chairman of the Army
Sub-Committee (Major General Shaukat Riza of Pakistan Army
gives his initials as S.E )
1 9.Riza Shaukat Major General, Op. at pp. 120-21
20 Ibid, pp 1 30-33
154
Military Plight of Pakistan
21 Robert Trumbull, New York Times 29 July 1947, quoted by
Lome J Kavic in "India's Quest for Security Defence Policies
1947-65", EBD Publishers, Dehradun 1967, p 82
22 Sen L P, op at pp 25-26
23 Riza Shaukat, op cit pp 136, and 307
24 Madan Vijay Lieutenant General, "Jammu and Kashmir Opera-
tions, 1947-48 The Other Version", US I Journal, July-September
1992, pp 302-303
25 Menezes S L Lieutenant General, op at p446
26 Proudfoot C L , Lieutenant Colonel, "We Lead" History of the
7‘'’ Light Cavalry, 1784-1990, Lancer International, New Delhi,
1991
* 5 ^
THE RAIDERS RAID
state Forces on the Eve of Indian Independence
Right from the start of the Second World War, there was a
perceptible thaw in the relations between Maharaja Sir Han
Singh and the British Governments, both in India and in the
United Kingdom Two battalions of the State Forces, 2 JAK
Infantry and 4 JAK Infantry, were placed at the disposal of the
British Imperial Government by the Maharaja ’ These
Battalions served the British with distinction At the same
time other units of the State Forces continued to assist the
British Indian Government in military duties in the NWFP as
hithertofore, thereby relieving some of the British Indian
Army units for active service duties in other theatres of the
Great War
No wonder therefore that "The war years also saw the
growing importance of the Maharaja with the British
Government He gave unstinted help to, and placed all his
resources at the disposal of the Government of India in their
prosecution of the War Consequently, he was appointed to
the Imperial War Cabinet and in this capacity toured the
Allied Front in the Middle East
At the end of Second World War, J & K State Forces
Headquarters at Badami^ Bagh Cantonment m Srinagar was
directly under command of the Maharaja There was no
General Staff as such, but the Army Headquarters did have
an Adjutant General and a Quarter Master General A retired
British Officer, Major General H L Scott, CB, DSO, MC was
156
Military Plight of Pakistan
the Chief of Staff through whom the Maharaja exercised his
command The State Forces were organised into four
brigades-
* lammu Brigade: Headquarters at Jammu
Cantonment JAK Training Battalion and Bodyguard Cavalry
less one squadron at Jammu Cantonment 5 JAK Battalion,
half Dogra half Muslim, with sub-units deployed from Kathua
to Bhimber along the southern border
* Kashmir Brigade: Headquarters, JAK Training School
and one squadron Bodyguard Cavalry all located at Badami
Bagh Cantonment- 4' JAK Battalion, half Dogra half Muslim, at
Domel with one company at Kohala and one company north
of Tithwal at Keren.
6 JAK Battalion, half-Sikh half-Muslim, at Bunji in
Baltistan with detachments at Leh, Skardu and Kargil.
7 JAK Battalion, all Dogra, at Srinagar, in reserve
• Mirpur Brigade: Headquarters at Dharmsala
Jhangar 2 JAK Battalion, half Gorkha half Muslim, at
Naushera with sub-units deployed on border posts.
3 JAK Battalion, half Gorkha half Muslim, at Mirpur
* Poonch Brigade: Headquarters at Poonch. 1 JAK
Battalion, all Dogras, deployed in border posts/detachments
in Bagh area.
8 JAK Battalion, all Dogras, at Poonch
9 JAK Battalion, all Dogras, deployed in detachments in
Rawalkot area
These four Brigades between them had only eight infantry
battalions Medium Machine Guns were an integral part of an
infantry battalion as opposed to the Indian Army where the
MMGs were organised into separate battalions of Mahar
The Raiders Raid
157
Regiment and attached to the brigades/battalions on as
required basis like other supporting arms. As for supplies, the
State Forces were dependent on local contractors For arms,
ammunition and military stores and equipment, the State
Forces were dependent on "arsenals" in the undivided Indian
Army's Northern Command with headquarters at Rawalpindi
The total post-war strength of the State forces was
approximately 12,000 all ranks, equivalent in infantry
strength to an infantry division, but without the necessary fire
power of artillery, and other supporting arms like the
engineers and signals as an organised set-up, as well as the
support services. In addition, a number of Garrison Police
companies raised from amongst the Gorkhas, Kangra Rajputs
and Sikh ex-servicemen were deployed to reinforce the State
Forces troops all along the 500-mile border with Pakistan
These Police units were armed with obsolete rifles/guns and
were posted in small detachments all along the Pakistani
Punjab border
From the foregoing it is evident that the State Forces were
suffering from a number of infrastructural constraints.
However, the deficiency of mountain batteries, which were
transferred to the Indian Army in 1942, was the most serious
as a result of which the infantry of the State Force was totally
devoid of artillery fire support ^ "The other problem facing
the Army was ammunition. Since the cessation of supply of
ammunition from Pakistan, the Army had been eating into its
reserves, and unless the reserves were replenished
immediately the State Troops were soon to have nothing to
fight with. Consequently the Indian Government was
approached for help and an indent for arms, ammunition and
other military equipment which included that required for
raising two mountain batteries was serjt to Delhi on 1
October 1947 through Lieutenant Colonel Bhagwan Singh,
who had been recalled to service for raising the artillery
units. The despatch of ammunition and weapons is believed
to have been stalled by the British staff officers holding key
positions at Army Headquarters in New Delhi
158
Military Plight of Pakistan
The class composition of the State Force and intrinsic
disloyalty of practically the entire Muslim elements of the
Force was the greatest handicap from which the State Army
was suffering — more on this later
The Raiders
The very looks of a Pathan used to instill a fear psychosis
amongst the people of Punjab plains, especially amongst the
Hindus, physically the weaker but financially and
intellectually the stronger community. The tribesman from
trans-Durand Line Frontiers is a tall, well built haughty man
with an imposing sort of aggressive personality He was
extremely poor, backward in education and civilization He
would fight for anything, any cause whatsoever is good
enough to fight for. And for Islam, most certainly. If he gets
the scent of a fight anywhere, he will rush straight into it,
heedless of the consequences, and nothing can stop him
from doing so A rifle and a dagger are part of his powerful
build And that was all! His fighting efficiency was a
misplaced reaction to his aggressive appearance, a fallacy, all
the more so because of his unreliability in active battle
conditions. No wonder therefore that the British were shy of
enlisting the Pathans to fight their wars, at home or overseas
This cautious attitude of the British administrations over a
long period of time was based on solid grounds of
experience, which was further reinforced in the Second
World War when an Afridi battalion had to be disarmed and
allotted the role of a labour battalion because of their lack of
trustworthiness and soldierly qualities. Looks and build alone
do not make a good soldier. Good as scouts and irregulars,
but certainly not as regular army material.
During the British regime in Northwest Frontier areas, as
a matter of .policy, tribesmen from west of Durrand Line were
not allowed to cross to the eastern side. And whenever they
did, they had to first surrender their arms at the border
check-post, and collect the on their return only. These
Mahsuds, Wazirs, Afridis, Mohmands ana many tribal
The Raiders Raid
159
clansmen of the rugged mountains were good at attacking
and fighting only isolated bodies of troops, or ill trained easy
going soldiers The British fought numerous battles against
them and established many cantonments and forts to contain
them These cantonments and forts were garrisoned largely
by Indian troops
While the British had refrained from enlisting these
tribesmen for a couple of centuries, the newly independent
Pakistanis, within a couple of weeks of their attaining power,
recruited these very tribesmen, organised and armed them to
be used as "liberators" of Jammu and Kashmir, of which
name most of them had not even heard of And Pakistani
establishment did not do this for the love of the tribals The
British had a lifetime problem of controlling these people and
administering their lands. Now they were a problem child of
the new Government of Pakistan, more so since they had
acquired 5,000 licensed firearms just before Partition in
addition to thousands of locally made rifles. The Qabailis-
problem was further compounded for Pakistan by territorial
claims put forth by Afghanistan to parts of NWFP, coupled
with their emotionally attractive appeal of kinship to Pak
Pathans for formation of an enlarged Pan -Afghanistan under a
Pathan king. This Pathanisation movement was a serious
security risk for the nascent State of Pakistan The
Government of Pakistan with direct complicity of the British
resolved this thorny problem with one stroke, by resorting to
tribal invasion of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.®
The Qabaihs themselves were also completely surprised.
After centuries of confinement within the bounds of their
bleak rugged mountains, they were suddenly welcomed in
Peshawar and provided with arms, ammunition, equipment,
and lorries to carry them, laced with wild promises of loot,
booty and women to be brought back home in their own
transport And of course they came, soon the trickle became
a flood.
The raiders came from various tribes and clans. There
were experienced fighters like Wazirs and Mahsuds from
760
Military Plight of Pakistan
Wazirastan, Afridis from Tirah, and the not so well
experienced Mohmands. The weapons, which they brought,
were of varied assortment — British, French, German and of
course what was popularly known as Frontier Rifle, the locally
manufactured staple of the area. A part of the first
consignment of 4,000 army rifles which Colonel Akbar Khan,
DSO, managed to "secretly release" (!) to the police for
onward distribution to the tribesmen found their way to
unauthorised hands for illegal sale at almost ten times the
price of a Frontier rifle. In their place the tribesman received
the inferior quality local variety which was otherwise an exact
replica of the military rifle Their transport was also equally
heterogeneous. They had no uniforms, nor any organised
supply system, at least not in the initial stages of their
operations, all typical of the irregular forces, which suited
their purpose ideally. They were perpetually short of
ammunition, since at least half of the ammunition released to
them found its way to black market in the Frontier areas' And
one cannot blame the tribesmen for this sort of thing, they
did not receive any regular pay. Their only source of income
was whatever they could scrounge or loot and send back
home for sale. That indeed was their wages!
These tribesmen formed one category of personnel that
came to be called raiders in Kashmir The second were the
armed locals of Mirpur-Poonch area, ex-servicemen or
volunteer militia-men who were motivated by' the call of
religion from across the border to defend their own homes
and hearths following the communal conflagration. These
loose bodies of men were stiffened by the third category of
men — Pak regular army personnel as volunteers, on leave or
absent without leave (AWOL) with full pay and allowances
looking out for some adventure, honours and awards. The
fourth category was Muslim deserters from the Jammu and
Kashmir State 'Forces who joined the enemy ranks with their
weapons and equipment
The Raiders Raid
767
The Raiders Start Raiding
Communal riots and harrowing tales of savage orgies
started all over Punjab soon after Jmnah announced his
"Direct Action" plan in 1946, resulting in an influx of Hindu
and Sikh refugees from across the border into the State
territory The fall of Khizr Hiyat Ministry in Punjab in March
1947 added fuel to the fire, and 14 August 1947,
Independence Day of Pakistan was the last proverbial straw
when all hell broke loose in the districts of Jhelum and
Gujranwala adjoining the State, besides of course in the rest
of the two halves of Punjab. This gave rise to numerous raids
of varying intensity from the Pakistani Punjab into the State
territory all along its border. In other words, Pakistani inspired
and organised raids started territorial infringement of the
State well before even the official birth of the new Dominion.
These initial raids took place mostly on the Jhelum front
when thousands of traumatized homeless Hindus and Sikh
fleeing for their lives from Rawalpindi and Jhelum districts
were chased across River Jhelum by pursuing armed groups
some of whom were in Pakistani Army uniforms. The riots in
Oghi area of Black Mountains in Hazara district were the
most savage where atrocities on the hapless people reached a
crescendo sending streams of refugees over the Hill- Begam
Ferry into Mirpur district As already noted, the entire border
region from Chichian to Manawar had already become
sensitive with the Poonch Rebellion gaining in momentum.
The general situation had become extremely grave with the
local Muslim population conniving with Pakistani agents
provocateurs spreading poisonous propaganda including
provocative posters, leaflets amongst the gatherings in
mosques inciting social and communal unrest.
River Jhelum, which formed the natural boundary of the
State with Pakistan from Kohala in the north to Mangla in the
south, could be easily crossed at numerous points where
regular ferries used to operate. In order to arrest further
Pakistani infiltration into the State, as a first step, with effect
from 4*^ September, all boats that came to the eastern bank of
762
Military Plight of Pakistan
the river were captured and destroyed, after payment of
compensation to the ferrymen
As they reached the border, the Hindus and Sikhs had to
be protected from t. eir pursuers, fed organised and led to
safety towards destinations of their choice Similarly, Muslim
refugees going into opposite direction had to be protected
and given safe passage
Colonel Akbar Khan, DSO, was Director Weapons &
Equipment at General Headquarters Pakistan. It was he who
had taken the initiative in setting the ball rolling for the raids
which, in course of time, were to graduate into a full-fledged
invasion of the State Again, it was Akbar Khan who had
formulated the basic plan under the title of "Armed Revolt
Inside Kashmir" and was the moving spirit behind organising,
equipping, and financing the "Raids" in Kashmir This subject
was exercising his mind even before the Partition. In
anticipation of the events yet to unfold,® while he was in
General Headquarters (India), he had withdrawn large
quantity of maps of Jammu and Kashmir from the Survey of
India. He was taken off his Army job and was appointed
Military Adviser to the Prime Minister thereby ruffling many
feathers, since a large number of officers senior to him were
waiting in the wings for a prestigious appointment of this
nature Soon after the "Mother of All Raids" was launched in
the Valley, Akbar Khan assumed command of all major
operations, especially in the Valley under the grandiose
pseudonym of "General Tariq" In this connection it may be
recalled that initially, Mr. Zaman Kiani was to be in charge of
operations from across the Punjab Border and Mr. Khurshid
Anwar, a commander of Muslim League National Guards was
in command of the Sector north of Rawalpindi
*By this time, 2 JAK Battalion under Lieutenant Colonel
Abdul Hamid Khah'was deployed in penny pockets at Owen
Pattan, Saligram, Rajauii’, KotH, Ban Bridge and Sensa with
the Battalion headquarters and one company at Naushera
Similarly, 3 JAK Battalion under ‘Lieutenarvt Colonel Puran
The Raiders Raid
163
Singh Thapa was thinly spread over Hill-Begam, Mangla Fort,
Chachian, Jatley-Alibeg with the Battalion headquarters and
rest of the sub-units at Mirpur
"The first major 'guerilla' incident occurred in Bagh
tehsil on 27 August, when Jemadar Khurd Singh and four
State Forces signalers were kidnapped by a Muslim crowd,
bound hand and foot and thrown into the Mahal river Two
days later, the Sikh gurudwara at Ali Beg was threatened by a
big Muslim gathering" although a Gorkha platoon was posted
there for the specific purpose of protection of the
Gurudwara ®
In Bagh-Poonch area, more tribesmen reinforced the
Poonch Rebellion. "Tons from the Kurram, a Lashkar from
Dir, Zadarans and even Tajiks from Afghanistan and Ghilzais
perhaps formed the largest part."’°
Some time after the first wave of raids had started m the
southern sector of the State, Maharaja of Patiala visited
Srinagar in July 1947 As a consequence of personal
relationship between the two Maharajas, one infantry
battalion, the 1®* Patiala Infantry, and one battery of mountain
artillery from the Patiala State Forces arrived in Jammu and
Kashmir during the first fortnight of October 1947.
Desertions & Treachery
On the night of 15/16 October 1947, a large party of
raiders laid siege to Tharochi Fort^’ where two companies of
2 JAK Battalion, one Gorkha and one Muslim had taken
refuge after fighting in Owen-Sensa area. The raiders were
wearing distinctive mazri shirts, a hallmark of the tribesmen,
or were in Pak O.G. uniforms. Brigadier Chhattar Singh in
command of the Mirpur Brigade ordered his Brigade Major
(BM), Major Nasarullah Khan to take two platoons of 3 JAK
Battalion to deliver supplies and ammunition to the garrison
in the Fort. On the way, he also assumed command of two
companies sent earlier to relieve the besieged garrison. Fie
deployed the Muslim Company on perimeter defence duty
764
Military Plight of Pakistan
outside the Fort and gave time off to the Gorkhas to rest,
which was most welcome after the previous actions and
hardships Major Nasarullah Khan then called a meeting of all
Muslim officers and JCOs and hatched a plan to eliminate the
non-Muslim elements of the Force. During the night, the
Muslim Company butchered the sleeping Gorkhas It was the
worst kind of treachery, a cold-blooded murder of
unsuspecting compatriots The Gorkha Company
Commander, Captain Prem Singh was strangled to death by
Muslim "brother officers" of his own Battalion Two Gorkha
JCOs and 30 Other Ranks (OR) managed to escape the
massacre and fled to J hangar to report the incident Next day,
Major Nasarullah Khan led the Muslim troops to Tharochhi
Fort where the garrison, blissfully ignorant of the
developments of the night before, and unaware of what was
to befall them soon, received the relieving column with joy.
And at night, the unsuspecting Gorkhas were all murdered in
a ghastly repeat performance. Their commander, "Captain
Raghubir Singh Thapa was tortured to death
A large well-armed force of raiders attacked Bhimber-
Munawar area on 18/19 October and again on the 27*^''. In
this instance, the attacking force was supported by tanks and
mechanized vehicles Bhimber fell to the enemy on the 29*.
The time period of this particular action highlights the level of
planning and coordination between various sectors in which
Pak Forces had suddenly become over active This just goes
to prove — since proof was very much required at that point
of time even though it is completely irrelevant at this point of
time — that Pak Army contingents were in the forefront at a
very early stage of the hostilities.
Rajauri was a small town whose population was mostly
Hindu business corhmunFty. It was garrisoned by two platoons
of 2 JAK Battalion, one Gorkha and the other Dogra. During
October 1947, this town was invested by the Muslim
elements of the town aided in targe measure by their co-
religionists from the nearby rural areas ar>d reinforced by tfw
Qabailis. The smalt beleaguered garrison tveld otit against
The Raiders Raid
765
repeated attacks but finally capitulated on 1 1 November
1947 resulting in the usual orgy of loot, killings, abductions
and rape which was the "Standard Operating Procedure"
adopted by the enemy in all such cases Major Angrez Singh
with two platoons of troops from the Training Battalion at
Jammu managed to extricate the inhabitants and succeeded
in rescuing many thousands from the clutches of sure torture
and death But the Garrison Commander, Subedar Major
Bhim Singh was killed in action
Mangla Fort was of considerable civil and military
significance in as much as the headworks of the Upper
Jhelum Canal were located there Its importance also lay in
the Fort's temple dedicated to Goddess Durga, the
Regimental Deity, on whom the 'War Cry' of the Regiment is
based — "Durga Mata ki Jai" And the Fort had a Gurudwara
too. One platoon of 3 JAK Battalion was posted there for
general duties On 7'’’ November 1947 an old woman sought
admission in the Fort She was carrying two letters, one for
Jemadar Khajoor Singh and the other for the Zaildar, Girdhari
Lai, one in Urdu and the other in English sent by Captain
Mohammed Azam of the State Forces asking the garrison
commander, Jemadar Khajoor Singh to surrender.
By this time Mangla Fort garrison had been under siege
for some weeks and was low on ammunition, but had plenty
of gunpowder and a stock of muzzleloaders of ancient
vintage. The situation had become so grave that the garrison
commander decided to accept the risk of using these guns to
fire pebbles on the enemy, perhaps the only instance of such
desperation in recent military history. By ZS'** November, the
situation inside the Fort had become quite unbearable The
enemy had sealed all routes of withdrawal. The small garrison
under a valiant JCO had held on for one month and 20 days
against heavy odds when it capitulated to overwhelming
enemy strength. As was customary for the raiders and the
erstwhile comrades in arms, loot, arson, torture and death
was the only fate that awaited the garrison and the civilians in
the Fort
166
Military Plight of Pakistan
Kotli, like Rajauri was a predominantly. Hindu business
community prosperous town situated on the Mirpur - Poonch
'forward' road. About 300 hostiles had occupied all the
heights around the town The besieged garrison of 9 JAK
Battalion was attacked on night 16/17 November by a strong
enemy force numbering about 3,000 supported by MMGs
and mortars. One Muslim platoon commander posted on a
tactical feature for defence of the town defected to the
enemy prior to the main attack The State Forces garrison
repulsed the attack despite being heavily outnumbered, and
200 enemy dead left behind were counted on the littered
battlefield
One Sher Tamroz with a mixed force of local Muslims
and Qabailis surrounded the small State Forces garrison at
Jhangar on Naushera- Mirpur Road This place was
administratively a good campsite with plenty of water The
garrison here held on for many weeks against numerous
enemy assaults, which lacked punch Fortunately for the Kotli
garrison, 50 Para Brigade’^ under Brigadier Y.S. Paranjpye
reached Jammu on 28 October 1947, just one day after India
intervened militarily to save Srinagar by airlifting the first
fighting contingent. But this Brigade came with only one
infantry battalion — and that too considerably under strength
3 Rajput commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Dharam Pal
had only six officers and 460 Other Ranks while its second
battalion, 1“ Punjab joined only on 13'*’ November
Fortunately, the Brigade had one Company of Mahar MGs
and got 1* Patiala Infantry in location — this Battalion having
been sent earlier by the Maharaja of Patiala as a gesture of
friendly assistance. These troops relieved the Jhangar garrison
on 19 November. The next day, the relief column
commenced dieir advance to Kotli, which was relieved on
27‘*' November — havinjg faced numerous enemy assaults
during a siege lasting six weeks. Xfter evacuating about 900
refugees, the refief colUfrtn withdrew to Jhangar on 28'^
November, and thereafter to Jammu
The Raiders Raid
167
The above pattern of operations by Indian Army in the
Jammu Region leaves a lingering impression that they were
fighting on an ad-hoc basis without a coherent plan
The raiders captured Bhimber on 29 October 1947
followed by Mendhar on 3''' November. They pushed out the
State Forces garrison from Bagh to Poonch on 9“' November
and captured Rajauri on the 11 with another success against
Mirpur garrison on the 25'*’ — all in quick succession. This
fast pace of progress was made possible on account of short
and easy lines of communications from Pakistan to the
southern borders of the State, besides of course sound
planning and competent leadership Thus, while attention
was riveted on the Valley, a grave situation was developing on
the southern borders of the State whence the hostiles were
heading towards Jammu itself. However, as a palliative, one
thousand rifles were sent to Paranjpye for raising Home
Guards from amongst the ex-servicemen in the region west of
Akhnur, to assist the locals in resisting the raiders
By now the reader would have noticed a persistent trend
amongst Muslim officers and men of the State Forces, who
had otherwise served the Regiment with loyalty and
distinction for a long period of time, to revert to desertion
and treachery at the first opportunity. Unfortunately, there
were numerous more such occasions all over the State when
these renegades stabbed their Dogra, Gorkha and Sikh
colleagues in the back. Cold blooded murder of sleeping
unsuspecting comrades in arms at night. Torture and killing of
brother officers in the mess premises. Unfortunately, in the
changed communal equations, this tragic breakdown of
espirit de corps and military camaraderie became second
nature with the Muslim component of the State Force all over
the State.
Indian military forces intervened in the Kashmir Valley on
27 >h October 1947 Their successful repulsion of the initial
invasion by Pakistan has generally overshadowed the fact that
their poor cousins of the State Forces had been fighting the
168
Military Plight of Pakistan
enemy raiders as well as their own Muslim comrades in arms,
organised and led by Pakistani military officers including
those of the erstwhile INA, right from the middle of July
1947, and in some cases still earlier too. These brave men —
Dogras, Gorkhas and Sikhs — had been fighting against heavy
odds. The terrain, climate, communications, armaments,
supplies, numerical strength, et al, were all stacked high
against these small isolated garrisons commanded by junior
leaders with extremely limited resources, with practically no
help or a word of cheer from the higher ups
A sizeable chunk of rural population in Jammu region was
hostile to the administration, more so towards the State
Forces in particular. Military intelligence was non-existent;
there was no network at all, let alone a reliable one. To
compound the all round adverse situation, their own
compatriots turned against them on grounds of religion,
always at the most inopportune moments of vagaries of battle
turning the scales against them. Yes, they fought alone.
Initially, soon to be joined in strength by the Indian Army and
the Indian Air Force.
The raids from across the border were not limited only to
the southwestern parts of the State in the Mirpur-Kotli-
Rajauri-Naushera sectors, far from it. The raids further up
North, and treachery of Muslim officers and men against their
Dogra-Corkha-Sikh compatriots in the Domel-Muzzaffarabad
sector was no less diabolical.
One more striking factor that emerges from the above
narrative is that the State Forces troops together with the
Garrison Felice companies were strung out in an arc all along
the State borders, in penny pockets. Nothing was left to
protect die heartland, and no reserves at all in the hands of
the Chief Staff or the Maharaja whereby they could influence
any situation. 9 JAK Battalion, which was m reserve at
Srinagar/ had already been committed in Poonch sector. It is
not that the higher authorities were not aware of this lacuna,
they Just did not have the resources to face the situation
The Raiders Raid
169
squarely They just did not have any more troops in the kitty,
nor were they designed, organised or equipped to fight a
regular war at such a large scale over such dispersed locartions
against so superior an enemy
PRE-ACCESSION DEVELOPMENTS
Mian Iftikharuddin, educated at Oxford, owner of the
Pakistan Times and a scion of a wealthy family of West
Punjab having leftist leanings visited Srinagar in August-
September 1947 to establish contacts with Kashmiri leaders
with a view to secure their assistance in Pakistani attempts for
accession of the State. Major (later Lieutenant Colonel) A S B.
Shah, Joint Secretary Foreign Affairs of the Government of
Pakistan also visited Srinagar on 8*'’ October 1947 as an
emissary of Mr Mohammed Ah Jinnah, the Governor General
of Pakistan. He brought a blank Form of Accession for
signature of the Maharaja. He also met the new Prime
Minister, Mr. Mehr Chand Mahajan but Major Shah had to
return a disappointed man when discussions became rather
acrimonious on the subject of supplies and 'economic
blockade'.
Mehr Chand Mahajan on relinquishing his job in the
Boundary Commission returned to his old job of a judge of
the High Court of what had now become East Punjab. Soon
after that, on 18 September 1947 the Maharaja offered him
the post of Prime Minister of his State. Being a Dogra from
Kangra, he was a natural choice when R.C Kak became a
liability in that chair After consultations with Pandit Nehru,
Sardar Patel, Mr. V.R Menon, the Governor General, and also
a meeting with Mahatma Gandhi, Mr Mahajan took eight
months leave of absence from the High Court and finally
assumed the appointment of Prime Minister on 18 October
1947, just a few days before a chain of cataclysmic events
were to break out In the State. Mr. B.L. Batra became his
Deputy, having assumed the appointment much earlier It
may be of passing interest to mention that while Sardar Patel
Military Plight of Pakistan
170
was more than happy with Mahajan as the replacement of
Kak, Pandit Nehru was not at all comfortable with Mahajan
since the later was rather distrustful of Sheikh Abdullah This
strain in personal relationship was the primary cause of exit
of Mahajan as early as March 1948, paving the way for the
Sheikh to become full-fledged Prime Minister of the State
The Chief of Staff of the State Forces, Major General
Scott submitted a note to the Maharaja on 22 September
1947 He summed up the overall military situation in the light
of numerous raids from across the border in Pakistan,
communal holocaust, the resultant mayhem and its affect on
the civil population particularly the Hindus and Sikhs The
grim situation the State would be faced with during the fast
approaching winter more so in the light of 'economic
blockade' imposed by Pakistan. The General emphasised the
extreme urgency of the situation and the grave risks involved.
"Although General Scott had done nothing which could have
been termed a disloyal act, his leanings towards Pakistan, as
an Englishman must have been all too evident to the
Maharaja. If nothing else he is known to have given his tacit
support to an offer of General Sir Douglas Gracey, Chief of
Staff of the Pakistani Army to establish Pakistani piquets and
patrols on the roads from Pakistan into the State via Domel
and Islamabad in order to prevent Pakistani raiders from
entering the State It is difficult to believe that General Scott
did not realize that the offer was being made to facilitate the
planned invasion rather than prevent it Whatever be the
reasons, soon after submitting his report the General was
relieved of his duties on 24* September and sent on leave till
the termination of his term on 1st November. He handed
over charge to Brigadier Rajinder Singh’® and left for England,
via Rawalpindi. In fairness to General Scott it must be
mentioned that, having been the Chief of Staff of the State
Forces for nearly eleven years, "as a last act of service to the
State he sent a cryptic message from Rawalpindi on his way
to England stating that raidprs In their thousands were being
collected, armed and trained in places like Abbottabad and
The Raiders Raid
171
Nathia Call for the last six months for an invasion of the
State."'®
On 29 September 1947, Sheikh Abdullah was released
from prison after he submitted a letter of apology to the
Maharaja affirming his loyalty to the Dogra regime Soon after
that, other leaders of the National Conference were also
released from prison
Notwithstanding all the grave developments, the
Maharaja Sir Han Singh was still indecisive Lord
Mountbatten had made every possible effort to avoid a
disaster But the Maharaja continued to be under the evil
influence of the Raj Guru and as well as his Russian friend.
He was still dreaming of his kingdom suddenly looming large
on the world map as the Asian Switzerland, one point,
perhaps the only point on which he and the Sheikh were in
complete agreement, albeit for entirely different personal
reasons, each of his own. In fact, in a meeting between the
Maharaja, Sheikh Abdullah and Mr. Mehr Chand Mahaj’an
held about one month after the Accession during which
Sheikh Abdullah ".. suggested that it would be a very good
thing If India and Pakistan were made to recognise the State
as an independent unit like Switzerland .. and the Maharaj'a
nodded assent"'® Of course, the motives of the two key
players in this game were entirely contradictory. The
Maharaja wanted to preserve his Dynasty in perpetuity;
Sheikh Abdullah was only interested in the welfare of his
people, the Kashmiris and their Kashminyat.
In Punjab the Muslim League was supreme and Muslim
fundamentalism a heady wine But NWFP was different.
Although the population of this Province was more than 90%
Muslim, the "Frontier Gandhi" Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and
his Party always stood for secular democracy. It was a pro-
Congress province, always in favour of Indian National
Congress, all through the movement and struggle for
independence of India. However, when Independence finally
did come to the country, the "Frontier Gandhi" his people
Military Plight of Pakistan
172
and their province were far removed from the Indian polity
Unfortunately, being a predominantly Muslim province and
geographically contiguous to Pakistan, he and his people had
no option whatsoever. Nonetheless, in accordance with the
agreements on formation of the two sovereign Dominions, a
referendum was held in NWFP whether the Province wanted
to join Pakistan — Yes, or No The Referendum did not
provide independence as a choice It was held on 6-17 July
1947 giving a 'yes' vote verdict with a very small margin.
Notwithstanding an extremely small margin computed in
favour of Pakistan, Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, the Chief
Minister of NWFP took more than an active part, a most
decisive part indeed in recruiting, organising, arming and
transporting the tribal Lashkars to Punjab, and thence to the
borders of Jammu and Kashmir State
It IS of interest here to note that Sir George Cunnigham
was the Governor of NWFP at this time He was a veteran of
NWFP service, having earlier served in the Province in
various capacities. It was almost a lifetime career for him in
this Province, and no doubt he was aware of the British
policy not to permit, let alone recruit the tribesmen from
west of the Durand Line for any serious venture outside. In a
radical departure from that time tested policy, concentration
and transportation of thousands of tribesmen in Peshawar
eastwards could possibly not have been hidden from him. He
must have known what was cooking, where, and why. Now,
Sir Cunnigham knew General Sir Rob Lockhart fairly well,
more so since the latter was his predecessor as Governor of
NWFR Further, it would also be reasonable to assume that he
knew the Supreme Commander of the Joint Defence
Council, Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck as also General
Sir Frank Messervey, Commander-in-Chief Pak Army; any
assumption to the contrary cannot possibly withstand the test
of impartial scrutiny. Then, how come, this gigantic plot of
inducting thousands upon thousands of well armed and well
provided tribesmen did not reach thp eyes and ears of the
Joint Defence Council, nor the British Commanders-rn-Chief
The Raiders Raid
173
of armies of the newly formed Dominions? And even if we
assume for the sake of argument that these principal British
actors on the scene were not personally known to each other,
they were professionally duty bound to communicate vital
informations to their superiors and colleagues alike One
cannot therefore escape the conclusion that the entire affair
was a British plot and conspiracy against India, if not in its
entirety, then at least with full complicity of the British The
role of Filed Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, Supreme
Commander of Armed Forces of both India and Pakistan is
most astonishing and deplorable It tantamount to
professional dishonesty of the most heinous kind, all the
more so since he, as the neutral person right at the very top
rung, had complete and free access not only to both the
Governments and their Armed Forces, but was also in
constant regular contact with them by telephone, radio,
courier, etc. No doubt he was the top villain of the piece
Yet another factor that gives rise to this plot-angle is the
fact that Colonel Akbar Khan, Military Adviser to the Prime
Minister of Pakistan, had his headquarters right within the
premises of Pak Army Headcjuarters, in the same building.
Therefore, how could General Frank Messervey remain
Ignorant of what was happening right under his nose in the
very same building in which he worked every day in and day
out But he did he not report the matter to his superior
officer, the Field Marshal. Why not? ... Be that as it may, it is
on record that at no time before 24 October 1947 did Field
Marshal Auchinleck draw the attention of the Government of
India to the extremely serious developments going on for
over three months by then on the Pakistan-J & K common
border. The fact is that the British officers were in hand-in-
glove situation with Pakistani political as well as military
establishment in so far as the future status of Jammu and
Kashmir wai$ concerned. Their stance was simply, and totally
anti'lndia. Of course there were a few notable exceptions
too, like Lieutenant General Sir Dudley Russel.
174
Military Plight of Pakistan
It was a most extraordinary situation indeed, at least in so
far as India was concerned.
THE MOTHER OF ALL RAIDS
The ushering in of Independence brought in its wake
numerous administrative problems of mind boggling
magnitude and complexity. The Indian political leadership
was deeply immersed in tackling the day to day problems
arising out of the communal holocaust as well as the
upheavals resulting from transmigration of population on an
unimaginable scale, together with the complexities of
numerous princely states They hardly had the time or the
inclination to pay attention to what was underway in
Pakistan, or what mischief(s) the new leaders of that country
were upto. On top of that, "the usual all pervading attitude of
moral superiority and rectitude shrouded the Indian thinking
to the complete exclusion of any evil designs, not even by the
devil"!
Enemy Intelligence
The Partition of India and subsequent division of assets
led to total dislocation of intelligence set-up in so far as India
was concerned. Mostly the Indian Police Service officers
manned intelligence Bureau of the Government of' undivided
India While in most other fields the division of assets and
resources was being amicably resolved, the Director of
Intelligence who had opted for service in Pakistan took
everything with him, lock, stock and barrel And what he
could not, in the true- to-character- approach of the
intelligence community, he made sure that it was destroyed,
destruction in the military intelligence sense, destroyed by
burning to absolute cinders and dust! The result was that with
the coming into being of Pakistan on 14 August 1947, she
had a well-established functioning intelligence service
whereas India had a mere semblance of it. The Indian set-up
was mostly on paper only, created after Independence, bbt
there was nothing concrete by way of intelligence sources.
The Raiders Raid
175
network of agents, information channels, communication
systems, nor were there any trained staff to sift the gram from
the chaff, and turn the information into usable intelligence
resource — collation in military terminology The Indian
Intelligence Bureau was badly handicapped as it was, more
so because of complete paralysis of civil administration in
Punjab 'with the result that all responsibility for all intelligence
fell on the rather narrow shoulders of the Military Intelligence
Directorate of Army Headquarters, which itself was trying to
cope up with Its teething troubles The unfortunate
consequence of this major deficiency was India's complete
Ignorance of Pak plans to usurp the State of Jammu and
Kashmir by means fair, or foul.
The British hierarchical control of Indian Armed Forces
further compounded the above situation against India,
resulting in India's complete ignorance of developments on
and across, the J & K — Pakistan border.
Lieutenant General L.P. Sen, DSO, has given a graphic
description in his Book, 'Slender Was the Thread', of the sad
state of affairs in the Ml Directorate when he took temporary
charge of the same as a Colonel All he had was bare
premises with odd junk strewn around, but nothing of any
intelligence value The worthy British had destroyed whatever
they could not take. There was no Indian officer in the
Directorate in any case. Whatever little tidbits of information
did come in, these were not properly processed; and if at all
done, were not made use of. For instance: When the raiders
attacked Bhimber in Mirpur district on 28/29 October, tanks
and flame-throwers supported them. Air photos taken by the
(R) lAF clearly showed tank tracks from Pakistan side and
across the Jammu-Pak border Obviously, this operation was
not an amateurish job hurriedly undertaken by mere tribals,
nor had the British ever equipped the Afridis with tanks and
flame-throwers! But if one decides to close one's eyes to an
unpleasant reality, the rational senses take a back seat and
truth is the first casualty. The reality of Pak regulars in
uniform, or in civvies on the pretext of being on leave, and
176
Military Plight of Pakistan
the ex-soldiers taking more than active part in the so called
raids, a euphemism for open invasion, could not have been
hidden from the British professionals at Delhi But did they
take cognizance?
As early as 4* October 1947, Dewan Chaman Lai, M P
received definite information from his source(s) in Pakistan
that large scale preparations were afoot to infiltrate tribesmen
from NWFP with the object of forcibly annexing the State to
Pakistan. "For this purpose, it had been arranged that army
personnel from Pakistan would join in these raids, but in
mufti It was also arranged to place 6,000 gallons of petrol
(and petrol was strictly rationed in those days so much so that
not a drop could be obtained without proper government
sanction) at the disposal of the insurgents, and as much
ammunition from the Government Ordnance Depot,
Rawalpindi, as was needed by the insurgents. A total of over
200 lorries and trucks and buses had been placed at the
disposal of these insurgents..." Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan,
Chief Minister of NWFP was personally coordinating these
activities. "The latest date of attack was fixed for 1 8 October
47" but delayed till 22 October 47.^°
The above information was passed onto Prime Minister
Nehru as well as Mr. Batra, the then Deputy Prime Minister
of the State
The authorities in Srinagar were so naive in this matter
that in September 1947, protest notes were sent to the
Government of Pakistan for the border violations. Their
naivete was all the more ironical because the Government of
Jammu and Kashmir had, in the past several occasions sent
reports of such raids and acts of looting, rape and murder to
the Government of Pakistan with a request that they curb the
local mischief mongers in the border areas. In other words,
the Government of Jarhmu and Kashmir was providing
intelligence to the Government of Pakistan confirming the
locations and extents of Pak misadventures’
The Raiders Raid
7 77
The net result of complete absence or failure of
intelligence set-up, or non-acceptance for use of whatever
little information was available, was that Pakistan had
succeeded in completing its preparations for the invasion of
the Valley, including subversion of numerous civil and military
officials, and the rank and file of the State administration as
well as the State Forces, without the State Government, or for
that matter even the Government of India having any inkling
of the sinister design, indeed a grand design in so far as
Pakistan was concerned. Unfortunately, the intelligence setup
did not show any appreciable improvement even m the later
stages of this campaign Mr B.N. Mullik joined the
Intelligence Bureau in September 1948 as Deputy Director in
charge of Internal Affairs including Kashmir,^’ and later rose
to be Its all-powerful Chief. He was a protege of Pandit
Nehru More often than not, the Bureau produced shameful
caricatures of half-baked intelligence with a mixture of
political intrigue to score points, rather than further the
national agenda. The end product was generally designed to
please the political superiors, rather than present a
professionally objective analysis — a trend setting
development in governance in Delhi for the decades to
come
"Operation Gulmarg" : Plans
Pakistan had set its heart on the Beauty Queen, the Vale
of Kashmir from Day One — if not still earlier, soon after the
Partition Plan became a concrete possibility And it brooked
no delay whatsoever in planning and launching its grand
design to take control of the Asian Switzerland.
The initial operational plan was m two phases. First phase
starting in September 1947 involving numerous small scale
raids and fifth column activities to shatter the State Forces, to
be followed by the "Mother of all Raids" in Jhelum Valley at
an appropriate time in the second half of October 1 947.
Wide spread fifth column activity was the key to the
initial plans Agent- provocateurs were inducted in the State
178
Military Plight of Pakistan
and they started functioning as early as June-July 1947
onwards to subvert the Muslim elements of civil services and
State Forces, achieving a very large measure of all round
success The initial sm ill scale raids were the overt military
part of this " centrally inspired grand design in the pattern
and timings of the (Uter) larger raids — the aim being to
keep up military pressure all along the border over a period
of months in order to draw out the J & K State Forces and
force them to split up into penny-packet outposts along the
border. At the same time, the economic blockade ... the
refusal of the Northern Command in Rawalpindi to continue
supplies of arms and ammunition and petrol to the J & K
Army., served further to hamstring the mobility and efficacy
of the State Forces. This grand design is confirmed by no
less a writer than Mr. Josef Korbel^^ in his book "Danger in
Kashmir" when' he says, "Ever since the Maharaja failed to
meet the time limit of accession, the Pakistan Government
pursued a policy of coercing him into accession to Pakistan
... Pakistan applied an economic blockade to coerce her into
accession ... The postal system did not work, savings and
postal bank accounts were tied up, postal cheque certificates
were not cashed and cheques on West Punjab banks were
not honoured.
The basic organisational structure of "Op Gulmarg" was
the Pathan Lashkars. Every Pathan tribe (clan) was required to
raise one Lashkar of 1,000 tribesmen. The -Deputy
Commissioners and Political Agents were responsible for
recruitment. One major, one captain and ten Junior
Commissioned Officers (JCOs) from regular army were
attached to each Lashkar. These army personnel were also all
Pathans, to dress amj live like all other members of the
Lashkar, On paper, fj^e-major was to act as 'adviser' to the
'Malik' who was nominally in command of his Lashkar, but
the ma|or was the d© f&do- commander of the Lashkar while
the captain was his staff officer and the JCOs commanded the
companies or groups, each about 100, strong. Colonel (later
Major Genera^ Aik^ar Khan, DSO, with the self-assumed ptjq
The Raiders Raid
179
of "General Tariq" was in overall command of the force.
Brigadier Sher Khan was to assist him and was sort of Liaison
Officer for Pak Army with the Task Force Their headquarters
were in the same building in Rawalpindi as the Pak Army
Commander-in-Chief
After enlistment, the Lashkars were required to
concentrate at Bannu, Wana, Peshawar, Kohat, Thai and
Nowshera by first week of September 1947 The Brigade
Commanders of these locations were required to issue arms
and ammunition to the Lashkars and help in equipping and
organising them These were to be issued from the various
Ordnance installations first to the Army units and then
through them to the Lashkars They were armed with light
machineguns, medium machine guns, Boyes' anti-tank rifles,
besides the usual .303 rife as the basic weapon of course.
The regular army officers and JCOs drawn from Frontier
Forcq Regiments/Rifles were to join their respective Lashkars
at these locations. All Lashkars were required to concentrate
at Abbottabad by October 1947 in a specially demarcated
and protected security zone about 10 miles outside the town.
Once in the security zone, no body was allowed to move out,
nor any visitors were to be permitted. The issuance of final
orders and briefing of tribesmen was also to be done at
Abbottabad
The British civil and military officials in the NWFP all
turned a blind eye to these goings-on; in fact, some of them
rendered active assistance. Inspector General of Police Grace
at Peshawar did not react at all and the British Deputy
Commissioner at Mianwali made arrangements to feed the
tribesmen in thousands. They did not prevent the Lashkar
lorries from crossing the Abbottabad Bridge While Frank
Messervey informed General Ldckhart of the impending
invasion, the latter did not pass on the information to the
Government he was serving "This failure to inform the
Indian Government led to an acrtnnonious exchange between
Nehru and Lockhart m late January 1948. Thereafter, the
latter resigned as the C-in-C and returned to Britain
180
Military Plight of Pakistan
The operational plan for "Op Gulmarg" involved the main
force of SIX Lashkars to advance from Domel to Uri-Baramula
and after capture of Srinagar Airfield, to secure Banihal Pass
Haji Pir Pass was also one of the vital objectives Two Lashkars
were to advance from there direct to Gulmrg so as to secure
the right flank of the mam force. A force of two Lashkars was
detailed to secure Tithwal and after crossing over the
Nastachun Pass was required to capture Sopore, Handwara
and Bandipur In addition a force of 1 0 Lashkars was to
operate in Poonch, Bhimber and Rawalkot sectors with
Jammu as the final objective.
The Azad Army' was responsible to provide guides Two
supply dumps, one each at Domel and Sialkot were to be
established by regular army administrative echelons to cater
to the needs of the two major thrusts 7 Infantry Division was
required to concentrate in Murree-Abbottabad area by 21
October 1947 with a brigade at Sialkot to provide back-up
support to the Lashkars D-Day was fixed as 22 October
1947.
The foregoing details of "Op Gulmarg" are based on a
very interesting, explosive and e.**' 'r account recorded by
Major General O.S. Kalkat when he was a Brigade Major in
Bannu Brigade in NWFP under a British Brigade Commander.
His brush with life-threatenmg danger and a somewhat
adventurous escape from Pakistan, and subsequent meeting
with Prime Minister Nehru are recounted in an anecdote in
Chapter 14 of this Book
It will thus be seen that despite all the care about secrecy,
information about the invasion leaked out to India; it is a
different matter altogether that Indian authorities chose not
to act on the same — by deliberation or otherwise! "Shiv
Saran Das was the Deputy Commissioner at Dera Ismail
Khan, the Southern district of NWFR He came to know of the
plan. He came on leave to India in late September and
informed the Government." Ofcourse, neither Indian
leadership nor the Army Headquarters reacted to safeguard
The Raiders Raid
181
the national interest "While on the Indian side the British
commanders were truant with the war, the role of British
officers in Pakistan was quite reverse It was really they who
had made the bold and ingenious plan to capture J&K by
using Pathan tribals as well as Pak regular forces in mufti
Pathans Invade in Full Force
Soon, all the pieces were in position on the board, at the
right place and time The agents-provocateurs had played
their hand The fifth column activity had amply proved its
worth The State Forces were indeed spread extremely thin
all along the border, neither depth in the forward defences,
nor any reserves at all One blow, and that was all that was
required to shatter the screen of defences occupied by the
State Forces During the first week of October 1947, border
posts all along the State borders were being constantly
engaged by tribesmen, and harassed by the local Muslims
besides their own comrades stabbing them m the back. On
the western front also, opposite the main approach to the
Valley, raider activities had substantially increased adding
greatly to the tension in the air. "The stage was being
carefully set for coup de grace"
4 JAK Battalion was one of the crack battalions of the
State Forces having served with distinction in Burma during
the Second World War Lieutenant Colonel Narain Singh, a
Jammu Dogra was the Commanding Officer with a fierce
pride in his Battalion in which he had served a long time.
Unfortunately for him, the Battalion was half Dogra Hindus
and half Poonchi Muslims. The Battalion was responsible for
defence of the borders in Muzzaffarbad-Domel sector,
guarding the mam artery of entry from the plains of Punjab
into the Valley — indeed the only major metalled road in the
State and the lifeline of the entire Valley
While enemy activity in Jammu sector in the Poonch-
Mirpur border area had been quite heavy over the past
couple of months, it had been all quiet on the western front
m the 4 JAK Battalion sector. Just as the Government of India,
182
Military Plight of Pakistan
and to a large extent the State Forces Headquarters in
Srinagar had been largely ignorant of what was cooking in the
Rawalpindi-Abbottabdad-Mansehra area, so was the
Commanding Officer of 4 JAK Battalion. Since more than
6,000 tribesmen had concentrated in the area with the
obvious purpose of invading the Valley, and reports of their
activities had percolated through the Hindu-Sikh refugees,
the Muslim company commanders continued to assure their
C O. that there was no substance in such reports He trusted
his company commanders much more than any other official
reports, or refugee -gossip to the contrary And this was soon
to prove to be his undoing.
Muslim troops in various battalions in the Frontier illaqa
in the north to Poonch-Mirpur area in the south had, by and
large, proved to be untrustworthy in as much as they had
time again remorselessly stabbed their non-Muslim
compatriots in the back at the very first opportunity Surely,
the State Force Headquarters as well as other battalion
commanders were conscious of this serious lacuna in their
midst, it was therefore suggested to Colonel Narain Singh that
Dogras replace Muslim elements of his Battalion, more so
because of the extremely sensitive assignment of his
Battalion. But the C.O. protested vehemently claiming that
this would be a great insult of his Battalion, which he would
not tolerate under any circumstances A typical Hindu Dogra
response of a high bred military officer — think no evil, hear
no evil, and if possible, see no evil even if it stares you in the
face! Such was his trust and faith in his command, in his
comrades in arms, in true spirit of an infantryman and a good
C.O., as it should be, (but not to the complete exclusion of
overwhelming evidence to the contrary).
The Muslim troops of this Battalion occupying forward-
defended localities provided a completely false sense of
security to the rest of the garrison in Domel area. They had
been in league with the organizers of "Op Culmarg" over the
past many days, generally on the pretext of assembly i^n the
mosques. Their subverston as part of the grand des^rv was
The Raiders Raid
163
already complete The commander of 'Azad Forces' had
established contact with Muslim JCOs of the Company who
had earlier served under him in Burma and they had assured
him of 100% support of all Muslim personnel of the Battalion.
And every single Muslim of 4 JAK Battalion, without a single
exception, defected to the enemy on the night of 21/22
October 1947 That fateful night about 5,000 tribesmen
armed with rifles, machine guns, mortars and grenades
crossed the border They were guided through the town areas
of Domel and Muzzaffarabad by the defectors from amongst
the Lohar Cali post of 'C' Company commanded by Captain
Azam
Muzzaffarabad Ransacked
Muzzaffarabad is situated astride Kishenganga River. This
was the key road Crossing Over River Jhelum and the primary
task of Colonel Naram Singh was to demolish this bridge in
case of an emergency. But the task of fifth columnists from
amongst the Battalion was to ensure that the raiders get a
clear passage over the bridge for their advance to Srinagar
The Poonchi Muslims of the Battalion had already entered
into a conspiracy to eliminate the Dogras and their CO so as
to clear the mam road for Pak infiltrators The Poonchis struck
in the early hours of 22 October 1947 and killed most of the
Dogras and their C.O It was an internal coup in the State
Forces of Jammu and Kashmir
The first military target, as was to be expected, was the
Battalion Quarter Guard Their very own Muslim comrades
killed Captain Ram Singh, the Battalion Adjutant and many of
his Dogra soldiers A footbridge, about 800 yards down
stream from Domel was the only unguarded crossing. The
invaders were guided to that crossing point by 'D' Company
personnel (all Muslims) and thus the Dogra Company
defences over the Domel Bridge were taken by the raiders
from the rear. The raiders w^nt for their kiH — raping, looting
and burning ad lib. The shops and houses were in flames.
Women were raped in the streets. Children were trampled to
784
Military Plight of Pakistan
death Such was the indescribable frenzy, ferocity and vicious
debauchery of the so-called liberators of Kashmir
It was blind faith and trust on one side, treachery and
deceit on the other Dogra versus Muslim, the former being
completely unaware of the new sad unequal equation
Subedar Mir Waz was holding a post at Chon He telephoned
Subedar Hukam Singh, the platoon commander at the
neighbouring post at Bhattik, that he was under heavy enemy
attack and requested for immediate help By this time Muslim
personnel of Hukam Singh's position had already deserted
considerably reducing his defence capability But still he
decided to reinforce Subedar Waz in order to fight the
common enemy, without in the least suspecting the motives
of his colleague And that was the end of Hukam Singh's
platoon All his men were in the trap, stripped down to
underwear, lined up on the Riverbank and shot in cold blood
by their very own comrades of yesterday Only one sepoy
managed to escape the massacre and somehow reached
Srinagar
'A' Company Commander, Lieutenant Labh Singh was
holding a fairly strong defended position in the Barsala-
Kohala Bridge area and his soldiers were all Dogras He
fought several small actions against the raider attacks with the
active help of Hindu and Sikh villagers along with the men of
the Garrison police, inflicting heavy casualties on the raiders
In the evening on 24 October 1947, a British Brigadier and a
Lieutenant Colonel, both of Pak Army, came over to Kohala
command post and sent for Labh Singh They explained to
him the gravity of general military situation in so far as the
Dogras were concerned, and asked him to surrender in
return for an assured safe passage to Rawalpindi Of course,
the offer was rejected As they were leaving, Jemadar Suraj
Prakash who had accompanied his Company Commander
sard to the British Brigadier, "Good-bye, Sir We shall meet
again if we live " The brigadier frowned and said, "You won't
live. Sahib Take it from me
The Raiders Raid
185
These prophetic words set the military grey matter m
motion He did a quick appreciation of the military situation
and concluded that his position had become untenable in the
true military sense With the enemy in occupation of Domel-
Muzzaffarabad and Pak regular Army in position at Kohala,
his Barsala post would soon be crushed out of existence
Labh Singh therefore abandoned his positions at last light on
25'^ October and withdrew southwestwards in the direction
of Poonch, with the Hindu-Sikh refugee column in tow
While retreating, he realised that his line of withdrawal was
blocked by the enemy m occupation of Topa Ridge
overlooking Bagala, and in that situation he could not
possibly extricate his troops and the refugees to safety He
therefore attacked Topa Ridge at 0215 am and in the process
captured one VCO (Subedar of Balauch Regiment) and eight
riflemen in Pak military uniforms The captured arms and
ammunition was issued to Hindu and Sikh refugees for
guarding the column Unfortunately, a rumour spread
amongst the refugees that the State Forces personnel had run
short of ammunition and were therefore planning to slip
away leaving the refugees to their fate The result was a
complete pandemonium and panic In desperation, some
Sikhs killed their own women, particularly young girls from
falling into the hands of the tribal raiders When Labh Singh
heard of this tragedy, he rushed in to stop this tragic massacre
by when, unfortunately, 3-400 females had already been
done to death An extremely unfortunate and tragic episode
in the face of sacrifices being made by the Dogras fighting
against most severe odds The column including the refugees
reached the safety of Bagh post on 31 October to join
Lieutenant Colonel Maluk Singh's force of 8 JAK Battalion
NOW Who ever said that British officers would not fight
in any war between India and Pakistan* Remember the fallout
from Junagarh fiasco? All the canons of moral high ground
were for application against India, to be deflected away from
Pakistan, always A British Brigadier in Kohala post when the
tnbals were physically ransacking Muzzaffarabad A
186
Military Plight of Pakistan
detachment of Baluch Regiment in regular Army uniforms at
Topa Ridge, Pakistani tanks and flame-throwers supporting
the raiders at Bhimber as early as end-August 1947, et al
Road to Srinagar was now open Srinagar was barely 100
miles away, just a few hours car drive' The glittering prize of
Valley Beautiful was right there, literally up for grabbing by
Pakistan without any further ado But there were many a
proverbial slips between the cup and the lips
VALIANT DEFENCE BY BRIGADIER RAJINDER SINGH
"The news of invasion was first received at Srinagar on
the morning of 22 October when the Officer Commanding
4''* Battalion spoke to the duty officer at Army Headquarters
on wireless and informed him of the catastrophe that had
befallen his troops The Battalion Headquarters was at that
time under attack by the enemy and Colonel Narain Singh
could not pass anything beyond an urgent request for
reinforcements, before going off the air Some Dogras who
had managed to escape the slaughter at Domel gave further
information to the Army Headquarters at Srinagar regarding
fate of the Battalion and their C O By the time this news of
the disaster reached Srinagar around noon on 22"'' October,
almost a mile long convoy of lorries and trucks with jubilant
tribesmen was leisurely winding its way up the Jhelum Valley
The defences at Garhi, 90 miles west of Srinagar
crumbled on the first day itself, viz 22"'' October, and the
enemy launched a three pronged attack on the
communication centre of Uri from the directions of
Muzzaffarabad, Domel and Poonch
The news of the invasion and fall of Domel Bridge intact
was a most devastating piece of information for Brigadier
Rajinder Singh, the Officiating Chief of Staff, as well as for the
Maharaja Hart Siftgh was so upset and excited that he put on
his military uniform and wanted the Chief of Staff to organise
reinforcements so that His Highness could personaify lead
them to battle to stem the eiierrty advance, to defend his dwrt*
The Raiders Raid
187
kingdom personally The Chief of Staff managed to dissuade
the Maharaja after considerable arguments and that too, only
when the Brigadier assured His Highness that he would
personally lead the troops in battle and stop the enemy well
short of the capital
All available reserves under the Army Headquarters had
already been committed at Chirala and Poonch So, for all
practical purposes, there was nothing in the kitty Brigadier
Rajinder Singh at the head of a heterogeneous force of three
officers — Captains Prithi Singh, Khazan Singh and Nasib
Singh — and about 150 men comprising of two platoons of
the 1 Battalion, one platoon of the 8'*' Battalion, some
personnel of the 7‘^ Battalion and most of the staff and
students of the Training School, a section of MMGs and a
detachment of 3" mortars from Badami Bagh Cantonment in
Srinagar left the City at about 6 30 pm on 22"'* October in
military transport augmented by civilian buses, and reached
U'ri around midnight. While the CO was organising defences
at Uri, he sent two platoons under Captain Pnthi Singh
towards Raghi, about 12 miles short of Domel when they met
a stream of Hindu and Sikh refugees fleeing from
Muzzaffarabad and Domel, By this time. Brigadier Rajinder
Singh had also come forward.
"The first clash with enemy took place on the morning of
23 October when the Column was half a mile short of Garhi
In a head-on collision, in which each side was surprised by
the other, the enemy, due to his overwhelming numerical
superiority ultimately got the better of the small Kashmir
force. After a sharp engagement in which the leading platoon
suffered its commander Subedar Duni Chand killed and a
few others wounded. Brigadier Rajinder Singh withdrew his
force to Hattian 4 km further back and took up a proper
delaying position there... While the wounded which included
Captain Prithi Singh were evacuated to Srinagar, Brigadier
Rajinder Singh flashed off a message to Army Headquarters
suggesting the following. -
188
Military Plight of Pakistan
* All the available men in the Cantonment to be
formed into units and dispatched to the front immediately
* Additional supporting weapons to be procured from
somewhere and sent up urgently
* One Company from Punch to advance via Hajipur
and join up with the force at Uri
* The Company of the 4* Battalion located at Kupwara
to immediately move down to Baramula and thence to Uri "
Since the enemy strength was overwhelming m numbers,
Rajmder Singh withdrew to another position ahead of Uri
with a view to delay the enemy advance Thus fighting one
delaying action after another during the whole of 23"^
October, this small force finally withdrew to Uri by nightfall
where main defences were being organised
Meanwhile the Maharaja had taken personal command of‘
Army Headquarters at Srinagar Brigadier Rajmder spoke to
Brigadier Faqir Singh, Commander Srinagar Brigade who
promised to send further reinforcements, about 80 men with
some 3" mortars and medium machine guns Captain Jawala
Singh reached Uri around 3 00 am 24 October with these
additional men and weapons "Jawala Singh while bringing an
assurance that action on the Brigadier's other suggestions was
in hand had also brought with him a written order from His
Highness, the Maharaja, binding Brigadier Rajmder Singh to
hofd Uri at all costs even if it meant fighting to the last man
and the last round
By this time, situation at Uri also had become quite
precarious with hordes of raiders fast approaching the small
township Rajmder Stngh got tJie steel Girder Bridge at Uri
demolished thus holding up further advance of tribal Lashkars
for the whole day of 24*. It is not to say that the raiders were
not able to cross and proceed to Srmagiar They could, and
they would have easily marched upto the capital and
captured it, if they wanted to and that was the big 'if' The
The Raiders Raid
189
tribesmen had not come all the way from the Frontier
Province for securing any such territorial gains for Pakistan.
Their sole motivation was love of plunder, loot, booty and
women, to be taken back to their homes in NWFP for which
availability of their own transport was sine qua non No
lorries, no move forward Being basically undisciplined in
nature, no amount of persuasion could make them change
their mind So they remained on the western end of the
demolished bridge till diversions could be prepared for the
lorries to get across
Meanwhile, as a diversion from boredom of waiting, they
let themselves loose at whatever was to be found anywhere
around the place. Preparation of a crossing for vehicles over
the demolished bridge site took about two days, thus
delaying the debussed column of invaders. In the ultimate
analysis, it is this delay caused by demolition of the bridge by
Brigadier Rajinder Singh that saved Srinagar, and the Valley of
Kashmir for India In the meantime, Commander-in-Chief of
Indian Army received "official" news of the invasion on 24**’
October. On the morning of that day, Indian Army was
directed "to examine and prepare plans for sending troops to
Kashmir by air and road " The proposed tasks of the military
units were: "to secure the airfield at Srinagar, to render
assistance to the Government of Kashmir in maintaining law
and order in Srinagar and, if possible, to drive away any
tribesmen who might have entered the city."^^
Mahura Power Fails
The hordes of tribesmen in their distinctive mazri dress
came close to the hastily organised and ill-prepared Un-
defences, and keeping them engaged frontally, they resorted
to their usual tactics of infiltration and bypassing prepared
defences. A large force of the enemy crossed over to the
north bank of )helum and moved ahead to recross the river
over another footbridge further upstream thus completely
out-flanking the State troops at Uri. In the face of these
dangerous moves by the raiders, Rajinder Singh had no
7 90
Military Plight of Pakistan
option but to abandon Uri When the withdrawing State
Forces troops reached in the vicinity of Mahura power house
around 11 30 pm on 24'^ October, the staff at the power
house thought that the invaders were coming Since they had
already heard various stories about their ferocity and
savagery, alarm and panic set m, and they put the power
plant out of action plunging the Valley including the capital in
darkness thereby adding further to the confusion and panic
amongst the civilian population When the Mahura power
was cut off, Dussehra festivities were in full swing in Srinagar
and the Maharaja was busy accepting nazaar from the nobles
as that day, 24* October was also his birthday
In order to prevent the enemy bypassing from the north
and later crossing over to the south bank of river Jhelum, the
Brigadier ordered Captain Jawala Singh to demolish the
footbridges across the river in this area This was successfully
accomplished The raiders were thus denied Mahura during"
the daylong skirmishes on the 25* after which Rajmder Singh
was forced to withdraw to another delaying position at
Buniyar
The teeming multitude of tribesmen came in droves,
wave after wave, awe inspiring in their sheer numbers and
appearance The Qabaihs infiltrated between Mahura and
Rampur in large numbers Rajinder Singh therefore decided
to withdraw to Rampur and thence to the Sen Ridge, short of
Baramula On the way out, the State troops fought numerous
rearguard actions at roadblocks and tried to delay the enemy
as much as they could It was a most unequal fight, and at the
best of times, a most difficult of military operations to
conduct At the second road block rearguard action at Diwan
Mandir, the Brigadier's driver was killed and the Brigadier
himself was mortally wounded "We have it on the testimony
of Captain Khazan Smgb who was in the same vehicle as
Brigadier Rajinder Singh, that he and his men offered to carry
the Brigadier on their backs but the Brigadier appreciating
that carrying him would hinder the withdrawal, asked them
to leave him there, and themselves rush to the next defensive
The Raiders Raid
191
position. That was the last that was seen of this gallant son of
Jammu The tragedy of the situation lies in the fact that,
unknown to the Brigadier and Captain Khazan Singh, the last
vehicle carrying the rear guard was yet to cross the roadblock
when Captain Khazan Singh and his men abandoned the
vehicle and took to the hills When the last vehicle finally
arrived on the spot, its commander Subedar Swaran Singh
steered his vehicle past the abandoned vehicle through
enemy fire without knowing that Brigadier Rajinder Singh was
lying wounded somewhere around " In the meantime, the
Company of 4*'^ Battalion from Kupwara under Captain
Prabhat Singh moved down towards Baramula as had been
suggested by Rajinder Singh. He deployed his Company and
the remnants of Jawala Singh's force a little beyond Baramula
while Jawala Singh himself wounded took the dead and
wounded to Srinagar
The death of Brigadier Rajinder Singh brought to an end
the heroic efforts made by a small band of dedicated soldiers
to stem the advance of a multitude of cruel and despicable
bands of raiders who neither knew nor respected any human
values in their avarice and greed for loot, plunder and
women With a handful of men, and fighting against
impossible odds, this gallant Brigadier delayed the enemy
advance long enough for military aid from India to reach the
Capital, and thus he was personally respdnsible for not only
saving the Valley for India but also saved Srinagar suffering
the same fate as was inflicted on Baramula. For his personal
courage and leadership. Brigadier Rajinder Singh was
awarded the Maha Vir Chakra, the first recipient of India's
second highest gallantry award, while Subedar Ram Saran
Dass of the 8**’ Battalion who commanded the two
detachments of 3" mortars was awarded the Vir Chakra. In
the words of Lieutenant General K.S. Katoch, Colonel
Commandant of J & K Rifles, "'In fact, it is my considered
view that but for the sacrifice made by Brigadier Rajinder
Smgh arid later by Lieutenant Colonel Ranjit Rai of Indian
Army, We would undoubtedly have lost the Valley." In a
792
Military Plight of Pakistan
similar vein, "In my opinion three factors saved Srinagar* ( i)
The original stand made by the State forces troops at
Muzzaffarabad and later at Uri. ( ii) The time wasted by the
raiders in their rampage at Baramula. (iii) Lieutenant Colonel
Rai's stand at Baramula and Rattan and also Major Sharma's
heroic stand at Badgom."^®
When the raiders attacked Domel-Muzzaffarabad area,
and were busy ransacking the rural areas to satisfy their lust,
there were nearly 1850 officers and men in Badami Bagh
cantonment besides another more than one hundred in
hospital, sick leave, etc. About five hundred of these were
Poonchies and the remainder were Dogras, Corkhas and
Sikhs They were trained soldiers like any others of the State
Force personnel. Then why did Brigadier Rajinder Singh take
only 200 men with him, reinforced by another about 100
later? In fact, the question arises why did the COS himself
assume for himself the role of a company commander instead
of remaining in his headquarters where he could have easily
organised the available manpower into at least two weak
battalions and thus offered better resistance to the advancing
enemy? Why was Brigadier Faqir Singh not directed to
organise the men in the Cantonment and lead them to
Baramula area, if not still further ahead, to delay the enemy?
Brigadier Rajinder Singh's absence from Srinagar at that most
critical time left the Army Headquarters of the State Forces
completely rudderless And time was the most crucial factor
— All these valid questions demand an answer. However, in
so far as the question of COS himself leading about 150 men
IS concerned, it is well on the cards that, in order t<^ placate
the Maharaja and to dissuade him from assuming the same
rote, the COS had to offer himself for the task, which is quite
understandable under the circumstances Perhaps, the
attitude of* His Highness left him with no other option. But
the other questions are far more important in this context to
which, indeed, there is no answer in currently available
literature.. Be that as it rnay, there is no denying the fact
that Brigadier Rajinder Singh indeed did an excellent jobc^f a
The Raiders Raid
193
highly risky and difficult assignment And in his absence.
Brigadier Faqir Singh as well as the Maharaja should have
taken the initiative to mobilise the troops available in the
Cantonment and organise the defences at Baramula, or as far
forward as possible It is difficult to explain as to why no body
reacted on those lines
The raiders occupied Mahura Power House on 25'*’
October When this news reached Srinagai, Hindus and Sikhs
of the area were in great panic Not knowing what the future
had in store for them, but being quite aware what fate
awaited them if and when the tribals reached the Capital,
they started moving down south over Banihal Pass with
whatever they could take along, by whatever means they
could get out, more so since the mam aim of the raiders was
communal vengeance, loot and women Another great
exodus of Hindus and Sikhs had begun to culminate into a
multitude of traumatized homeless people, victims of a
senseless vendetta
The fall of Domel and Muzzaffarabad, failure of electric
power in the Valley, death of his Chief of Staff, et al,
completely unnerved Maharaja Sir Han Singh He along with
his family left Srinagar on the night of 25 October 1947,
albeit on the advice and urging of VP Menon His departure
was soon followed by flight of top officials of the Government
leaving the Capital and its people to their own fate
Rape of Baramula
Having captured Mahura and its vital powerhouse on 25“’
October, the next day the raiders were at Baramula, a small
town of 14,000 people, 35 miles from Srinagar on the main
black topped Domel-Un-Snnagar Road In the words of Josef
Korbel, "The tribesmen — great, wild, black beasts they were
— came shooting down from the hills on both sides of the
town A 20-year-old Indian nurse, Philomena, tried to protect
a Muslim patient whose baby had just been born She was
shot dead first The patient was next
794
Military Plight of Pakistan
The horrors of Pathan atrocities have been vividly
described in a 1948 Government of India White Paper But
the horrendous savagery of the tribal raiders is graphically
better described in the words of foreign writers and visitors
rather than Indian-Hin lus who might be accused of partiality
on communal grounds This town was visited by Robert
Trombull, a correspondent of the New York Times, after its
recapture by the Indian troops who in his dispatch published
in the paper of 10 November 1947 wrote, "The City has
been stripped of its wealth and young women before the
tribesmen fled in terror at midnight Friday, before the
advancing Indian Army Surviving residents estimate that
3,000 of their fellow townsmen including four Europeans and
a retired British officer, known only as Colonel Dykes, and his
pregnant wife were slain When the raiders rushed into the
town on October 26'^ witnesses said, 'One party of Mahsud
tribesmen immediately scaled the walls of St Joseph
Franciscan Hospital compound, and stormed the Convent
hospital and the little church Four nuns and Colonel Dykes
were shot immediately'
"Murder, rape, arson, loot and bestial murder of a local
National Conference worker, Maqbool Sherwani, who had
rallied local sentiment against the invaders, provided further
evidence that they had not come to liberate their fellow
Muslims He was crucified before being shot, to be
remembered as a hero " Religion or the so called liberation
of Kashmir was the last item on the tribals' agenda, all that
they were interested in was loot and women, and they got so
much of the latter that abducted girls were sold in hundreds
for Rs 150/- each back home
Colonel DOT Dykes was the Commandant of Sikh
Regimental Centre and had come to Baramula for his wife's
confinement After shooting the Colonel, the raiders molested
his pregnant wife whose naked body was later found in a
nearby well However, General Lockhart rang up General
Douglas Gracey m Rawalpindi who managed to get the Dyke
children recovered and sent to England Another lucky
The Raiders Raid
195
escapee was Major J E Thompson who was in Baramula on
27'^ October and had a miraculous escape. He managed to
reach Abbottabad and thence to Delhi to meet his fiancee,
an Indian girl
The occupants of the Presentation Convent including the
Assistant Mother Superior, Sister Terasoline were murdered
and the vandalism was extended even to the holy crosses on
the graves, besides of course the church and its properties
Instead of advancing to Srinagar Airfield and blitzkrieging
to Banihal Pass, the Lashkars were frantically busy in satisfying
their lust for booty of goods and women. In this carnage of
unparalleled proportions, India gained another two precious
days in which to rush m military assistance and thus save the
Valley The enforced sacrifices of residents of Baramula,
Muslims and non-Muslims alike saved the people of Srinagar
from a similar violent fate However, for the residents of
Baramula, it was indeed the bleakest Id-ul-Fitr — October
27, 1947
Ethereal Victory Vapourizes
The planners of "Op Gulmarg" were absolutely confident
of success of their venture. They had even worked out a plan
for post-liberation scenario also And, pray, why not? After all,
all factors and circumstances favoured the Pak plans The
terrain was ideal for guerilla warfare and Infiltration tactics.
Successful fifth column activities had subverted the Muslim
elements of the State Forces completely. The State Forces had
been dispersed and thinly spread all along the 500 miles of
State borders, with no second line of defence, or depth
positions, nor any reserves whatsoever in the heartland. The
State Forces had no artillery or other supporting arms, nor an
organised set-up of military supply services. In fact, the State
Forces were dependent on Pakistani bases for replenishment
of ammunition and Petroleum products. In any case, they
were neither organised nor equipped and trained to fight
against external attack kt such a gigantic scale as was
launched by f^kistan. The social and political conditions
796
Military Plight of Pakistan
were most favourable to the invading hordes Above all, the
surface communications were entirely in favour of the
invaders Under the circumstances, only one result could be
expected — VICTORY Victory for Pakistan
Akbar Khan had assumed a grand nom de plume of
"General Tariq", romantically significant after the Arab
invasion of Morocco m the 8th century AD He was proud to
be the Chief of the Raiders, an appellation that earlier used
to smack of being derogatory and disparaging but now
" raiding is, now a days, an accepted and very highly
developed branch of the art of war So we can, I think,
without indignity, retain the name 'raiders' — particularly so
when the fighting technique of the Frontier tribesmen does,
in the military sense, make him indeed a very competent and
daring type of raider Akbar Khan had planned a victory
march into Srinagar for which GHQ had located a Pak Army
Brigade at Kohala, as back-up support for initial invasion, and
for mopping up operations later
The distance from Domel-Muzz^ffarabad to Srinagar was
just about 100 miles over a good metalled black topped road
Once the defenders of the strategic bridge, 4 JAK Battalion
had been eliminated in an internal coup as per plan, and the
bridge taken intact, it was merely a comfortable few hours
drive by a column on four-wheelers And if Pak military
strategists had planned for a fast moving blitzkrieg operation,
and had allocated a sq4jadron of armoured cars, the entire
operation would have been successfully concluded by the
evening of 22 October 1947 All over in 24 hours* Possession
IS the nine points of law Accession would have automatically
followed in favour of Pakistan
However, perhaps the Pak Army did not want to show
their hand so soon in the proceedings They kept their faith
in storming the Valley by Qabaili Lashkars assembled for the
dual purpose^. And that is where they miscalculated The
halting of the advance at Uri, holding up the motorized
column at the demolished bridge for 2-3 days was most
The Raiders Raid
197
crucial The situation could have been retrieved if foot
columns had been organised to march on the scenic route
along the Jhelum to Baramula and beyond to Srinagar But
that was not to be, since the invaders were not amenable to
such discipline and organisation They had their own ideas of
conducting such operations in their own way, independent of
interference by other agencies And their own aim-plus was
quite clear they stuck to their guns and vehicles
Nevertheless, the fortunes of battle, and ultimately of the
war were still in favour of Pakistan when the invaders
captured Mahura powerhouse on 24-25 October 1947
Srinagar was now so close, just a couple of hours quick drive
away There was nothing between Pakistan and their
objective, Srinagar, that could possibly hold up their advance
except Brigadier Rajinder Singh with a couple of assorted
companies of the State troops The Maharaja had still not
decided on the million-dollar question, in fact, at that point
of time he was almost on his way seeking the safety of
Jammu It was so near, yet so far The lust for loot, the instinct
to plunder, abduction and rape overtook the invaders at
Baramula inflicting a most devastating blow to Mr jinnah's
plans of celebrating Id-ul-Fitr in the comfortable environs of
Srinagar
Pak Army Brigade waited in vain at Kohala to rush to
Srinagar — to round up, and failing persuasion, force the
tribals into their vehicles to be escorted back to the S P, the
starting point of the operations in Pakistan But that was not
to be' While Baramula was being ransacked and plundered
ad !ib, Indian Army was flying on the "wings of courage" to
take charge of the Airfield, the Capital and the Valley, to
wrest victory from the jaws of defeat
On the morning of October 29, 'General Tariq'
accompanied by the press correspondent Ah Akhtar Mirza
left for Srinagar to take stock of the situation The next
evening they were in the vicinity of Milestone 4, just on the
outskirts of Srfnagar Having encountered no opposition, and
198
Military Plight of Pakistan
no traffic either, his first reaction on encountering the water
obstacle was to get a couple of armoured cars, which would
drive straight through and make a grand entrance into the
town before Indian forces could become strong enough to
resist the tribesmen " — they could reach here from Pakistan
within twenty-four hours The thing to do, therefore was to
rush back and get the armoured cars
On return to Rawalpindi, Colonel Masud offered Akbar
Khan to take not two but the whole of his squadron of
armoured cars, the men in civil dress, without official orders,
all at their own risk So great was the response and
enthusiasm for the so-called 'liberation' of Kashmir However,
Brigadier Sher Khan and the Central Government Minister
Raja Chazanfar All Khan strongly opposed the idea for fear of
provoking India into full-scale war with Pakistan The
proposal was therefore dropped But for this quirk of fate,
'General Tariq' would have achieved a fait accompli against
official orders and policy Srinagar saved again' This time by
Pakistanis themselves, when they grabbed defeat while
victory was already in their grasp
By this time, operations were in progress in four major
areas of the State Chhamb-Jhangar-Rajauri, Poonch, Kashmir
Valley and fourthly, Skardu-Kargil-Leh area Starting with local
raids in Jammu and Poonch area in August 1947, Pakistan's
second phase of invasion was attacks on Mirpur-Kotli area in
October-November, followed by annexation of Gilgit and
advance towards Skardu in November The fourth stage of
Pak invasion was "Operation Gulmarg" in the Valley with
planned incursions towards Tithwal and Gurais, simultaneous
with major attacks in Poonch-Bhimber However, the mood
of the people in the Valley was totally anti-Pakistan, Sheikh
Abdullah was riding at the cre^ of popularity
Role of the State forces
Vvith "Op Gulmarg" off the launch pad, and the
impending arrival of Indian Army on the scene, the active
and independent part being played bv the State Forces was
The Raiders Raid
199
soon to come to end There is no gainsaying that the crucial
part played by the State Forces under the inspiring leadership
of Brigadier Rajinder Singh in stemming the advance was
primarily responsible for saving Srinagar, and ultimately the
whole of the Valley It is indeed very unfortunate that the role
of the State Forces was adversely commented upon by top
leadership of India, obviously due to ignorance of the factual
position as well absence of suitable briefing In this context it
needs to be understood that the State troops were not
organised, equipped and trained, nor expected to
independently fight in a regular war like situation It was a
small force charged with defending nearly 500 miles of
frontier, which was much beyond its capabdrty Their
potential was limited merely to border policing duties and
internal law and order problems The State troops were
deployed m small garrisons all along the border to fulfil that
role, and no more They did not have any armour, artillery or
communication equipment to undertake regular warfare on
their own Of course, they could, and did prove to be an
effective appendage to a regular army, as they had been m
the past under the British regime, and later did so shoulder to
shoulder with the Indian Army too
The strength of the State Forces was so limited — a mere
eight infantry battalions — and the area to be defended so
vast and spread out that organised coordinated defensive
measures on an effective scale could possibly not be
undertaken, more so when no reserves at all were available,
nor mobility and communication infrastructure existed All
that they were capable of was to put up a defensive screen, a
thin crust which once pierced through by the enemy, did not
have any resources for a second line of defence, or counter-
attack capability
As soon as lapsing of paramountcy became a fact of life
and Pakistan decided to annex the territory by force, there
was a perpetual shortage of ammunition, war-like stores and
materials, besides the strangulating effects of economic and
commercial blockade by Pakistan which starved the State
200
Military Plight of Pakistan
Forces of their supplies of military materials as well as other
necessities of life Unfortunately, the Indian authorities too
failed to come to the assistance of the State Forces in terms of
military hardware and ammunition Although the State
Government with the Government of India placed an indent
for supply of arms, ammunition and other military hardware,
the supplies did not materialise even though the Defence and
Home Ministers had personally given their approval Maybe,
the British officers who were in control of higher echelons of
Indian Armed Forces prevented the supplies being made to
the State On the other hand, while Indian troops were
fighting the Pakistanis, substantial sums of money and military
stores were being sent to Pakistan — the former at the
political level and the latter at the military level where British
officers were enthusiastic to keep up the business as usual
atmosphere in implementing the terms of division of military
assets between the two Dominions Indian attitude towards
Pakistan was unduly magnanimous because of our innate
naivete "The division of war equipment between the two
countries had become the most unpalatable affair Whatever
arms and ammunition was sent to Pakistan was being used
against us in J&K While we were sending tram loads of it to
Pakistan, each one of us was painfully conscious that we were
indirectly helping Pakistan to kill our own men We were
helpless, for the C-in-C insisted that we continue to send
Pakistan's share to her I implored him to stop or at least slow
down this movement as Pakistan had done, but all I received
m turn was a stern warning that notwithstanding what
Pakistan did, we were to fulfill our obligations faithfully
The class composition of the State Forces was a major
factor contributing to the inherent weaknfess of the Force
Not that It could have been avoided That was impossible,
considering the population mix All the same, the fact
remains that desertions and betrayals by the Muslim elements
at critical junctures led to humiliating defeat of an otherwise
fine body of fighting men whose personal qualities as soldiers
were second to none
The Raiders Raid
201
Notwithstanding all the foregoing constraints, and "in
spite of such handicaps and against overwhelming attacking
hordes, State forces fought hard and well and held
tenaciously at all important defensive positions like Punch,
Kotli, Bhimber, Mirpur and Skardu During the entire
Operations, this small force lost 1990 men; the
corresponding figure for Indian Army was 1103."'’^ The
sacrifices made by the State Forces and the honours and
awards bestowed by the powers that be also show a similar
trend of disparity — the State Forces personnel's acts of
bravery and ultimate sacrifice have gone by unsung and
unrewarded in many a cases.
NOTES & REFERENCES
1 2 JAK, half Gorkha and half Muslim commanded by Lieutenant
Colonel Khuda Baksh boarded HMS Islamia at Karachi on 19 Au-
gust 1944 and went to Basra in Iraq as part of PAI Force — Persia
And Iraq Force After serving in Iraq till mid-September, the Battal-
ion moved to Syria Major General G A Pilleau commended 2 JAK
for Its fine performance and recommended that the Battalion re-
main in the area until the end of the withdrawal of British troops
At the end of the War, they disembarked at Bombay on 25 January
1946
4 JAK Infantry, half Dogra and half Muslim, was sent to Raiwala
Jungle Warfare Training Centre near Dehradun m March 1944 and
joined 9 Indian Infantry Brigade of 5 Indian Infantry Division in
Burma in October 1944 which was then advancing eastward for
recapture of Burma During its tenure in Burma, the Battalion
earned two O.B.E s, one M B E , five M C s, three I.D S M.s one
O.B.I. class I and one O B I class II — Palit D.KVrC, Maj'or Gen-
eral, "Jammu And Kashmir Arms History of the J & K Rifles", Palit
and Dutt F*ublishers, Dehradun, 1972, pp 134-36.
2 Bamzai, Prithvi Nath Kaul,"A History of Kashmir. Political-So-
cial-Cultural from the Earliest Times to the Present
Day"; Metropolitan Book Company, New Delhi, 1962;p 665.
3 Palit D.K.; op at pp. 150-51
202
Military Plight of Pakistan
4 Jammu and Kashmir State Forces had two mountain batteries of
artillery, which during the Second World War became part of 23
Mountain Regiment in Burma At the time of Partition, they were
stationed in the NWFP like many other units of the Indian Army,
or State Forces One of these two batteries later joined 2 (SP) Field
Regiment of Pakistan at Mardan while the other was repatriated to
India
5. Brahma Singh K Major, "FJistory of Jammu & Kashmir Rifles
(1820-1956)", Lancer International, New Delhi, 1990, pp 223-24
6 Kadian Rajesh, The Kashmir Tangle, Vision Books, New Delhi
1992;p.?
7 Brahma Singh, op cit , p 222-23
8 Nanda K K , Lieutenant General, "Conquering Kashmir, A Paki-
stani Obsession"; Lancer Books, New Delhi, 1 994, pp.1 1 0-1 1 ?
9 Palit D K ,op. cit , p 1 60.
lOAkbarKhan, DSO, Major General, "Raiders in Kashmir";Army
Publishers, Delhi/Karachi 1970, p 86
11 Tharochi Fort is situated on the left bank of River Poonch,
about 8 miles south of Kotli. The Mongral Muslims under Nasir-
Din Khan built it. The Fort fell to the Sikhs during the reign of Ma-
haraja Ranjit Singh, In 1855 it passed into the possession of Maha-
raja Gulab Singh when he defeated Raja Jawahar Singh Gulab
Singh rebuilt the Fort in stone In 1937 it was garrisoned by a de-
tachment of eight rank and file of Fort Guards — Major K Brahma
Singh, op cit 297
12 Palit, op. cit , p.1 64.
13.550 Para Brigade had lost its Brigade Signal Section to Pakistan
as a result of division of military assets between the two Domin-
ions — Major General Shaukat Riza, "The Pakistan Army 1947-
1949", Natraj Publishers, Dehradun, First Indian edition 1997;
p.309.
14. Brahma Singh; op. cit.; p 223.
The Raiders Raid
203
^ 5 Brigadier Rajinder Singh was born on 1 4"’ June 1 899 in a fam-
ily of Jamwal
Rajputs He graduated from PW College Jammu and was commis-
sioned as a Lieutenant in Jammu and Kashmir State Forces at the
age of 22 years — Brahma Singh, op cit , p 223
16 Brahma Singh, op cit pp 150-51
17 Khurshid K H , "Memoirs of Jinn", Oxford University Press,
Karachi, 1990
18 Chibber M L Lieutenant General, "Pakistan's Criminal Folly in
Kashmir", Manas Publications, New Delhi 1998, pp 51 and 58
19 Karan Singh, "Heir Apparent", Vol 1, OUP, New Delhi, 1982,
p 92
20 Dewan Chaman Lai, 'The Kashmir Story', an article in Volume
II of 'The Story of Kashmir' Yesterday and Today"; Edited by
Vermder Grover,Deep & Deep Publications, New Delhi, 1995,
p 343
21 Mullik B.N.; "My Years with Nehru Kashmir", Allied Publishers,
New Delhi, 1971.
22. Palit, op cit,p.l53.
23. Mr Josef Korbel, a Czech diplomat, was India's nominee on the
United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) His
Daughter, Madeleine Albright rose to be the US Secretary of State
— Jairam Ramesh in "India Today" dated 12 July 1999.
24 Korbel Josef, "Danger in Kashmir"; Princeton University Press,
Princeton. 1954.
25. Kadian Rajesh; The Kashmir Tangle, Vision Books, New Delhi
1992; p.79
26. Kalkat O.S. Major General,"The Far Flung Frontiers", Allied
Publishers, New Delhi, 1983.
27 Chibber Ml.y Lieutenant Ger>eral; "Pakistan's Criminial Folly in
Kashmir", Manas Publications, New Delhi, 1998;p.69
204
Military Plight of Pakistan
28 Rajinder Nath, Major General, "Military Leadership m India —
From Vedic Period to Indo-Pak Wars", Lancer Books, New Delhi
1990, p 266
29 Palit D K ,op cit p 1 78
30 Ibid.p 1 83
31 Brahma Singh, op cit , p 233
32 Ibid, pp.233-35
33 Palit D.K ,op cit. p 196
34 Brahma Singh, op cit pp 234-36.
35 Atal Hira Lai, Major General, "Nehru's Emissary to Kashmir";
Army Education Stores, New Delhi, 1972, pp 136-37
36 Korbel Josef;op. cit. p.88
37 Trombull Robert, New York Times dated 10 November 1947
38.Menezes S.L. Lieutenant General, "Fidelity & Honour The In-
dian Army From The Seventeenth to The twenty-first Century", Vi-
king, 1 993, p 438
39 Akbar Khan, op cit. p.68
40. The great African tribal Chief converted to Islam and called
himself Tariq-Ibn-Zarea He led the Arab Armies in conquest of
Spain A fort was then built at Mons Cape to honour his memory
and was named as Gebel-al-Tariq, the Hill of Tariq, which, down
the ages got corrupted into Gibraltar
41. Ibid p 43
42. Brahma Singh op. cit pp22 3-224
43. Thorat S.P.RLieutenant Cer>eral, "From ReveiHe to Retreat", Al-
lied Publishers, New Delhi, 1985; p.100
44 Bloeria Sudhir S. Dr., "The Battles of Zojila", Har Anand Publi-
cations, New Delhi, 1 997, p,46.
INDIAN MILITARY
INTERVENTION
After relinquishtng the high office of Governor General of
India, Lord Louis Mountbatten m a speech in Cambridge on
14 November 1968, informed the audience that during his
stay at Srinagar from 18 to 23 June 1947 he had told
Maharaja Sir Han Singh, "Ascertain the will of your people by
any means and join any Dominion your people wish to join
by 14 August this year He did not do that, and what
happened can be seen Had he acceded to Pakistan before
August 14, the future Government of India had given me an
assurance that no objection whatsoever would be raised by
them Had His Highness acceded to India by August 14,
Pakistan did not then exist, and therefore could not have
interfered " Further, he had made it explicitly clear to the
Maharaja that the "only protection for Kashmir after 15
August 1947 was to join one or the other of the Constituent
Assemblies "
But the Maharaja remained indecisive, tied down to a
perpetual hesitation-syndrome He did not pay heed, neither
to the advice of the British Governor General of India, nor to
the consequences of raids from across the border that started
taking place from mid-July onwards, if not still earlier, all
along the border of his State with Pakistan He ignored the
signals coming from the ominous developments in Gilgit and
the Frontier lllaqas, from Skardu How could any sane person
not take cpgrrizanc^ of what was going on in Gilgit and the
206
Military Plight of Pakistan
Northern Areas is beyond comprehension He also ignored
the meaning behind Mahatma Gandhi's visit to Srinagar in
early August 1947 Although it w/as a low key visit, but it was
significant in as much as a man of his stature had decided to
personally visit the Valley at a such a critical juncture, when
historic events were unfolding in the mam arena at Delhi
That was not all. Even the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
connection with Han Singh was used At the instance of
Sardar Patel, Madhavrao Sadashiv Golwalkar, Chief of RSS
since 1940 tried to persuade the Maharaja to acceded to
India, and urged him to recruit Punjabi Hindus and Sikhs in
his Army But all in vain The inevitable was to happen The
writing was on the wall was always there but Han Singh could
not see a thing. The Maharaja lodged his first formal protest
to Pakistan on 4^'^ September 1947 against the raids and the
economic blockade imposed by Pakistan in complete
violation of the Standstill Agreement, which Pakistan had
accepted with reference to the status of Jammu and Kashmir
that was, technically, still an independent entity. Here it
should be noted that the raids had started as early as mid-July
but the very first protest note went out on September 4**’ He
was so far removed from reality that as late as 1 5 October
1947 the Maharaja cabled the British Prime Minister in
London about the economic blockade and the invasion of the
State by Pak nationals in the garb of tribal raiders. What locus
standi the British Prime Minister had in this matter!
This state of suspense and indecision seemed to continue
ad nauseam ad infinitum, much to the chagrin of all
concerned including the people of the State who were at the
receiving end. This resulted in disastrous consequences,
which followed the full-scale invasion of the Valley by
Pakistan, with covert connivance of British officers holding
commanding positions in both the Dominions. It is indeed
astonishing that even Lord Mountbatten's last address to the
Princes, about one month before Partition, in his capacity as
the Crown Representative in which he advised the Princes to
accede to India or Pakistan, subj'ect among other
Indian Military Intervention
207
considerations to the factor of geographical contiguity, did
not cut any ice on the Maharaja Above all, Han Singh also
Ignored the developments emanating from the Poonch
Rebellion where 'no tax' campaigns started as early as April
1947 had assumed menacing proportions It was all in vain
On 22"'* October 1947, the raids had been transformed
into a full-fledged invasion of the Valley Pakistan's intense
desire to forcibly occupy Kashmir stemmed from the strategic
importance of the State in the context of Central Asia and the
rest of the sub-continent, as well as the security of Lahore-
Rawalpindi road-rail corridor, but above all, because of its
Muslim majority status vis-a-vis the "Two Nation Theory"
Indeed, Han Singh was living m a dreamland of his own
making from which he awoke with a start and hurriedly fled
Srinagar on the night of 25*'’ October with his family and
valuables, driving hell for leather the whole night and the
next day over the Banihal Pass and the fair weather single
road to Jammu This scenario was of course the near-
culmination of the drama of Accession since 15,000-20,000
Pathans — who had a natural predilection for fighting
whether with others or amongst themselves — stiffened by
Pak regulars had reached the gates of Srinagar for what was
portrayed to them as the Jehad (Muslim religious war)
There is no gainsaying that the Maharaja continued to
avoid facing the inevitable choice in the matter of accession
to one Dominion or the other, but that does not mean that
he was not responding to the military threat On 13
September 1947, hts Government approached New Delhi for
loan of services of Lieutenant Colonel Kashmira Singh Katoch
to replace Major General Scott They also requested for
arrangements to be made for telegraph, telephone and
wireless communications to be established with India, as well
as improvement of Pathankot-Jammu road including a boat-
bridge over the Ravi On 1®* October the State Government
sent an indent for ammunition and military equipment The
Deputy Prune Minister die State, B L Batra also requested
208
Military Plight of Pakistan
for concentration of Indian military forces around Madhopur,
for early induction if required It is unfortunate that due to
various factors, practically neither any action was taken by
the Indian authorities on the specific requests of neither the
State Government, nor any worthwhile advance military
planning done to meet an emergency. Maybe, the British
military officers holding senior and top positions at Delhi
thwarted whatever attempts the nascent Indian Government
made.
"Azad Kashmir" State
Notwithstanding the pressure tactics of Pakistan, the
heightened fifth columnist activities and subversion of Muslim
elements of the State Forces as well as in the civil services in
Jammu region, the bulk of the Muslim population in the
Valley continued to follow their traditional line of secularism
and communal amity This was in sharp contrast to the
communal frenzy prevailing in the southern sectors of the
State. Despite the communal carnage in Northern and
Eastern India that preceded and followed the Partition, the
situation in the Valley continued to be peaceful and
harmonious barring some odd pockets of fanaticism in
downtown Srinagar which were lying dormant. The people,
by and large, were with the Sheikh. They favoured the line of
National Conference to tie the knot with India, and certainly
not with Pakistan, more so after the savage depredations at
Muzzaffarabad and Baramula, the latter in particular This by
itself was a loud vindication of Indian National Congress
stand on the "Two Nation Theory" which the Valley Muslims
had repudiated whole heartedly m no uncertain terms In the
face of marauding raiders who made no distinction between
Muslims and Hindus in so far.as their basic aim of plunder
and women was concerned, the National Conference took
up the task of organising defence of Srinagar and surrounding
areas. Thousands of focat volunteers including women from
all communities came fbtward for rifle training and patrolling,
mustering to the call of "Shaheed Ho", to keep order, protect
vital installations thus defeating the evfl designs of the raiders
Indian Military Intervention
209
While cataclysmic developments were taking place m the
Valley, on 24 October 1947 the leaders of Poonch Rebellion
declared their independence from the Dogra Rule The
formation of State of "Azad Kashmir", under the
presidentship of Mohammed Ibrahim Khan with Mirwaiz
Mohammed Yusuf Khan as the Minister of Education, was
proclaimed It was not an isolated event Instead, it was part
of the 'Grand Design', a pre-planned, well-coordinated move
in conjunction with developments in the Valley, an integral
part of "Operation Gulmarg" — a euphemism for Pak Regular
Army set-up Concurrently, the newly formed Government of
Azad Kashmir declared that its forces had captured Mahura
Power House barely 30 miles from Srinagar on the main road
from Pakistan, thereby plunging not only the Capital but also
the entire Valley into darkness
The announcement of formation of this self proclaimed
government was a historic development in itself, in as much
as It was the forerunner of momentous events yet to take
shape From this moment, the State of Jammu & Kashmir
became symbolically divided into two separate entities Its
long term implications seemed to have been lost on the then
Government in Delhi, at least at that point of time, otherwise
India would not have, or should not have wasted 2-3 more
days in legal wrangling before dispatching military aid to the
beleaguered State
THE ACCESSION
On the same day, 24 October 1947, Mr B L Batra, the
Deputy Prime Minister of the State reached Delhi with the
papers for Accession in his bag and an appeal for Indian
military intervention, if possible without the formality of
Accession Major General D K Palit, VrC, has recorded that
"As a result of the Maharaja's appeal, the commanders of the
Indian armed forces were directed on the morning of 24
October 'to examine and prepare plans for sending troops to
Kashmir by air and road ' During the afternoon the same day.
210
Military Plight of Pakistan
staff officers of the army and air force accompanied Mr VP
Menon (Adviser to the States Ministry) on a flight to Srinagar
to consult with the Kashmir Government and military
headquarters. At the same time, orders were issued to an
infantry battalion to prepare itself to be flown, at short notice,
to Srinagar."^ Howeve., this version does not completely tally
with official records Nonetheless, General Palit's version
appears to be nearer the factual position
Batra had two letters with him from the Maharaja, one
for Prime Minister Nehru and the other for Sardar Patel, both
appealing for immediate military help In the evening he met
the Indian leaders and conveyed the extremely critical nature
of the developments in the Valley, and the overall dismal
situation in the State. That evening Lord Mountbatten was
attending a dinner reception in honour of the visiting Foreign
Minister of what was then known as Siam, later Thailand,
when Prime Minister Nehru took him aside to inform him of
the full scale invasion of the Valley by Pathan tribesmen, and
that It was a touch and go situation.
Indian political leaders and the Cabinet were not yet
geared up to facing an emergency situation, much less at
quick decision making The matter was formally discussed m
the meeting of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet next
morning Why not the same very night, whatever be the
hour? In this meeting, the C-in-C General Sir Rob Lockhart
informed them that his opposite number m Pakistan had sent
him a belated message that about 5,000 tribesmen had
entered the Kashmir Valley about 3 days earlier, and had
ransacked Muzzaffarbad while on their way to Srinagar In
point of fact, it was General Sir Frank Messervey who had
personally signed the top secret D (D. letter addressed to
Brigadier C.P Murray, Commander Bannu Frontier Brigade
Group, amongst others, and received there as early as 20
August 1947, in which he set out the plan for "Op Gulmarg"
laying down the D Day as 22 October 1947.^ Another glaring
example of astonishing British duplicity, cunning and
downright professional disloyalty Can any body in his senses
Indian Military Intervention
211
believe that between Lockhart and Messervey they did not
know what was cooking for the past many weeks, and
Lockhart had to wait for a formal belated report from his
counterpart, and then this formal meeting, to alert the
Government of India he was serving, about what was
otherwise a matter of life and death for the new Dominion
No wonder he was soon to be removed from this position
But did the Governor General or the Prime Minister question
him about this obvious act of perfidy and lack of professional
integrity? No one in the Government could have dared to
raise the question since "I must admit that Sir George
Cunnigham, who had relieved Sir Rob Lockhart as Governor
of the NWFP, sent warnings of the move of these tribesmen to
General Lockhart, who had now become Commander-m-
Chief of the Indian Army, but these warnings were vague
In any case, these reports failed at the time to excite any
feeling of undue alarm or concern in the Government of
India Obviously, advance information of tribal invasion was
available, but even Indian political leadership was not willing
to heed the warning signals Then why blame the British
alone’
Menon reached Srinagar on 25'” October morning along
with Colonel K S Katoch and Wing Commander H C
Dewan At the same time. Lieutenant Colonel SHFJ
Manekshaw, MC, (Later Filed Marshal and Chief of Army
Staff) of the Military Operations Directorate was also sent
there for on the spot study of the situation While driving
from the airfield to the Palace, Menon found the streets
deserted, and the State police conspicuous by their absence
He found the Maharaja completely unnerved and helpless In
view of the fast moving developments taking place on the
Uri-Srinagar road, Menon advised Han Singh to leave
immediately with his family for Jammu, and to take his
valuable possessions with him The Maharaja was only too
willing to comply with this timely advice And the royal
caravan on a royal exodus left that very night for Banihal and
beyond
272
Military Plight of Pakistan
Early morning the next day, 26 ‘^ October, Menon
accompanied by the State Prime Minister, Mr Mehr Chand
Mahajan flew back to Delhi and drove straight from
Safdarjang Airport to the residence of the Prime Minister
Sheikh Abdullah was staying in the house of the Prime
Minister, and Sardar Patel was already present there. Indeed,
after all, a sense of urgency was m the air The stakes were
high. It was a matter of touch and go how soon the invaders
would be roaming in the streets of Srinagar inflicting the
same savagery as they had in Baramula, and elsewhere during
their recent sojourn through the Valley Beautiful It was any
body's guess The fate of Kashmir hung in the balance.
State Prime Minister Mehr Chand Mahajan was
hypertense — requesting, beseeching, demanding, begging
most immediate military help to save Kashmir and its hapless
citizenry from the clutches of barbarous hordes, and its
ultimate consumption by Pakistan. In fact, he was so
persistent m his urging that he demanded military help to
reach Srinagar that very afternoon of the 26 *^. Since the
situation was indeed critical, Mahajan was quite justified in
his assessment of the time factor, and hence his pleadings
However, Prime Minister Nehru was in no mood to oblige
more so since the Governor-General had insisted on
completion of the modalities of accession, as also of
ascertaining the wishes of the people before agreeing to the
request for direct military intervention. Both parties were
right in their own way Legalities and modalities are prime
considerations for the elitist legal minds, and so it was in this
meeting too, right or wrong ...
Mahajan could no longer stand the strain of pressure and
said, "Take the Accession and give whatever power you
desire to the popular party. The Army must fly to save
Srinagar this evening or else I will go to Lahore and negotiate
terms with Mr. Jinnah."® On this outburst, Mr. Nehru also lost
his temper, which in any case he was often wcmt to do, amJ.
asked Mahajan to leave, when Sardar Patel who had a ^ood
chemistry with Mahajan intervened to cool the tempers and
saved the situation A dramatic element of Bollywood style
was then injected in the proceedings when "Just then a slip of
paper was passed on to Prime Minister Nehru It came from
Sheikh Abdullah who was sitting in the adjacent room,
listening to the conversation. Mahajan then records " He
(Abdullah) now strengthened my hands by telling the Prime
Minister that military help must be sent immediately The
Prime Minister's attitude changed on reading this slip."^
In this connection it should be remembered that Mahajan
was suspected to have played a pivotal role in allocating the
three eastern tehsils of Gurdaspur district to India thereby
providing geographical contiguity to the State with India,
which was sine qua non for accession of the State to the
Indian Union When viewed m this context, one has nothing
but sympathy and praise for Mahajan's conduct In the
meeting with Prime Minister Nehru who should therefore
have given due consideration to the sentiments of the other
person After all, Mahajan too had a personal stake in saving
Kashmir for India; it could not possibly be the exclusive
preserve of Pandit Nehru alone
Nehru had blind faith m Abdullah In his eyes, Abdullah
was Kashmir and Kashmir was Abdullah — at least at that
point of time Abdullah was the sole embodiment of wishes
of the people of Kashmir His charismatic personality, his
considerable physical and political stature and affable nature
were such that Prime Minister reposed complete faith in his
judgement And so it was for accession, as well as for
ascertaining the wishes of the people for which Lord
Mountbatten too seemed to go along with Nehru's views on
this tricky question. Pandit Nehru did place all his eggs in one
basket alone, to the complete exclusion of any other
personality, or alternative. But that is how the great Mr.
Nehru was made ®
Lord Mountbatten continued to be of the opinion that it
was improper to move troops in what was technically still an
independent entity. He could agree to the proposal of direct
274
Military Plight of Pakistan
military help only after Kashmir had formally acceded to
India, and that accession should be conditional on the
holding of a plebiscite However, the next day Mountbatten
seems to have mellowed down in his stand on this point, in
as much as, instead of a plebiscite, "a reference to the
people" became an acceptable option He informed " Han
Singh that he was accepting the Instrument of Accession with
the condition that after law and order had been restored, the
question 'should be settled by a reference to the people'".®
After the above stormy session at Prime Minister Nehru's
residence, the proposal was put up before the Cabinet
Committee on Defence chaired, as was the practice, by the
Governor General; and it was unanimously approved Menon
was once again asked to undertake his 'shuttle diplomacy'
mission, this time to Jammu to complete the formalities of
Accession
The Maharaja concurred. In any case, at this point of
time, he had absolutely no option at all. His pet dream of an
independent "Switzerland of the East", militarily unviable
because of fear of Russia and China, lay shattered before
him, like a house of cards, in complete shambles, as was his
bedroom where Menon was getting his signatures on the
Instrument of Accession. The Maharaja also wrote down a
letter to the Governor General "describing the pitiable plight
of the State and reiterating his request for military help. He
further informed the Governor General that it was his
intention to set up an Interim Government at once and to ask
Sheikh Abdullah to carry the responsibility in this emergency
with Mahajan, his Prime Minister. The significance of
Accession lay not so much in the signatures of the Maharaja,
but in its endorsement by Sheikh Abdullah and his National
Conference as well as the overwhelming support of the
people of the Valley.
Here, it is of great interest to note that the Dogra Dynasty
had acquired the territory of Kashmir through a paper
transaction from the British when, in fact, the British did not
Indian Military Intervention
215
have physical possession of the same At that time in 1846
the Dogras had to seek the assistance of outside forces to
gain control of what the British had 'sold' to them Major
Henry Lawrence had then led a force of 10,000 Sikhs of
Lahore Darbar for the benefit of the Dogras Paradoxically
enough, the same story was now being repeated Another
paper transaction, the Instrument of Accession, transferring
the rights of ownership without giving physical possession,
and the Sikh soldiers of 1 Sikh to enforce that paper decree*
History does repeat itself, in most bizarre sequences
Menon was back in Delhi, the same evening, now setting
in motion another entirely different drama with altogether
different actors in a completely different environment
However, before we change curtains to the new scene, a
word about the controversy regarding the date and timing of
signing of the Instrument of Accession vis-a-vis the despatch
of Indian troops, as well as the part played by various leaders,
particularly Nehru and Mountbatten in this episode Did the
Indian troops land in Srinagar before the formal Instrument of
Accession was concluded, or after? — a day this way or that
IS the bone of contention amongst the academics and the
historians the world over. And Alistaire Lamb has made much
of this fine point of distinction in his two celebrated volumes
on the subject", amongst a few others on the Northern and
NorthEastern Frontiers of India. "It now transpires that Lamb
was funded by a pro-Pakistan Kashmiri organisation in the UK
to do this book "
Be that as it may, the accession of the State to the
Dominion of India was complete in 'law and fact'. The
Accession was accepted by the Governor General and
formalities thereof completed in exactly the same manner as
was done in respect of any other Princely State. No favours
granted, none whatsoever, except that a disfavour, a
condition was imposed by the Governor General in his letter
of acceptance of accession dated 27 October 1 947 addressed
to the Mahara_ja that " .. It is my Government's wish that, as
soon as law and order have been restored and the soil
216
Military Plight of Pakistan
cleared of the invaders, the question of the State's accession
should be settled by a reference to the people"^^ This is part
of the official documents and is the legal position of the
Government of India The omission of the word 'plebiscite' is
significant and its place is taken by "a reference to the
people". In this connection, behind the curtains
developments between Prime Minister Nehru and Governor
General Mountbatten are of great interest Regarding signing
the Acceptance of Accession, the latter told the former,
As a constitutional Governor General, I will only sign it at
your request .. I will only countersign it on condition that
you offer a plebiscite." This is all the more revealing since
Mountbatten has admitted,"... honestly I wanted Kashmir to
join Pakistan. For one simple reason, it made Pakistan more
viable. . They had 85 percent Muslims
In so far as the legal position is concerned, there was no
provision for ascertaining the wishes of the people, nor was it
mandatory to specify this in the letter of acceptance. It was
not a part of the Instrument of Accession in any case It is
Prime Minister Nehru who had brought in this element while
dealing with Junagarh The term 'reference to the people'
was obviously subject to different interpretations by different
people at different times leading to controversies. Many
people have assumed that what the Governor General had in
mind was a plebiscite as was done in the case of NWFP and
junagarh, while many Indian leaders including Pandit Nehru
believed that installation of alternative government under
Sheikh Abdullah and the subsequent elections were in
themselves more than adequate expression of the wishes of
the people. And that should close the argument, more so
since the State is .part of the Indian Union, in law and fact.
However, just for the sake of argument, let us assume that in
a referendum the people of the State voted in favour of
Pakistan. Could the Governor General, or Prime Minister
Nehru, or any other authority possibly undo the Accession
that was already complete in law and fact? Easier said than
done' In any case Pandit Nehru saw the Accession supported
Indian Military Intervention
217
by the Sheikh as a repudiation of the "Two Nation Theory"
propounded by Jinnah in connivance with the British Taking
the argument a step further during the preparations for
Partition, North West Frontier Province, a Muslim majority
area was under a pro-Congress (read secular, anti Jmnah)
provincial government, but still a referendum was held from
6-17 July 1947 However, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his
Red Shirts decided to abstain since there was no option for a
free Pathanistan While 289,244 voted for Pakistan and 2,874
for India, the votes for Pakistan were assessed to be 50.49%
of total electorate, and on the basis of that extremely small
margin, the Province was awarded to Pakistan What if that
small margin had gone against Pakistan It is all a matter of
conjecture now, but at that time it did add to the negation of
Jinnah's communal politics and British support for the same
Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, India's freedom fighter par
excellence, spent most of his later life languishing in Pak jails,
or in exile, and expressed his anguish over the Partition and
Its aftermath in his book, "Thrown to the Wolves".’®
As for Kashmir, "The uncertainty that has haunted
Kashmir's post-independence ties with India is traceable to
the overlapping but not identical motivations of, and
countervailing pulls on, Nehru and Abdullah They were both
charismatic, dominating, emotional personalities whose
visions of future, often of the present, did not match realities
on the ground They shared commitments to secularism and
socio-economic change; they detested feudal rule and were
obsessed with Kashmir, but not entirely for the same
reasons . Nehru was anxious to fit Jammu and Kashmir into a
secular nation, which it would strengthen. Abdullah was a
Kashmiri nationalist driven by socialist rather than religious
concerns. His primary concern was to end the centuries of
exploitation and oppression that Kashmiris had suffered at
the hand of rulers from outside the Valley, especially the
latest, the Jammu based Dogra Dynasty."’®
Pakistan could not reconcile to the idea of accession of
Kashmir to the Union of India. How could she? In fact, it was
278
Military Plight of Pakistan
not at all fair to expect Pakistan to do so As far back as
January 1933 when the initial idea, the very concept of
Pakistan was first mooted by Chaudhry Rehmat All at
Emmanual College in the English university town of
Cambridge, Kashmir was included in his imaginary country to
be created in north-west India to be called Pakistan. The
phrase was coined from a combination of letters of Punjab,
Afghanistan (NWFP), Kashmir, Sindh and 'tan' from
Baluchistan However, 'B' for Bengal was conspicuous for its
absence from the proposed formation He and three other
Muslim students then joined together to produce a four page
pamphlet titled "Now or Never" advocating partition of the
Indian sub-continent to create a separate homeland for
Muslims And next year, Jinnah returned to India from his
self-imposed exile in England to take charge of the then
moribund Muslim League However, Rehmat All was just
incidental. Kashmir was 75% Muslim and that by itself was
the primary reason for the architects of the new Dominion to
take It for granted that Kashmir would form part of their
country After all, that alone was the basis of the Partition
Plan. The* economy of Kashmir was so intimately intertwined
with that of Pakistan by virtue of the surface communications
and geographical factors that Kashmir outside of Pakistan
could not be rationally conceived as an entity. Its products,
goods and services all passed through Pakistan, so did its
postal and banking services. In fact the entire economy of
Jammu and Kashmir was linked to Pakistan alone, and to no
other country. The logic of the State's situation
overwhelmingly favoured integration with Pakistan. No
wonder therefore that "There is a psychological hurt in the
minds of the Pakistani establishment. They feel that Junagarh
and Hyderabad, which were predominantly Non-Muslim
States but had a Muslim ruler, were coerced by India to
accede to India. Consequently, J&K which was predominantly
inhabited by Muslims should have acceded to Pakistan"
The announcement of the State's accession to India
immediately gave rise to the security concerns of Pakistan on
Indian Military Intervention
219
account the geo-strategic considerations For Pakistan, the
southwestern border of the State was much too
uncomfortably close to its mam corridor of road and rail
network as well as its capital region Should any hostile
power get control of that strategic region along Poonch-Kotli-
Mirpur, the security of Pakistani Punjab and its major cities
would be seriously jeopardized. The situation regarding the
rivers and canal network, which was the lifeline of West
Punjab, was also similarly affected With the State of Jammu
and Kashmir in Indian hands, the potential threat as
perceived by Pakistani rulers was indeed great.
By the time accession finally became a reality, "Op
Gulmarg" was in full swing The reasoning in Pakistan appears
to have been that even if that operation succeeds in all its
objectives, the potential threat to Pakistan's lifelines from
Jammu region shall remain as strong as ever While during the
reign of the Maharaja Srinagar occupied the place of pride in
the State and the only importance of Jammu lay in its being
the seat of Dogra Dynasty, in the completely altered scenario,
Jammu became the focal point of strategy. Jammu-Kathua
stretch of territory was the fulcrum since that was the only
land route of access for India, kind courtesy the Radcliffe
Award That was the nodal point for all military
reinforcements, weapons and equipment, supplies and
ammunition — indeed a new life line for the State that could
soon be developed in due course in replacement of the
Domel-Srinagar road to sustain military operations as well as
the civil population.
Jinnah's dream of celebrating Id-ul-Fitr in Srinagar on
October 27 seemed to be petering out The prize in the
Valley was still not in Pak hands and their time schedule had
gone off the rails. Under the circumstances, the first thought
of Pak strategists was to throttle Indian intervention at Jammu
Itself and thus nip the evil in the bud, as the saying goes. This
proposition was put forward not only by Akbar Khan, but by
Jinnah too. The Governor General of Pakistan, Mr.
Mohammed Ali Jinnah ordered an attack on Jammu in order
220
Military Plight of Pakistan
to avoid open full-scale war between the two Dominions
Lieutenant General Gracey, the then officiating C-in-C of Pak
Army countermanded Jinnah's orders for direct intervention
by Pak Army This should not be taken to mean that the
British officers were playing an honest broker. Far from it,
actually, the contrary was the case In fact, it was feared that
launching of Pak Army against Jammu would provoke India to
attack Pakistan mainland, which the latter could ill afford at
that point of time. This fear, the risk of retaliation by India
was to haunt Pakistan during 1948 also whenever Indian
military fortunes were on the ascendancy''®
The Air Lift
By the time the dramatic process of Accession had run its
full course and orders trickled down the chain of command
to the level where real hard actions usually take place, it was
late evening of October 26**' The cast of this fresh drama had
absolutely no inkling of what was in store for them that night
and for many more days and nights to come. Major S.K.
Sinha (Later Lieutenant General and Vice Chief of Army Staff)
was then a Grade II General Staff Officer on the staff of
Lieutenant General Sir Dudley Russel, KBE,CB,DSO,MC,
General Officer Commanding in Chief of the newly formed
post-Independence Delhi & East Punjab Command It was
around 10 00 pm by when eight staff officers could be
assembled for an emergency meeting in the Operations
Room of the Command Headquarters. It was a somewhat
comical scene for army officers officially meeting for the first
ever active operation to be undertaken by the Army of
Independent India in defence of its own country — "most of
us were dressed in our jackets and to add colour to our
costumes, the duty officer was in pajama suits."^’
General Russell informed the meeting that the State of
Jammu and Kashmir had acceded to India and that his
Command had been assigned the task of defending that State
against invading tribesmen from Pakistan The first and
foremost task before the meeting was to airlift one battalion
Indian Military Inters/ention
221
group to Srinagar next morning using (R) lAF and civil airlines
Dakota aircraft 1/5'^ Corkha Rifles (Frontier Force) had been
ordered m the morning of 26“’ October to be ready at
Safdarjang airport the next morning at 06 30 am for an
operational commitment — flight to Srinagar This Battalion
strength at that time was only 350 and so the Commanding
Officer, Lieutenant Colonel A S Pathania, MC, decided to
take only two rifle companies, the mortar platoon and some
specialist personnel. Since the Battalion did not have any
Indian officers, he enquired if he could take two British
officers, one each as Adjutant and Quartermaster This was
not agreed to, and the move orders for 1/5 GR were
cancelled
History had to repeat itself So it had to be the Sikhs
Once again, the Sikhs as the saviours of Srinagar ..
First Battalion of the Sikh Regiment was then deployed in
nearby Curgaon on civil law and order duties like the rest of
the Army in the two halves of Punjab. However, being the
nearest available infantry unit in not too dispersed a state, it
was selected for the job
Perhaps, unknown to the officers attending the above
meeting, the Army Airlift Committee in the Air Headquarters,
responsible for overall supervision of this task, had its first
meeting on 25‘“ October 1947 over which Air Marshal
Elmhirst presided. The others who attended this meeting
included Jo*nt Secretary Ministry of Defence, Director
General Civil Aviation and his Deputy, Senior Air Staff Officer
Air Vice Marshal S Mukerjee and Croup Captain Operations,
Meher Singh. The Committee finalised the various
arrangements connected with the proposed airlift of troops,
arms, ammunition and military equipment to Srinagar. All
available civilian Dakotas, about fifty in number were
requisitioned.
Notwithstanding the numerous constraints, which initially
appeared to be almost insurmountable, the airlift operations
proved to be a great success. In this connection there is
222
Military Plight of Pakistan
incontrovertible evidence m the form of a joint statement by
all the three Service Chiefs of India at the time. General R M
Lockharst, Air Marshal TW. Elmhirst, Rear Admiral J TS Hall,
all British officers — "On 24 October the Commander-in-
Chief, Indian Army received information that tribesmen had
seized Muzzaffarabad This was the first indication of the
raids Prior to this date, no plans of any sort for sending
Indian forces into Kashmir had been formulated, or even
considered.
Information was most scanty Time factor was the crux of
the problem The urgency was indeed great which can be
easily gauged from the following Warning Order^® issued to
the Commanding Officer, 1 Sikh, Lieutenant Colonel Dewan
Ranjit Rai
"Your battalion less two companies will concentrate
Palam airfield by 0400 hours 27 October ( ) One battery 13
Field Regiment in infantry role being placed under your
command (.) Be prepared to fly on an operational mission ex
Palam morning 27 October (.) Remainder Battalion will be
flown 28 October (.) Operation Instruction will be handed
over at airfield (.) Ammunition, rations and warm clothing will
be issued at Airfield under arrangements this Headquarters
DTO (Date, Time of Origin) has been a matter of
controversy. From Sin ha's account it appears to have been
late at night 26* October, Alistair Lamb claims it to be at 1
pm that day. It is well on the cards that the latter version is
nearer the factual position
A similar emergency signal message was sent to 50 Para
Brigade for induction to Jammu by road from Pathankot via
Kathua —Samba by the 'Tonga Road". It was also decided that
the Valley would be built up to one brigade group before the
onset of winter
Having set the ball rolling, the immediate task before the
General Staff was to make out an Operations Instruction for
the Battalion Commander to be delivered to him at the
Airfield next morning. The Army Commander personally
drafted the tasks of CO 1 Sikh as under.
Indian Military Intervention
223
* "Secure Srinagar airfield and civil aviation wireless
station,
* Take such action as your first task and available
troops allow to drive tribesmen away from Srinagar,
* aid the local government in the maintenance of law
and order in Srinagar"-*
The usual opening paragraph of an op instruction is
information about the enemy The irony of the situation was
that the only available information was that a large number of
tribesmen had invaded the Kashmir Valley and that they were
heading for Srinagar That's all! If Srinagar was ignorant of
such elementary information as to the mode of transport,
how far from Srinagar they were, and their weapons and
equipment, Delhi was equally clueless about the details even
five days after the Invasion was launched. Obviously; the
British senior staff officers at Army Headquarters in Delhi
were not doing what they should have been doing as a
matter of routine.
The Op Instruction further stated that if the Battalion did
not receive the signal to land in Srinagar, it would go to
Jammu, from there requisition local transport and go as far
North as possible. A rather strange order emanating from a
Command Headquarters to a Battalion* From the level of a
C O.C -in-C of the calibre of General Russel who had earlier
commanded 8'** Indian Division in Italy with distinction, and
lately was in command of 5 Infantry Division In japan as part
of Allied Occupation Force, when the Indian Independence
and consequent change in policy led to the early withdrawal
of the Division to its home base in Ranchi. Wisdom of
hindsight? Yes, indeed. By 25* October it was more or less
certain that Indian military intervention in the State was
inevitable- The next morning it was a foregone conclusion.
Therefore, it was a matter of simple military prudence that at
least on the 26* fighter reconnaissance mission(s) should
have flown over the Valley. C-in-C (R) I.A.F. Air Marshal T.W.
224
Military Plight of Pakistan
Elmhirst should have ordered such a mission, may be he
would have had to obtain concurrence of the Governor
General in the matter But that was no big deal Since the Air
Force had not done what they should have done. General
Lockhart should have insisted on this elementary military
action because his troops, even though Indian, were being
thrown into active operations under the most exceptional
circumstances Above all, when all this top brass had not
reacted correctly. General Russel should have asked for such
a mission, if not on the 26 '*’ then at least early morning next
day Indeed, a serious omission at all levels of higher
command
Fortunately, the raiders had kept themselves busy at
Baramula and had not occupied Srinagar airstrip by the time
Indian airlift got under way In this connection it is of interest
that concurrently with the issuance of orders by the Governor
General for military intervention, the British Government in
London issued their instruction that no British officer would
accompany troops moving into Jammu and Kashmir State, for
the simple reason that they did not want to see their officers
pitted against one another. Sounds very plausible (') but does
not stand the test of rational analysis. Since Pakistan was
vehemently insisting that only tribal volunteers of their own
volition were going to Srinagar to liberate their Muslim
brethren, and that her regular troops were not at all involved
in the State, where was the question of British officers
accompanying Indian foops to the State being pitted against
British officers from the opposite side? What was the rational
basis for this assumption by the British Imperial Government
in London? Obviously, the British knew the truth all along,
they were merely playing hide and seek with the truth....
Besides the absence of intelligence, there were many
other handicaps under which this operation was being
launched, chief of which in the present context were —
extremely short notice resulting in complete lack of
preparation, an extremely difficult and long line of
communication; difficult unfamiliar terrain and complete
Indian Military Intervention
225
absence of training, organisation and equipment to fight in
such a terrain, impending severe winter conditions, divided
and dispersed state of the Indian Army deployed on peculiar
civilian law and order and refugee evacuation duties, et al.
Indeed, "Seldom in the history of warfare has any operation
been launched with no previous preparation in the face of so
many handicaps"^^
Well before the early morning rays of the sun could usher
in the D Day for India's first military operation led by its own
officers in defence of their own country, Palam Airfield was
bustling with hectic military activity Air Commodore S.
Mukerjee was there to supervise the arrangements for air lift,
so was Brigadier Hiralal Atal designated as Liaison Officer to
the Kashmir Government, specially and personally nominated
and briefed by Prime Minister Nehru himself The load
manifest for the very first flight included the leading elements
of 1 Sikh, their C.O. Lieutenant Colonel Rai, and Brigadier
Atal. They took off at 6 30 am, in a DC3 aircraft piloted by a
young flight lieutenant. It was a historic flight, if ever there
was one
The aircraft was over Srinagar around 9 00 am. "While
circling round the city and its surroundings we could see no
movement at all of men and vehicles — it looked like a dead
city. As we approached to land, I was astonished to see a
multitude of human beings emerging as if from the earth;
they had all taken cover — very effectively..." On landing,
they were greeted by an Indian Army officer whose services
had been lent to the State Government and the Acting Chief
of Staff of the State Forces who briefed Colonel Rai
The Dakota aircraft in which Brigadier Atal landed at
Srinagar was later sent to Baramula for a quick aerial
reconnaissance. On landing back, the pilot reported that "...
there was no movement whatsoever on the road to Srinagar
and that Baramula was aflame at places and smouldering in
others Wheit the British top Brass should have done, was
achieved by an Indian Brigadier with whatever means at his
disposal
226
Military Plight of Pakistan
About 300 troops with their arms, ammunition and
equipment were airlifted that first day in 28 Dakota sorties, a
commendable performance from any standards It was an
impressive airlift comprising of Dakotas of the Air Force and
of private airlines flown by civilian pilots The pilots had not
been familiar with the ^o called airfield at Srinagar, m fact
Badgom dirt airstrip v th absolutely no support facilities like
navigational aids, radar, refueling facilities, fire tenders, etc
All that was there by way of communication facility was the
Civil Aviation Department's wireless station A NCO of the
State Forces equipped with an altimeter gauge constituted
the Air Traffic Control' Since there were no refueling facilities
at all, initially this had to be done by jerrycans The pilots
were not familiar with mountainous approach to the Valley,
while enroute they had to clear the Banihal Pass, which at it's
lowest, was 9,300 ft AMSL To further compound the bad
situation, clouds of dust rose on the runway on landing and
take off, obscuring the view for the following sorties One
captain and two havildars of Bengal Sappers managed to get
some water sprinkled on the dusty strip to mitigate the
problem And that was the beginning of rudimentary
maintenance of the Airstrip
While 1 Sikh was landing in Srinagar, 50 Para Brigade
started moving by road to Jammu Since it had already been
decided that Srinagar would be built upto a brigade group,
the next battalion to follow the Sikhs was 1 Para Kumaon
Like the Sikhs, this Battalion was also operating m Gurgaon
area when the orders for their move to Srinagar came The
Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Geofrey Beer being
a British officer was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Pritam
Singh, MC, (Later Brigadier) at Safdarjung airport a few hours
before the Dakotas carrying the Battalion headquarters and
two rifle companies took off on 29*** October The next day
the other two rifle companies of the Battalion landed at
Srinagar along with a cxjmpany of Mahar MMGs and two 3 7"
howitzers The fly in of 4 Kumaon commenced on 31
October with Ma^or Som Nath Sharma's 'D' Company being
Indian Military Intervention
227
the first to arrive along with the remaining personnel of 1
Para Kumaon
The burden of administrative arrangements at the
despatching end in Delhi was the responsibility of "Delhi
Area Headquarters who fortunately had three young junior
Indian Commissioned Officers (ICOs) on their staff. It was
their Herculean efforts and high sense of duty, which enabled
our troops to receive adequate arms, ammunition, clothing
and rations in the early stages The attitude of the senior staff
officers, who were British, was one of general indifference as
they must have felt that this war was none of their business
. A young Ordnance Officer of Delhi Area issued out
ammunition from Red Fort emergency reserves at his own
risk and responsibility, without the authority of his British
superiors so that it could be flown out to the troops in time.
The courage and devotion of civil and military pilots who
flew day in and day out, every day, without much rest to
themselves or their aircraft, which received very little
maintenance, was most impressive. This operation speaks
volumes for the efficiency and competence of the pilots and
their ground support elements. "An entire brigade,! 61 under
Brig L.P Sen, DSO, was airlifted within five days. Dakotas did
the transportation and fighters and fighter-bombers, spitfires,
Tempests and even Harvards gave ground support to the
Army — then and right through the year. The Airlines, their
pilots, crew and technicians were also requisitioned to help
with the airlift and they did a magnificent job. Air Marshal
Elmhirst was at the helm of this emergency project and Air
Cdre Meher Singh was at the head of the Operational Group.
In the history of aviation, there are few events to match this
achievement."^^
There was widespread jubilation and celebration in
Srinagar and neighbouring towns and villages after the Indian
troops started landing at Badgom. The people of Srinagar
heaved a sigh of relief. Bands of local volunteers had formed
themselves into 'mohalla tolies' and mustered to the clarion
228
Military Plight of Pakistan
call of "Shaheed Ho". They helped in maintaining law and
order and kept vigil at strategic points The population was
well disciplined, and under the guidance and control of the
local National Conference leaders, notably Bakshi Ghulam
Mohamed, G.M Sadiq and D P Dhar, who offered full
cooperation by way of transport and guides. It should be
noted that air transported troops did not have any vehicles at
all and were totally dependent on the civil transport, both for
their operational and administrative needs And Sheikh
Abdullah and his National Conference rose to the occasion
admirably The situation here was in marked contrast to the
attitude of the Poonchi, Baltistani and Jammu Muslims
The First Encounters
The initial delay and dilly-dallying by the Indian Cabinet
in coming to the aid of the State was more than made up by
the efficiency, courage and devotion of the Indian pilots, civil
and military alike. And 1 Sikh rose above all of them Within
minutes of landing and getting his command together.
Colonel Rai deployed one rifle company to secure the
airfield. At about 2 pm he led the other two companies, one
of his own Battalion and the other of the gunners who too
were otherwise Sikhs, forward in the true Sikh offensive
spirit. In the vehicles provided by the National Conference
set-up at Srinagar, this force soon reached the position held
by remnants of the State Forces numbering about 1 00 on a
ridge about one mile south-east of Baramula It was here,
about one mile east of Baramula that the first engagement
between Indian troops and Pak invaders took place on the
27 ^*' of October 1947. And both were surprised — The
Pakistanis were surprised by the sudden appearance of
regular Indian Army troops which they least expected, and
Colonel Rai was surprised by the well equipped well
organised raiders, obviously led by professionals, and armed
with machine guns and 3" mortars. In fact. Major Khurshid
Anwar who had been earlier cashiered from the undivided
Indian Army for embezzlement of mess founds was
commanding the enemy forces.
Indian Military Intervention
229
Colonel Rai soon realised that here he was up against a
numerically far superior enemy, well equipped, armed and
led He therefore decided to withdraw about two miles east
of Baramula and took up hurried defences on the low hills
astride the main road.
Colonel Rai's bold move forward to the gates of Baramula
and the short engagement there imposed a certain degree of
caution on the enemy thereby gaming some time However,
he soon found that enemy's outflanking movements were
endangering his hastily prepared defences and therefore he
decided to withdraw to Rattan, half way between Baramula
and Srinagar, by the evening of the next day By that time, the
Sikhs had already caused at least one day's delay on the
enemy's advance to Badgom Airstrip, which was of most vital
significance for further build up of Indian military strength
While withdrawing his Rear Party to a pre-reconnoitered lay
back position. Colonel Rai was mortally wounded.
Unfortunately, his body could not be recovered One subedar
of the mortar platoon and two Other Ranks (OR) were also
killed in the same action while 15 others who were wounded
were evacuated to Badami Bagh Cantonment Military
Hospital in Srinagar
Captain Lichmore, the Adjutant of the Sikhs, on his own
initiative sent out 'B' Company to reinforce the Battalion
position But 1 Sikh after withdrawing from Baramula and the
death of their C.O. did not take up defences south of Rattan.
Instead, the embussed column came within seven miles of
the City when they were intercepted by the Battalion
Second-in-Command, Major Sampuran Bachan Singh who
assumed command of the Battalion and took the column
back to Rattan where they took up defences around 3.00 am
29'^ October. The Adjutant had also sent out an officer patrol
at 8.00 pm 28*^ October along the road Srinagar-Thunmarg as
far as Magam, and then a few miles beyond Rattan. They
reported that enemy had not contacted Rattan till then.
Brigadier Atal's presence at the Battalion headquarters at the
Airfield that evening went a long way in stabilising the
230
Military Plight of Pakistan
Otherwise quite tricky situation It later transpired that 1 Sikh
abandoned the Rattan position after 60 odd State Forces
troops holding that position had told the Sikhs that they had
been ordered to return to Srinagar which, of course, was not
a correct statement
Meanwhile, Brigadier Atal had been busy in Srinagar
meeting various political personalities He had exchanged a
number of messages with Prime Minister Nehru about the
prevailing civil situation in the City In the message bearing
DTO 281030 sent by name to Mr Nehru, he suggested to the
Prime Minister that air attacks on road Baramula-Srinagar be
resorted to, and that small reconnaissance planes be
stationed at Srinagar airfield to undertake periodic
reconnaissance missions since practically no enemy
intelligence was available Further, "Very evident that Kashmir
Maharaja Government not functioning So-called Governor
Major Pritam Singh and Rao Ratan Singh 1 G P are supposed
to constitute the Government, they are completely
demoralised The mass exodus of their families and those of
other high officials has caused panic National Conference
with Abdullah and Bakshi a tireless worker are doing yeoman
work and personally consider it essential that some form of
recognised Government be formed early Baramula captured
by attackers yesterday afternoon 3 PM and set on flames I
request you to have an Indian on General Russel's Staff as his
Brigadier General Staff and that Brigadier Mellsop be relieved
immediately Colonel L P Sen is the name I suggest " The
replies from Prime Minister were equally long, if not longer
still including a rather longish letter addressed to "My Dear
Hiralal" in which the Prime Minister mentioned "I am asking
for the return immediately of Bijji Kaul from Washington
It was Kashmiriyat all the way'
On the other side of the curtain, "The swift airlift upset
Jinnah's applecart When the invasion began, he was at
Abbottabad and expected to ride in triumph into Kashmir
On hearing of the landings of Indian troops at Srinagar he
was furious General Sir Douglas Gracey was at the time
Indian Military Intervention
231
acting as Pakistan's Commander-m-Chief m the temporary
absence of General Messervey. Jmnah at once ordered
Gracey to send regular troops into Kashmir This order was
sent to him on the night of 27 October through the Military
Secretary to the Governor of West Punjab, with whom Jmnah
at the time was staying Gracey replied that he was not
prepared to issue such instructions without the approval of
the Supreme Commander, Field Marshal Sir Claude
Auchinleck. Since armies of both the Dominions were under
one supreme command, Auchinleck could possibly not issue
an order that would tantamount to approving an Inter-
Dominion war At Gracey's request, Auchinleck flew into
Lahore the next day and explained to Jmnah the military
issues involved He told him that on account of the State's
accession to India, the latter's Government had a perfect
right to send in troops m response to the Maharaja's request
He further explained that any intervention by Pakistani troops
would amount to an invasion and 'would involve
automatically and immediately the withdrawal of every
British officer serving with the newly formed Pakistan Army'
The Pakistan Army at this time was relying more heavily on
British officers than the Indian Army. The advice, therefore,
had Its effect on Jmnah and he cancelled his orders. Thus, a
confrontation between the regular forces of India and
Pakistan was averted for the time being.
In order to further defuse the situation, Mountbatten
accompanied by Lord Ismay visited Lahore on November
for a meeting with Jmnah. Prime Minister Nehru and his
Deputy Sardar Patel both found excuses not to accompany
their Governor General, much that the latter wanted them to.
The meeting took place m an atmosphere of extreme
suspicion and distrust. Mr. Jmnah put forward a 3-point
proposal:
1 . Cease-fire within 48 hours.
2 Withdrawal of Indian forces and the tribesmen.
J-iJ.
Military Plight of Pakistan
3 Plebfscite under the joint control of the two
Governors General (i.e , Jinnah and Mountbatten) without
any influence of Sheikh Abdullah and Indian Army.
Mountbatten asked Jinnah the common sense question of
how he could be responsible for withdrawing the tribesmen
when he had no control over them as professed by him' In
turn, Mountbatten suggested a plebiscite under the auspices
of the United Nations but Jinnah promptly rejected the idea.
Indian military assistance was given ".. in return not only
for accession but also for the agreement (crucial in the eyes
of Jawahar Lai Nehru) that the Maharaja would entrust to
Sheikh Abdullah the task of forming an Emergency
Government under the Prime Ministership of Mahajan."^^
Maharaja Han Singh adhered to this agreement and
appointed Sheikh Abdullah as head of the Emergency
Government with the title of Chief Emergency Administrator
with Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed as his Deputy and Mirza
Afzal Beg continuing as Minister. This arrangement under the
supervision of Mahajan continued till 5 March 1948 when
Sheikh Abdullah was appointed Prime Minister at the head of
an Interim Government of the State
When the action in Baramula-Pattan area was being
fought, airlift was in full swing. Indian Dakotas were landing
with clockwork regularity every 45 minutes Incoming
Dakotas were bringing in troops and military hardware while
returning flights were evacuating all those who wanted to
leave Skeleton Headquarters 161 Infantry Brigade had
landed in the meantime. Brigadier J.C. Katoch landed on the
29‘^ and immediately assumed command of all troops in the
Valley. He was accompanied by Colonel L P. Sen, then
Officiating Director of Military Intelligence at Army
Headquarters who had come on a quick visit to collect
operational information and report back to Brigadier Thapar,
Director Military Operations, the same evening at Delhi. The
same day, 29* October 161 Infantry Brigade Signal Section
reported an excellent piece of news; wireless
communications had been established with Delhi,
Indian Military Intervention
233
A sniper bullet on the 31st wounded brigadier Katoch
who had barely assumed command on 29th October. The
Indian Army evacuated him to Delhi, the third senior officer
casualty within 3-4 days of commencement of operations.
And the situation was changing so fast, reinforcements flying
in at such a rapid pace that the Brigade saw three different
officiating Brigade Commanders within 48 hours of Katoch
becoming a casualty, all because senior lieutenant colonels
kept arriving one after the other'
At this time, the division of armed forces between the
two Dominions was still in progress Sub-units and personnel
were being changed over from one to the other as per their
religious affiliations and personal choice. " .many infantry
battalions were a hotchpotch of sorts The final position was
that 1 (P’ara) Punjab had two companies from Pak 1/12
Frontier Force Regiment, and 1 Sikh had men from Pak 1/1
Punjab and 3/15 Punjab, besides the gunners temporarily
attached to it. Even 4 Kumaon had a Dogra Company from 4/
13 Frontier Force Rifles."^®
It was the 1 Sikh[now in full strength] that was holding a
strong well-prepared defensive position on high ground
astride the main road at Pattan Since it was important for the
enemy to clear the mam axis, three determined attacks
supported by 3" mortars were launched against the Pattan
defences but the enemy did not succeed in dislodging the
Sikhs. As a last resort, the raiders bypassed the defences with
a northern diversionary hook via Bandipur- Gandharbal
under a Subedar Major, and made their way by the mam
road towards Srinagar. Concurrently, a strong southern
movement via Bacfgom under Captain Sher Mohammed, a
defector from the State Forces, posed a serious threat to the
airfield Thus the enemy main thrust reached Badgom, a few
miles from the airfield About 700 raiders took cover m the
village and disguised themselves as Kashmiris in long flowing
robes.
234
Military Plight of Pakistan
With the evacuation of Brigadier Katoch to Delhi as a
battle casualty, it was urgently necessary that a new brigade
commander be positioned immediately to take charge of all
operations in and around Srinagar. The officiating Director of
Military Intelligence at Army Headquarters, Colonel L P Sen,
DSO, was appointed in his place He took over command of
161 Infantry Brigade on 2"^' November with 'temporary rank'
of Brigadier
On return from Srinagar on 29 October 1947, Colonel
Sen reported to the Director of Military Operations, Brigadier
Thapar of the grim military situation at Srinagar It was a
touch and go matter and Sen informed Thapar of the
situation as he had assessed it based on the information he
had gathered. The same day, unknown to these officers.
Prime Minister Nehru had deputed a Kashmiri officer to visit
Srinagar and to report back to him. During his short stay of a
couple of hours at Srinagar airfield, this officer had not even
met the Brigade Commander, or the Battalion Commander,
nor visited any forward positions, and reported an optimistic
picture of the situation to the Prime Minister direct without
informing his military superiors. And he had done that before
Colonel Sen even returned to Delhi.
The same evening Brigadier Thapar sent his latest
assessment of the situation to the Prime Minister who was
justifiably upset over the two conflicting reports from two
senior Army officers The session with the Prime Minister was
quite stormy that night! Prime Minister Nehru's such
infringement of military chain of command was not to remain
a solitary instance in the history of this country, while for Sen
this controversial incident was not a favourable start in his
new challenging assignment.
However, the second incident the next day was certainly
more auspicious — Mahatma Gandhi wanted an intelligence
briefing on the developments m Kashmir Accordingly,
Colonel Sen called on the Mahatma. His parting remarks to
the Colonel were quite significant and appropriate to the
Indian Military Intervention
235
Situation "Wars are a curse to humanity They are so utterly
senseless They bring nothing but suffering and destruction "
On being asked what he, Colonel Sen should do in Kashmir,
Gandhi smiled and replied, "You are going in to protect
innocent people, to save them from suffering, and their
property from destruction To achieve that you must naturally
make use of all means at your disposal
A Brigade is deployed
The new Commander of 161 Infantry Brigade Colonel
L P Sen, DSO took off from Safdarjang Airport in the early
hours of 2"‘‘ November amongst rumours at the airport that
Badgom airstrip had fallen into enemy hands, but landed
safely at the other end without an incident By this time,
substantial reinforcement had arrived in Srinagar
Nonetheless, the situation was quite dismal since a large
enemy force had already outflanked the Rattan defences and
was knocking at the gates of the airfield as we have already
seen.
1 Kumaon, being a Para Battalion was only 650 strong It
also had two rifle companies of 4 Kumaon and was
responsible for the defence of the airfield 1 Para Punjab
under command of Lieutenant Colonel C I.S Khullar was
much under strength at this time and had only 450
personnel. This Battalion was deployed at Magam, 12 miles
from Srinagar astride the road to Culmarg In addition, the
Brigade had one mountain battery from Patiala State Forces,
which the Maharaja of Patiala had sent to the Maharaja of
Jammu and Kashmir as a friendly assistance. Unfortunately,
the mountain gunners had come without the dial sights for
their guns, and hence the four 3 7<t<t guns were a hindrance
than an asset at the Airfield. However, the mountain gunners
were asked to fire two rounds of High Explosive and one of
smoke into the blues, every now and then, in the general
direction of enemy concentrations without any aim just as a
morale boosting exercise.
236
Military Plight of Pakistan
Besides the above, about 100 troops of Maharaja's
bodyguards, a purely ceremonial unit were also available It
will be seen that by 2-3 November 1947, Brigadier Sen had a
good part of four-infantry battalions worth of troops available
to him This does not include 2,000 reasonably trained,
armed and organised State Forces personnel in Badami Bagh
Cantonment of whose presence none of the Indian
commanders had any knowledge whatsoever
By this time the raiders had fanned out of Baramula
enroute to the Capital, setting villages on fire to announce
their entry into the Valley, accompanied by plunder, loot and
rape at will. They were guided to their rendezvous by light
signals from friendly sources. Their physical appearance and
overwhelming strength of numbers was enough to cause
panic and alarm However, Emergency Government of
Sheikh Abdullah was in full control of the situation in the City
and its suburbs They rendered full assistance by way of
passenger buses, lorries, trucks and guides being placed at
the disposal of the Brigade. But it was the acute shortage of
petrol that often was a stumbling block. Decanting from the
Dakotas, which brought m men and materials, was one of the
unorthodox methods adopted to get this precious commodity
to keep the troops moving.
This in brief was the general state of troops-deployment
when Brigadier Sen assumed command at Srinagar The
operational situation of course had turned pretty serious and
grim by now. The airfield defences were directly threatened
by overwhelming numbers and so was the capital. Both
threats were being developed simultaneously. Infiltration by
large parties of enemy was a serious cause for concern. The
Brigade Commander had barely taken charge, hardly known
his command let alone seen them. Well, these are the
mercurial ironies of life, the vagaries of war...
Patrolling was being done to cover the gaps between the
defences at the airport and since the patrol action had
achieved its aim, one company of 4 Kumaoh was withdrawn
Indian Military Intervention
237
to the airfield, leaving one company under Major Sharma to
hold on to the firm base Major Sharma reported all quiet on
the Badgom front The movements in the village appeared
normal, nothing suspicious whatsoever Suddenly, about half
an hour before the thinning out time, the firm base was fired
at from some houses in the village However, Major Sharma
did not return the fire for fear of causing injury to women
and children in the village This ineffective intermittent firing
continued for some time It later transpired that this was
meant to distract the firm base from the main attack, which
was developing from the west
About 2 30 pm on November 1947 the enemy, about
700 strong disguised as Kashmiris, their weapons hidden
under their loose cloaks, attacked this firm base position and
over-ran the defences resulting in most of the personnel
being killed or wounded By about 5 pm this position was
reinforced by another company of 1 Para Kumaon, but it was
too late Major Sharma and his Company fought to the
'proverbial last man last round' in which he earned his
posthumous Param Vir Chakra, the Republic's highest award
for gallantry Another outstanding act of gallantry that day was
by Sepoy Dewan Singh who, even though wounded like his
Company Commander, picked up a bren gun and killed
fifteen of the enemy single-handed He was posthumously
awarded the Maha Vir Chakra, the second hignest gallantry
award of Independent India
This Battle of Badgom was an extremely costly episode
for the Brigade, particularly the new Commander for whom it
was the opening round of this campaign However, the
enemy too had suffered heavy casualties and the toll on his
morale was greater because of close air support provided by
the Spitfires operating from Srinagar Airfield The enemy did
not exploit his success to occupy the heights dominating the
airfield It was a piece of good luck for India to have been
able tb save the airfield that evening Perhaps, the enemy
thought that the Indian positions in Humbom-Badgom sector
were stron.gly hehit and therefore decided to withdraw to
238
Military Plight of Pakistan
their favourite haunts of Baramula. Either way, it was a
blessing in disguise for the Brigade, but the situation was still
not free from danger There was no room for complacency
since the enemy forces were still in tact, and in good shape.
It was just a coincidence that next morning the Deputy
Prime Minister, Sardar Vallabh Bhai Patel accompanied by the
Defence Minister, Sardar Baldev Singh visited Srinagar and
came to the Brigade Operations Room (Ops Room) for a
briefing While reviewing the developments of the night
before, when Srinagar was definitely threatened and loss of
the airfield was well on the cards, but for the unexpected
hesitation on the part of the enemy. Brigadier Sen addressing
the Defence Minister asked, "Am I expected to eject the
tribesmen from the Valley regardless of the fate that may
befall Srinagar, or is the town to be saved?" Before the
Defence Minister could reply, Sardar Patel who otherwise
seemed to be disinterested if not snoozing, snapped back
emphatically, "Of course Srinagar must be saved
Before leaving the Ops Room Sardar Patel informed the
Brigade Commander that he would get whatever additional
resources he had asked for, as soon as possible. And true to
his word and reputation of a man of action, the same evening
a message was received at the Brigade Headquarters from
Delhi that two infantry battalions, one squadron armoured
cars and a battery of field artillery were on their way up by
road. This quick road movement had become possible
because, while exciting events of far reaching significance
were taking place in and around Srinagar, construction of an
all weather road from Pathankot to Jammu was progressing at
a frantic pace by the combined efforts of civil and military
engineers. 15 Field Company Engineers completed a 180-ft
Bailey Pontoon Bridge Over River Ravi at Madhopur on 2"''
November. 37 Assault Field Company and elements of 32
Field Company was positioned at Ramban, which was
another major bottleneck. A number of detachments of field
engineers were deployed under comman?J of JAK Div
Engineers all along the road from Madhqpur onwards rj^t
upto Banihal Pass to take care of the road and bridges.
Indian Military Intervention
239
With Srinagar Airfield safely in Indian hands, and
substantial reinforcements particularly by way of armour and
artillery already on their way up, besides the fighter aircraft
providing excellent close air support, events were moving at a
fast pace towards the first most decisive Battle of this War
NOTES & REFERENCES
1 Initially, the intelligence wizards in Delhi could not figure out
where Fort Owen was, and therefore by default, the information
could not be put to any use
2 Liaqat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister and Defence Minister of
Pakistan hailed from UP (India).
3 Palit D K VrC, Major General; "Jammu and Kashmir Arms. His-
tory of J & K Rifles", Palir & Dutt Publishers, Dehradun, 1972,
p 196
4.Kalkat OS., "The Far Flung Frontiers"; Allied Publishers, New
Delhi, 1983, p.29
5 Menon VP, "The Story of the Integration of the Indian States",
Longmans,London, 1956, p 414
6 Bhattacharjea Ajit, "KASHMIR The Wounded Valley", UBS Pub-
lishers' Distributors, New Delhi, 1994,p 139
7 Mahajan, Mehr Chand; "Looking Back. An Autobiography", Asia
Publishing House, New Delhi, 1963, pp151-52.
8. Prime Minister Nehru followed exactly a similar prescription
when he was faced with a crisis in 1962. He again put all his eggs
in one basket held by Lieutenant General BM (Bijji) Kaul and Mr
B N. Mullik, once again with disastrous results of course, a repeti-
tion of the drama in Kashmir. In the end, the Nation paid a heavy
price for the series of blunders committed by the Indian political
leadership over the decades
240
Military Plight of Pakistan
9 Bhattarharjea Ajit, op cit p 141
10 Menon VP, "The Story of Integration of the Indian States",
Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1985, pp 398-400
11 Lamb, Alistair, "Kashmir A Disputed Legacy", Oxford Books,
UK 1991 and Karachi, 1993 Also, "Crisis in Kashmir 1947-66",
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1966
12 Chibber M L , Lieutenant General, "Pakistan's Criminal Folly in
Kashmir", Manas Publications, New Delhi, 1998, p 59
1 3 Grover Verinder, "The Story of Kashmir Yesterday and Today"
Vol III, Deep & Deep Publications, New Delhi, 1995, p 109
14 Rajendra Nath, Major General, "Military Leadership in India",
Lancer Books, New Delhi 1990,p265 quoting Larry Collins and
Domonique Lapierre in "Mountbatten and Independent India",
pp 39, 142 and 146
15 Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, "Thrown to the Wolves"
1 6 Bhattacharjea, op cit p 6
17 Kadian, Rajesh, The Kashmir Tangle, Vision Books , New
Delhi,1 992, p 55, and Bhattacharjea Ajit, op cit p 86
18 Chibber M L , op at , p 51
19 Akbar Khan,DSO, Major General, " Raiders in Kashmir", Army
Publishers, Delhi/Karachi, 1970, pp 90-98
20 Lieutenant Colonel Iskander Mirza was an officer in the Politi-
cal Department of the British Government in India dealing with
Tribal Affairs in Northwest Frontier Province On Independence he
was appointed the Defence Secretary of Pakistan and later became
the Governor General of Pakistan
21 Sinha, S K Lieutenant General, "Operation Rescue Military Op-
erations in Jammu & Kashmir 1947-49", Vision Books, New Delhi,
1977/1997, pp 11-12
22 Palsokar R D ,MC, Colonel, "History of The 5* Gorkha Rifles
(Frontier Force) Vol 111,1885-1991, 58 G TC Shillong 1991 ,p 1 1 5
Indian Military Intervention
241
23. Chaturvedi M S Air Marshal, "History of the Indian Air Force",
Vikas Publishers New Delhi, 1978,p 71.
24 Korbel Josef, "Danger in Kashmir", Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 1954
25 Sinha S.K , op cit ,p 13
26 lbid,p 15.
27 Bamzai, Prithvi Nath Kaul;"A History of Kashmir. Political-So-
cial-Cultural from the Earliest Times to the Present Day", Metro-
politan Book Company, Delhi, 1962, p 682
28 Atal, Hiralal, Major General, Nehru's Emissary to Kashmir;
Army Educational Stores, 1972; p p 33-35
29 Praval K C , Major, "Valour Triumphs — A History of The
Kumaon Regiment", Thomson Press (India) Limited, 1976,p 167.
30 "History of the Corps of Engineers", Palit & Palit Publishers,
New Delhi, 1 980.
31 "Atal, op cit p 10
32 Lai PC , Air Chief Marshal, "My Years with the lAF"; Lancer In-
ternational, New Delhi, 1986;p 59
33 Atal, op cit pp 49-51.
34 Campbell-johnson Allen, "Mission with Mountbatten" Robert
Hale, London, 1951, pp 223-26 and 363; and Praval K.C ;op
cit ;p.35
35. Lamb, Alistair; "Kashmir A Disputed Legacy"; Karachi 1993;
p.136.
36 Praval K C., Major; "Indian Army After Independence"; Lancer
Paperbacks, New Delhi, 1987/1 993, p 29.
37.Colonel "L P. ('Bogey') Sen, a tall, fair and handsome, this
Sandhurst-trained Bengali was originally from the Baluch Regi-
ment. He had a fine war record and had won the Distinguished
Service Order in the Arakans. At 37, with only sixteen years of ser-
242
Military Plight of Pakistan
vice, he had just been promoted brigadier and was full of enthusi-
asm " — Praval K C ,ibid,p 29
38 Sen L P, Lieutenant General, D S O , "Slender was the Thread
Kashmir Conflict 1947-48", Orient Longman, New Delhi 1969/
1994, p56
39 Som Nath was the son of Major General R N Sharma of Army
Medical Corps He had seen some bitter fighting in the Arakans
during World War II, and now had his arm in plaster due to a frac-
ture while playing hockey
40 Praval K C , "Valour Triumphs"op cit p 1 69
41 Sen L P Lieutenant General, op cit ,pp 71-75
42 Ibid, p 76
THE BATTLE OF
SHALATENG"
“THE FORTUNES OF WAR ARE STRANGE AND
UNPREDICTABLE ”
Soon after reviewing the Battle of Badgom as it
developed on 3 "^ November and the operational situation
resulting therefrom, Brigadier Sen issued orders for
withdrawal of 1 Sikh from Rattan to concentrate on the south-
east edge of the City so as to block enemy routes of ingress
from Pampur This was an important operational requirement
since reports of raiders' infiltration into Pampur had been
pouring in over the last couple of days The Brigade
Defended Sector now looked something like this
* Two Companies of 4 Kumaon deployed on protection
of the Airfield (one company nominated as Brigade reserve)
* I Para Punjab in Humhom area astride road Srinagar-
Badgom
* 1 Para Kumaon in Chandmari area (Rifle Range) to
deny enemy approaches to the City from the west
* 1 Sikh comprising of six rifle companies on southeast
edge of the City covering the road from Pampur
* Maharaja's Body Guards, about 100 State Forces
personnel in area Gandarbal to cover the northwestern
approaches to the City.
THE BATTLE OF SHALATENG
NOT TO SCALE
(■ased%n slcmocr was xhe xhread'
The Battle of Shalateng
245
The location and role of the Patiala State Forces artillery
unit IS not mentioned in the above, perhaps, it was deployed
on the Airfield The remaining companies of 4 Kumaon
arrived on 4*'^ November under Lieutenant Colonel Padam
Singh However, the following day the command of the
Battalion passed on to Lieutenant Colonel M M. Khanna
(Later Lieutenant General, MVC)
The primary aim of the above defensive layout was to
guard various approaches to the City against infiltration or
direct assault by the raiders Since no amount of force can
possibly cover every approach to a fairly large city by static
defensive positions held by infantry, by the very nature of
such deployment there were large tracts of land and dead
ground, which could not be covered. Obviously, every square
meter of frontage can not possibly be covered by physically
holding It by men. Far from It. Covering by fire and
observation, and using mobile troops in reserve — be it even
armed horsemen — is the crux of the solution. But creation
ot such mobile reserve(s) was not possible within the
resources then available to the Brigade Commander.
However, it is a matter of academic interest as to what
efforts, if at all any, were made to organise some sort of such
a reserve, if not for fighting, then at least for patrolling and
gathering information infiltration by the raiders. Local ponies
were in abundance, the people and the National Conference
were extremely cooperative. Similarly, the lack of depth in
defensive layout and reserves could have been partly
overcome by more judicious employment of the two
additional rifle companies with 1 Sikh, as well as the Patiala
gunners.
It is not that there were no more troops in the Valley or in
the City at that time. As it turned out later after the Battle had
achieved a brilliant climax and total victory for Indian Army,
it transpired that there were nearly 2,000 State Forces
persoi»n-el "concealing themselves" in Badami Bagh
Canton meni
246
Military Plight of Pakistan
Fallout from Rattan
In his fluent easy style of his well written book, "Slender
Was the Thread", General Sen has made much hullabaloo
about this deployment, particularly regarding the reasons
which prompted him to pull out 1 Sikh from a well prepared
strongly held defensive position at Rattan much against the
wishes of all concerned — the C.O. of the Battalion,
Lieutenant Colonel Sampuran Bachan Singh; the Divsional
Commander Major General Kalwant Singh, a no-nonsense
hard task master. Since the raiders were adept at hit and run
tactics, and were making a nuisance of themselves all over
the rural areas around the City and sometimes within
Srinagar itself too, thereby causing immense damage not only
to life and property but also generally disturbing the peace at
will, it was necessary to put a stop to this type of violence.
The Brigadier reasons that his problem was how to make the
enemy concentrate so that he could destroy them in pitched
battle? "I therefore decided that the best way to effect such a
concentration would be to give them an incentive to do so,
and this could only be achieved by giving them a very
attractive bait. . The bait, I felt, could only be the road — ■
freedom to use which, I was convinced, would act like a
magnet... 1 Sikh at Rattan was the stumbling block, and I
decided to withdraw this Battalion and throw open the road
to the tribals He has thus made out the argument that this
decision to abandon Rattan defences was a deliberate military
calculation, a plan to entice the invaders to concentrate, and
thus present themselves as a worthwhile target for pitched
battle so that his brilliant generalship could defeat the enemy
and thus put them to route
Sounds very plausible!
The pull out frorw Rattan might have given an impression
to the enemy that Indian troops had virlthdrawn in the face of
heavy losses suffered by them at Badgom. But all this talk
about the "bait to the enemy* arid he falling for it, as if a trap
was deliberately planned, and laid out as a brilliant military
The Battle of Shalateng
247
manoeuvre — No All this appears to be simple military bull,
a trifle over the top A mere after thought to counter
extremely explosive reaction not only from Major General
Kalwant Singh but also from one and all in the Emergency
Government, notably the Sheikh as we shall soon see The
simple truth appears to be that that very morning Sardar Patel
had given a clear-cut decision- Save Srinagar. That was the
first priority task, and rightly so In pursuance of that. Sen
certainly acted boldly, and brilliantly, more so in the light of
the previous days grim situation that the Brigade had just
faced Furthermore, 1 Sikh at Rattan were far too out, in fact
completely isolated from the defence perimeter which was
rather thin on the ground as it is. Strong pockets of enemy
infiltrators could easily interpose between Rattan and Srinagar
thus creating serious problems for Sen Hence Sen rightly
pulled out 1 Sikh to bolster up defences of Srinagar till further
reinforcements promised by Sardar Patel actually fetched in,
to allow offensive operations to be undertaken to evict the
tribals from the Valley Lieutenant General S K Sinha also
confirms this version when he says "Sen who had now taken
over command of the Brigade, decided to pull in the Sikhs
from Rattan, and form a closer defence ring round Srinagar.'"’
After Sardar Patel and party had left for Delhi on 4'*’
November, and Sen had done his day's work including
issuance of orders for redeployment of 1 Sikh, he went over
to the house of Sheikh Abdullah to apologise for his earlier
rough-gruff behavior® There he also met Bakshi Ghulam
Mohammed and Mr. D.P Dhar and talked about National
Conference volunteers and the dangerous missions some of
them had been undertaking to gather enemy information all
along the front. He thanked these leaders for all their help,
transport, etc, but did not divulge, not even a hint about the
impending withdrawal of 1 Sikh from Rattan.
As soon as the cat was out of the bag, there was loud
furore aJI over. Major General Kalwant Singh who had taken
over as CommiarKler lAK Div with his headquarters at Jammu
was absoJylely fudous. iwad was at Srin^^l airfield first thing
248
Military Plight of Pakistan
on the 5‘'’ morning. There was serious disagreement between
the two over the military justification and the story of bait
that Sen recited, which at best was a hunch as admitted by
Sen himself in his book But a hunch cannot take the place of
sound military reasoning which was certainly in favour of
Sen All the same, it was like fire works between the two
senior commanders, both strong personalities, and both
highly regarded professionally. Kalwant Singh was extremely
upset over withdrawal of 1 Sikh "without his approval and
without consulting JAK Force Headquarters". But now it was a
fait accompli, and impotent anger of the General over his
Brigadier was of no further avail. It was too late in the day in
any case since the enemy had promptly occupied Rattan
defences.
When this explosive news reached the Sheikh, he was no
less furious. As it is. Sen had severely rubbed the Sher-e-
Kashmir (Lion of Kashmir) on the wrong side by his
impetuous rude behavior the day before; this was the last
straw for the de facto chief of Emergency Government The
Sheikh Saheb promptly despatched D.R Dhar to Delhi to get
Sen sacked, and to get a new Brigade Commander for
Srinagar. Prime Minister Nehru who saw Kashmir through the
prism of Abdullah, and who was already miffed at Sen a few
days earlier, readily agreed. However fortunately for Sen,
Sardar Patel, the Iron Man of India who had carefully
observed the Brigadier and was apparently impressed by his
professionalism, and rightly so, put his foot down against any
change of command at Srinagar at that crucial juncture,...
Sen's reputation and the Distinguished Service Order,
awarded by the British for his gallantry in Burma during the
Second World War, certainly stood him in good stead!
Sardar Patel was quite emphatic about saving Srinagar
and this was a top priority job, hence, it was tantamount to a
policy directive for Sen. Hence, the deployment of the
Brigade had to have the accent changed from tf>e overall aim
of throwing the raiders out of the Valley to the limited
immediate aim of security of Srinagar, till arrivel o# further
The Battle of Shalateng
249
reinforcements which were said to be on the way This,
together with the enemy's outflanking movements around
Pattan were the professional military reasons for withdrawal
of 1 Sikh from Pattan Moreover there were definite reports
of raiders taking on the City from Pampur side, and hence
the urgent requirement to deny that approach to the enemy
Under the circumstances, the Brigade Commander was not
only justified but also well within his rights to redeploy the
troops as he had done for which he did not require specific
clearance from his higher headquarters After all, he was
responsible for the safety of Srinagar and of his Command,
and certainly not General Kalwant Singh or the Sheikh If only
Brigadier Sen had stuck to the professional line of reasoning
with his military and political bosses, rather than indulging in
that grandiose hunch of the 'bait' argument'
The above redeployment, although purely defensive, was
not a reflection of a defensive mind-set Far from it, and
certainly not for a commander of the calibre and
temperament of Brigadier Sen who was imbued with an
energetic offensive spirit — The general idea was that on the
arrival of the expected reinforcements by way of two infantry
battalions, one squadron armoured cars and a battery of 25
pounder guns, the Indian forces will break out on 1 0‘'’
November to recapture Pattan the same day and Baramula
the next day A good timetable to plan on, but which battle if
ever went exactly by the planned time schedules When
misfortunes come, they don't come alone Having escaped
sacking by the width of cat's whiskers — how else can one
explain Prime Minister Nehru being over ruled — it was 1
Sikh ex-Pattan to land Sen in a thick soupe on the night of 5/
6 November 1 947, absolutely inadvertently of course
Two volunteers of National Conference were returning to
the City after a reconnaissance patrol in Badgom area The
sentry of 1 Sikh cnallenged, but they did not respond and
instead kept advancing The sentry challenged again and
when there was till no response, he fired And the Sikhs
always fire to kill Unfortunately for those poor souls and Sen,
250
Military Plight of Pakistan
this sentry was a good shot too' Both men were killed To
make matters worse, the Sikhs quietly buried them The next
morning, the news of the incident reached Sheikh Abdullah
He was more than furious The Lion of the Valley was roaring
revenge Sen was again in a jam The situation was indeed
most difficult for him — a temporary Brigadier given charge
of 161 Infantry Brigade for about ten days till Katoch recovers
and re-assumes his command Sen, besides being so new to
the command, was facing flack from all over, all alone
Indeed, senior military commanders are very lonely persons,
more so in battle conditions
In order to calm the situation and to placate the Sheikh,
Sen moved 1 Sikh from their present defended area on the
south-eastern edge of the City to the north of 1 Para Kumaon,
astride the Srinagar-Baramula Road, with their right flank
resting on River Jhelum Soon after 1 Sikh evacuated the
position, the locals dug up the fresh grave and took the two
bodies in a procession through downtown Srinagar, shouting
slogans It was indeed a most explosive situation However, it
IS to the credit of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed who addressed
the processionists and explained the unfortunate incident, a
pure and simple mistake, an error in identification and
military procedures with which the local civilians were not at
all familiar Fortunately for all concerned, this is where the
matter ended, which it would not have but for the tact and
leadership of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed The procession
dispersed quietly
Daimlers loin the Battle (regarding the Daimlers, please
see Note 27)
7* Cavalry Regiment equipped with Sherman tanks was
part of BRINDIV on occupation duties in Japan During
August 1947 the Regiment reached Ranchi while its tanks and
soft vehicles were on the high seas in another ship On arrival
in India the rote of the Regiment was changed to that of a
light armoured regiment tt was a mixed regiment — A'
Squadron was of Jats, 'B' of Punjabi Musalmans and 'C' of
The Battle of Shalateng
251
Sikhs. As part of the process of division of assets between the
two Dominions, personnel of B Squadron were repatriated to
Pakistan while A Squadron from 6“’ Duke of Connaught's
Own Lancers (DOC) — which was allocated to Pakistan and
whose personnel were Jats — was repatriated to India from
Kohat m NWFP. They arrived at Ambala Cantt in early
October 1947 under command of Major I J Rikhye It was a
clean exchange of two squadrons; thus DOC 'A' Squadron
now became part of the 7'*' Light Cavalry Regiment as its 'B'
Squadron This new squadron had not had the time or
opportunity to get assimilated in the new Regiment.
Therefore, when the requirement arose for a squadron of
armoured cars to be inducted into Kashmir for active duty,
this DOC squadron just arrived from Kohat was nominated
for the crucial assignment The Squadron was once again on
the move, leaving Ambala on 1“ November. This Squadron
fought under the name of 'B' Squadron 7 Cav and brought
glory to the Regiment. And it was a lucky coincidence that it
was a Jat Squadron, and not a Sikh squadron as we shall see
later
While the rest of 7 Cav was concentrating at Jammu, 'B'
Squadron carrying 10 days supply of rations and petrol and
two first line lifts of ammunition reached Ramban Suspension
Bridge on 4**’ November This 19**’ century bridge across River
Chenab, about 120 miles north of Jammu was originally
designed to carry carts and carriages only. Later only the
personal car of the Maharaja was allowed to go over it. With
the war came the empty buses, to cross one at a time But
the bridge was not at all safe for the 7 V 2 ton Daimler
armoured cars which were stripped to their bare bones to
reduce the load. And they too crossed the bridge! It was an
agonizingly slow process, one car at a time, and in the
process the bridge was severely damaged, a large number of
nuts and bolts having cracked. Immediately after the
armoured cars squadron were across, the bridge was closed
to all vefhfcuta^' trafffic resulting in an emergency convoy of 3
ton vehicles carrying petrol to Srinagar being held up for
252
Military Plight of Pakistan
more than a week till emergency repairs were carried out by
State PWD, and later by 37 Assault Field Company of
Bombay Sappers.
However, the above repairs were only a stopgap
arrangement and the military engineers had to find a better
long-term solution to the problem. Meanwhile, on November
, JAK Div HQ was established at Jammu which was
supported by 1 Armoured Divisional Engineers redesignated
as J & K Divisional Engineers comprising of 32 and 37 Assault
Field Companies, and 39 Assault Field Park Company then in
the process of moving from Secunderabad to Jammu. The
Commander (Royal) Indian Engineers, Lieutenant Colonel
Shiv Dyal Singh deployed 37 Assault Field Company and 21
Field Company of Bombay Sappers to construct a 1 60 ft load
class 18 Bailey Bridge about 300 yards upstream of the
existing suspension bridge. The new bridge was completed
only on 3'“ January 1948 due to considerable delay in getting
heavy bridging equipment to the site.®
Now back to the Daimlers — Major Rikhye with one
troop of four armoured cars and the Rifle Troop reported for
duty at HQ 161 Infantry Brigade at Srinagar airfield at about
5.30 pm on 5**’ November, a "virtual gift from gods", in the
words of the Brigade Commander. Major Rikhye requested
that the troop be given the next day off for maintenance of
the cars. The remaining squadron along with the rest of the
reinforcement column arrived at the Airfield on 7*'’
November, as scheduled.
The civil population in and around Bandipur, north of
Wular Lake were feeling isolated and in panic for quite some
time. The Sheikh had also been asking for some troops to be
sent that side to restore confidence amongst the public at
large But all these days. Sen could not spare anything at all.
However, he was certainly tooking for some opportunity to
mend fences with the Sheikh; and this troop of armoured
cars and the rifle troop were just the right thing at the right
time. So Major Rikhye was ordered to organise a patrol under
The Battle of Shalateng
253
Lieutenant David in the Bandipur area Soon after the Patrol
left the airfield, around 7 00 am radio reports from 1 Sikh
indicated heavy sniping from the enemy The Rifle Company
covering the bridge was heavily engaged by enemy fire
Immediate air reconnaissance was ordered to ascertain the
strength and movements of the raiders A Harvard flew over
Chandmari area and reported thousands of tribals milling
around the Brigade frontage between villages of Shalateng
and Zainakut About 150 lorries were reported, parked on
the mam road, nose to tail facing eastwards, in the direction
of Srinagar Extensive enemy movements were also reported
south of the mam road, but almost nothing towards Humhom
or Badgom Soon, the volume and intensity of fire increased
substantially, covering almost the entire Brigade-frontage The
defenders were heavily outnumbered The reinforcements
well on their way up were unlikely to be available till the
next day at the earliest In the absence of dial sights, the
mountain guns were also of no use
From air reconnaissance it was evident that the raiders
had got much too close to own troops positions Air strikes
against the enemy forward elements were therefore ruled
out Although strafing by fighter aircraft on the rear elements
was well on the cards, that too was considered a rather risky
affair m as much as air action might lead to the rear elements
surging forward in wave action, which in turn might lead to
hand to hand fighting •< — and that had to be avoided at all
costs because of enemys' numerical superiority of almost
seven to one
Close air support was ruled out Artillery fire support was
just not there Based on arrival of artillery and armour
support so vital for success m such a battle. Sen had planned
his 'D Day' as November 10*'’ If the battle was going be
joined on 7 ^ November, a distinct possibility, at least 72
hours in advance, the odds were apparently in favour of the
enemy However, the large concentration of tribal Invaders in
the open ground near Shalateng, about four miles west of the
city VMas toofe tempting a target to resist Here was the golden
254
Military Plight of Pakistan
opportunity that Sen had been waiting for So he decided to
go oni the offensive and exploit right upto Baramula
immediately without waiting for the additional infantry,
artillery and armour that was expected by late evening In
any case, if he delayed till the reinforcement could be made
ready to go into offensive battle, these tribesmen might
infiltrate aJI over the City and its surrounds thereby not only
creating havoc, but also make his defences untenable. In the
end, it proved to be a wise decision even though it appeared
rather risky at that point of time. However, the entire battle-
plan now hinged on David and his two armoured cars and
Rifle Troop
The Battle is joined
Brigadier Sen's modified plan for the battle was: 1 Sikh to
remain in position and answer enemys' increasing fire only
lightly; 1 Para Kumaon to move west in small parties,
infiltrating surreptitiously for about a mile then form up facing
north thus placing the Battalion on the right TIank of the
enemy In the meantime Lieutenant David had been ordered
to move from Gandarbal, Krahom-Sumbal-Shadipur to road
junction north of Shalateng, to the rear of the enemy
concentration. When David's force was to be in the right
place in the area of road -junction. Brigade Commander was
to issue the code word 'GO' on which the two armoured cars
and the rifle troop were to engage the enemy from the rear
and 1 Sikh was to open up with every thing from the front.
Thus supported by intense, albeit small arms fire and
battalion 3" mortars, 1 Para Kumaon whose objective was the
high ground near Zainakut was to deliver bayonet assault on
the enemy right flank. In short, the crux of the plan was the
two armoured cars, "gift from the gods", to be in the right
place at the right time. 'A' Company of 4 Kumaon, Ahirs
under Major H.S. Bolina, vy^ts moved from the airfield
defences to secure the paratroopers formirtg-up-place (FUP)
and to remain in the rear of the Sikhs as Brigade reserve.
Of necessity, David had to be briefed oo the radio net, in
clear. The gist of this briefing was — On reaching the cross-
The Battle of Shalateng
255
roads at Shalateng, you will see a large concentration of
armed tribals who will think that you are their own troops
since you will be coming from the rear On arrival, take up
position behind the tribals, facing east, as though you are a
part of them and in support of them On the word 'GO',
open fire on the enemy to destroy him in coordination with
the assault by 1 Sikh and 1 Para Kumaon ^
Surprised by David's armoured cars were of prime
importance for success of this battle. He had to pretend that
he was one of them, coming from behind them to support
them to capture Srinagar. And of course he had to be careful
not to shoot up Kumaonis in the heat of the battle It was
therefore a very fortunate coincidence that 'B' Squadron 7
Cav was now comprised of Jats and not Sikhs' God seemed to
be on the side of Sen and his brave troops ...
The progress of David's Patrol was agonizingly slow, more
so since the nerves were taut with excitement of the
impending action, and expectation of the unfolding events.
The route was completely unreconnoitered. The men were
just fresh from the plains of Punjab and had been in battle
zone barely 24 hours, nor were they familiar with the terrain,
not even with own troops It was indeed a strange and
difficult situation for a young subaltern who rose to the
occasion with distinction. He managed to get his cars across
weak narrow bridges. In one instance the width of the bridge
was so restricted that its handrails had to be dismantled, and
even then the free board on either side was just about two
inches But got across they did, in painfully slow motion, and
eventually reached the appointed rendezvous. And soon they
were at the junction of Srinagar-Baramula and Sumbal-
Srinagar roads.
The surprise was indeed complete. In the ding-dong of
battle, fortunately no one could talk to each other, nor hear
anybody. But see they could. And the Qabatlis were happy to
see 'their own' armoured cars supporting them for the final
victory march. They smiled at the crew. .Some of them even
reverently touched the cars in appreciation
256
Military Plight of Pakistan
The question arises why did the tribals gather together in
such large numbers in so limited an area, so close to the mam
road at the 4“' mile stone on the edge of the City, right in
front of Indian defences and thus become sitting ducks
"General Tariq" himself gives the answer, " From our side
the approaches to Srinagar were all covered with water
Although the water had shrunk a good deal since the
summer, there was still enough of it to restrict movement
either to the mam road or a few paths and bunds It seems
that the nearer they got to the enemy post the more they had
found themselves converging on the road because of this
water Ultimately, it must have looked as if the only way to
deal with the post was to go for it straight down the narrow
road — and this is apparently what they had done "®
"GO'" All hell broke loose on the unsuspecting Qabailis
who were dreaming of a victory march into Srinagar They
were shot up by 'their own' armoured cars and the Rifle
Troop from the rear, by the Sikhs m front and bayoneted by
the Kumaonis from the right Confusion galore The Sikhs also
joined the attack, and so did the reserve company of 4
Kumaon from the right flank of the Sikhs The invaders turned
and fled westwards, back to their favourite haunt of
Baramula The Air Force Spitfires strafed the fleeing enemy
from above In just about 20 minutes from the word 'GO', a
major disaster like a thunderbolt had struck the raiders who
suffered heavy casualties They left behind 472 dead counted
on the battlefield, 146 m between Shalateng and Rattan,
abandoned 138 civilians buses and lorries which was a
welcome addition to the Emergency Government's fleet of
vehicles The battlefield was strewn with large number of
weapons including MMGs, medical stores, field ambulances,
rations, kits, beddings, et al
What caused the enemy debacle? In the first place the
tribesmen felt let down by the powers that be m their own
country They found the Fndfan Air Force and the guns
pounding them but neither the Pak regular army units were
anywhere around, nor the Pak Air Force earner to their rescue
The Battle of Shalateng
257
This was highly demoralising and disturbing resulting in the
tribesmen withdrawing back towards Muzzaffarabad at full
speed Further, "These men have an elaborate system holding
lengthy councils of war for each action when all the pros and
cons are seriously considered and thereafter, if not every
man, then at least every group, individually understands and
accepts the allotted task This is how they had arranged their
brilliant attack at Muzzaffarabad, the first target. But after
that, they simply appear to have been carried forward in a
rush which worked well enough upto Baramula .. " but not
thereafter "In their own country, the tribesmen fought as
snipers and raiders.. They were masters in the art of
ambushing troops and transport. They could also attack
isolated posts But there were two things they usually did not
do. They did not like to attack troops in defensive positions
— and they did not like to sit in defensive positions to be
attacked by troops." And this precisely was the situation the
tribesmen faced. The tribesman is able to appear at the most
unexpected times and places — and this unpredictability
makes him a menace.. Further, he has only a rifle and a
knife to carry, and because he is physically tougher, he can
move very much longer and faster than any troops The
tribesman lost at Shalateng because his fighting attributes
could no be put to appropriate use FHowever, as we shall see
later in this narrative, Akbar Khan was to exploit these
characteristics to the hilt to achieve a landmark victory over
Indian Army when he, while commanding a Brigade,
captured a strategic feature known as Pandu from 161
Infantry Brigade.
Pursuit of enemy after success in a defensive battle is the
most natural part of sequence of battle procedure, and 161
Infantry Brigade was quick to grab the opportunity. Within
minutes of the enemy taking to the heels towards Baramula,
the Brigade advance commenced with the Sikhs in the lead
as advance guard supported by a detachment of Madras
Sappers. The Sikhs were more than happy to be back "home"
to occupy their old defences at Pattan by about 8.00 pm the
258
Military Plight of Pakistan
same day, 7'” November The remainder Brigade, the main
body reached about t'-'o hours later
The Indian troops were m thin OG summer cotton
uniforms. And it was mighty cold up in the mountains at
night But that was not to deter the dashing Brigade
Commander from resuming the Brigade advance to Baramula
around midnight 7/8 November
The unpleasant task ot clearing the battlefield littered
with bodies and stores of all types, empties of bullets and
shells strewn all over, fell on the ever-willing broad shoulders
of Mr. D.P. Dhar who got the whole place cleared in 3-4 days
While the Shalateng battle was in progress, the mam
reinforcement column also fetched in at the airfield, but it
was too late for the battle then being fought However, 2
Dogra which had been airlifted from Adampur airfield on 7 ^*'
November and had one extra rifle company attached to it
temporarily from the Baluch Dogras was immediately
deployed for additional protection of the airfield Their
Adjutant was rather amused when he received a message
from the Brigade, "Send escort of one platoon, find your own
transport
This Battle was an unmitigated disaster for Pakistani plans
to grab Srinagar by force of arms. Brigadier Sen's plan for this
major Battle, the first to be fought by Indian troops led by
their own officers in defence of their own country was
brilliant in concept and glorious in its execution. And it saved
Srinagar for India, bes'dr of course vindicating his stand
completely. HoA'ever, the vagan* = fuc; also played a most
significant part in Indian success in this memorable battle of
this Campaign. The 'ifs' and 'buts' of war... But for that
unfortunate incident of killing of two volunteers of the
National Conference, 1 Sikh would have continued to be
where Sen had initially deployed them as part of his Brigade
Defended Sector, and enemy would have faced only one
infantry battalion, 1 Para'Kumaon in their "victory march" to
Srinagar 'But' for the jat crew of the armoured cars and the
The Battle of Shalateng
259
Rifle Troop, what if they were Sikhs^ To cap it all, the
despatch of the "gift from the gods" to placate the Sheikh
Thus Sheikh Abdullah — his furious ire on the first instance
and his persistence for the second — was primarily
responsible for Dame Fate to side with the Indian troops
Baramula Recaptured
1 Para Kumaon led the Brigade advance from Rattan to
Baramula Supported by the armoured cars, they captured
the hill features south of Baramula town, unopposed After
securing these hills as the firm base, they entered the town,
again unopposed Thus by 7 30 am on 8'*’ November
Baramula was retaken without firing a shot Meanwhile, 1
Sikh also moved up into the town along with the armoured
cars
Bakshi Chulam Mohammed was in Baramula within one
hour of Its capture by the Indian troops The locals were
dead-scared and tense However, news of Bakshi's arrival
had a calming effect on the populace The town was
completely deserted It was a deathly silence that prevailed
all over, silent as a tomb There were scenes of deliberate,
VICIOUS and systematic destruction, wanton pillage, arson and
loot The Mission Hospital and the Mission Church were
riddled with bullet holes, and the patients slaughtered
Prime Minister Nehru and Defence Minister Baldev Singh
visited Srinagar They were conducted around the Shalateng
battlefield on November "Dead bodies were lying on and
beside the road and burnt out shells of lorries that had been
strafed by our aircraft The Prime Minister was given a
Guard of Honour at Srinagar on 11 November and the
honour for this ceremony went to the 'B' Squadron A
number of bravery awards were given notables ones being
the award of VrC to Lieutenant David and Dafadar Jage Ram,
both of 7 Cav
By the time Baramula was retaken, additional
reinforcements had arrived at the airfield In the wake of
withdrawal of 1 Sikh from Rattan, Tac HQ JAK Dtv had also
260
Military Plight of Pakistan
moved to Srinagar on November Since 161 Infantry
Brigade was straining on the leash to get going for Uri — and
thence hopefully to Domel — the command and control
structure was reorganised. Colonel (later Lieutenant General)
Harbaksh Singh was allotted 4 Kumaon commanded by
Lieutenant Colonel (later Lieutenant General) M M Khanna
and 6 Rajputana Rifles commanded by Lieutenant Colonel
S S. Kalan, MC'^; and this force designated as Srinagar
Defence Force was made responsible for the security of the
airfield as well as the City and its surrounding areas The
Order of Battle of 161 Infantry Brigade now was as follows.
Headquarters 1 61 Infantry Brigade
* One troop 'B' Squadron 7 Cav
* One Mountain Battery’^
* One troop 1 1 Field Battery (25 pounders)
* First Battalion 2"'* Punjab Regiment
* First Battalion The Sikh Regiment (Personnel of one
battery of 13 Field Regiment Artillery in infantry role as an
additional rifle company)
* 1 Kumaon (Para)
* 2 Dogra
* Company Mahar MMGs
Pursuit operations are a pretty fast moving military
actions, all the more so if a commander wants to extract the
maximum advantage from his success in the earlier battle, be
It defensive or an attack operation when the enemy is on the
run. And success in battle is a heady wine! So was it here.
161 Infantry Brigade left Baramula at 7.00 am lO*'’ November
for advance to Uri. 1 Sikh with a troop of armoured cars was
in the lead as advance guard followed by 1 Para Kumaon and
troop field battery in the main body. 1 Para Punjab was to
join the column later after handing over firm base duties at
Baramula to 2 Dogra, which was in the process of moving up
from Srinagar airfield
The Battle of Shalateng
26 7
The road from Baramula to Uri follows the south bank of
river Jhelum, overlooked by heavily forested spurs of the
famous Pir Panjal Range It is a formidable range with steep
banks on both sides of the river, which flows through a gorge
The pursuit phase of the battle was indeed hot and fast The
tribesmen were on the run, chased by armoured and infantry
column on the ground and by Spitfires in the air Tempest
sorties operating from Amritsar were harassing the tribesmen
all the way to Domel where a few 250-pound bombs
destroyed a boat bridge at Muzzaffarabad However, small
groups of tribesmen fleeing from Shalateng- Baramula were
still active in the area, the heights on both sides of the road
had to be physically occupied, searched, cleared and
piqueted for the mam body to pass through. Of necessity, the
advance had to be slow, more so on account of the damaged
bridges
The advance had not gone much beyond Baramula when
Sen was ordered to shed 1 Para Punjab and return the
Battalion to Srinagar so that it could join its parent formation
50 Parachute Brigade in Jammu area Sen argued that since
50 Para Brigade was not operating in a Para role, but like any
other infantry brigade, it was really immaterial which infantry
battalion made up its full requirement, any other battalion
from Jammu area, or from the rest of India would serve the
purpose And hence it was really not at all necessary to
disturb the progress of pursuit-advance operations to Uri, and
thence to Domel, which at that point of time was Sen's
objective. But General Kalwant Singh refused to see the
strength and sense of Sen's reasoning Sen had no option but
to comply, howsoever irra.tional the order appeared to be. Of
necessity, therefore, the advance was halted, the Brigade
column regrouped, and piquets redeployed It was a time
consuming and frustrating process.
The advance thereafter became a slow and laborious
process since the strength of the column was substantially
reduced. "... the removal of 1 Para Punjab violated a cardinal
principle of war i.e, instead of reinforcing success, exactly the
262
Military Plight of Pakistan
opposite was done Less than a week earlier, two infantry
battalions were moved up from Jammu to Srinagar If an
infantry battalion was indeed required for 50 Para Brigade, all
that should have been done was to hold one of these
battalions back in Jammu, rather than indulge in this exercise
in futility of moving battalions up and own for 300 miles, just
for the sake of affiliations As it is, Indian Army as a whole
was in the throes of reorganisation consequent of the
Partition and division of military assets, leading to all round
changes in affiliations To drive a final nail in the argument —
1 Para Kumaon on the Orbat of 161 Infantry Brigade was also
a para battalion belonging to 77 Para Brigade'
In hindsight, it appears to be a simple case of clash of
egos Both strong personalities professionally sound,
melodramatic and impulsive In any case, Kalwant Singh
could not have forgotten so soon the episode of withdrawal
of 1 Sikh from Pattan, and Brigadier Sen's stand being
gloriously vindicated by an outstanding success m battle
In order to make up for the loss of 1 Para Punjab and
keep the pace of advance to Uri at full steam, Sen requested
Srinagar to order 4 Kumaon to move forward to join the
Brigade as soon as possible after first light on 1 1 November.
But the General said 'No', since he had just formed Sri
Garrison under Harbaksh Singh for the defence of Srinagar,
which included 4 Kumaon. In other words, the General had
kept two infantry battalions (4 Kumaon and 6 Raj Rif),
squadron less one troop of armour, troop field battery —
almost a brigade worth of troops to patrol the Valley when
Srinagar was absolutely safe, and there were hardly any
raiders left in the Valley. That decision was all the more
disconcerting since hordes of invaders had been held back,
and already repulsed with much lesser force. Indeed, it is
virtually impossible to professionally justify the General's
decision, notwithstanding his high military reputation to the
contrary It is therefore difficult to escape the conclusion that
personality clash, ego-conflict; with perhaps an iota of
professional jealousy was the root cause of the problem
The Battle of Shalateng
263
between the two commanders This unfortunately was to
continue for the rest of this Campaign leading to the
proverbial situation of two swords and one scabbard,
particularly whenever both commanders were in Srinagar In
the same breath, one might as well add that, but for this
enigmatic situation, it was well within the realm of possibility
for Indian troops to have reached Domel before the Pak
forces could even react to failure of their "Op Culmarg" As
confirmed by Major General Akbar Khan also, there was
nothing between Uri and Domel to stop the Indians But the
Indians managed to halt themselves
Now back to the clash of the opposing forces — The
Brigade column resumed its advance on 10^'’ November in
the face of small scale delaying rearguard actions by the
withdrawing enemy forces necessitating frequent dismounting
of the advance guard, clearing the enemy from hill tops for
which MMG fire support from the armoured cars proved
particularly useful, embussing and resuming the advance — a
process repeated many times in the day when the head of
the column reached Rampur area by about 4 pm That day's
advance had covered only six miles. This was understandable
since It involved a series of difficult operations as the road for
most part passed through a narrow gorge flanked by hills 8-
10,000 ft high on either side.
Mahura powerhouse was barely five miles from where
the advancing column had halted for the night on 11
November. Soon some explosions were heard from the
direction of the PowerHouse Suspecting that the
withdrawing enemy might be damaging the machinery and
equipment of the power station, the troop armoured cars and
the rifle troop were ordered to rush to the Power House with
1 Para Kumaon following on foot. It was a risky decision, but
paid off and the installation was saved from demolition just in
the nick of time. Army Engineers with the help of local staff
managed to repair the plant in about 8-1 0 days and electric
power supply to Srinagar and surrounding areas was soon
restored
264
Military Plight of Pakistan
Uri Liberated
The withdrawing enemy had demolished the bridge at
MS 54 It was a small gap of only 15-ft, but had steep banks
on both sides In the absence of military bridging equipment,
or earth moving equipment like the dozers, it proved to be
an effective obstacle Fu»-ther advance was held up till an
improvised crossing was prepared by pitching in boulders to
fill the gap. This slow and tedious process took good part of a
day and a half giving considerable respite to the enemy,
besides enabling the tribesmen to make preparations for
imposing further delay and casualties
The above deficiency in force-composition brought out a
serious lacuna in staff work both at JAK HQ in Jammu as well
as Command Headquarters in Delhi While planning for
reinforcements to be sent by road to Srinagar, provision was
made for armour and artillery support but engineer support
was completely neglected. May be, they could not spare a
full fledged engineer field company because of other pressing
commitments on resources deployed on Pathakot-Jammu
road, at least a detachment of Sappers with a dozer and
demolition accessories was the least that should have been
added to the Orbat of 161 Infantry Brigade, It appears that
even the Brigade Commander did not make a bid for that
However, a proper bridge was constructed here three weeks
later when 32 Assault Field Company Engineers commanded
by Major R.N. Kumar was allotted to the Brigade for
subsequent operations
Uri was re-occupied on IS*** November, not re-captured
since there were no enemy troops in and around Uri at the
time By then, bulk of the raiders had managed to reach the
safety of Muzzaffarabad The Brigade had advanced 62 miles
in four days, in mountainous terrain for which the troops
were ill equipped and ill trained. And blankets at night?
Three soldiers shared one. In the words of the Brigade
Commander, "...they braved the enemy and the elements
and got better of both".’®
The Battle of Shalateng
265
Uri used to be a small town on the bank of River Jhelum,
situated half way between Domel and Srinagar on the mam
road It used to be a convenient halting place for tourists,
with cafes, restaurants and wayside eateries dotting the
roadside The place is shaped like a bowl, the town at the
bottom of the cup and high hills on all sides It is also a
communication centre of sorts, in as much as the road to
Poonch takes off from here to cross the famous Haji Pir Pass
at 8652-ft AMSL over the Pir Panjal Range.
The Brigade had left one battalion at Baramula as its firm
base Having had to shed 1 Para Punjab soon after resuming
advance. Sen now had only two battalions at Uri He
deployed 1 Sikh on the heights and placed 1 Para Kumaon to
guard the lower slopes and entries to the town The
additional rifle company with 1 Sikh was kept as Brigade
reserve Uri was thus securely in Indian hands on November
13 “’
As soon as confirmation of capture and consolidation of
Uri was received at JAK Div HQ that was still in Srinagar,
General Kalwant Singh ordered cessation of further advance
to Domel Sen was further informed that his next task would
be to hold Uri in strength as a firm base, and to advance to
Poonch around 18^“ November in coordination with move of
50 Para Brigade from the south He was further instructed
that no reconnaissance whatsoever of the road Uri-Haji Pir
Pass was to be undertaken — the last part of the instruction
seems to have come from a civilian bureaucrat with no
knowledge of military operations, and followed in toto by the
ever obedient military brass.
General Kalwant Singh issued his orders on 16 November
1947. He ordered 50 Para Brigade to relieve the State Forces
garrisons in Jammu and Poonch area after handing over
responsibility for L of C to 268 Infantry Brigade 161 Infantry
Brigade was ordered to move a column from Uri on 18'“
November towards Poonch. "General Bucher thought that
Kalwant Singh' plan far exceeded his instructions from Army
266
Military Plight of Pakistan
Headquarters He also termed the advance from Uri, when
the opposition was strong in that sector, somewhat premature
and foolhardy Brigadier Pranjpye was also unhappy and felt
that the allotment of troops to tasks and timings were
unrealistic and too ambitious Subsequent events proved both
of them right
Of course. Sen vehemently protested over the absurdity
of the above order Militarily, it just did not seem to make
sense to the Brigade Commander who was obviously not
aware of the developments m Delhi In his own words, "This
order took me completely by surprise I explained to Major
General Kalwant Singh that 1 had the enemy on the run, and
unless I kept up the pressure he would recover and come
back, and instead of attacking him, we would be
attacked.. In the end, that is precisely what happened
VICTORY INDIA: ADVANTAGE PAKISTAN
The capture of Uri by Indian forces set the stage for
repetition of Junagarh, albeit in an entirely different
perspective. Junagarh was a territorial victory for India in a
very limited sense, but Pakistan derived a major diplomatic
advantage for having extracted the principle of a plebiscite as
the sole means of ascertaining the wishes of the people as to
which Dominion a princely state, in dispute, would join,
even though such a provision did not exist even indirectly in
the Indian Independence Act and the related documents
pertaining to matters connected with accession. Since
Junagarh was m any case going to be part of the Indian
Union, India did not derive any special advantage. But on the
other hand, the sole outcome of the imbroglio there was a
favourable development for Pakistan, as a moral principle
and a public relations point when it came to the dispute
about the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
Even though the Indian Forces had scuttled "Op
Gulmarg", the advantage once again went to Pakistan. The
initiative was back in Pakistan's hands, to make the Indian
commanders dance to their tune
Ihe Battle of Shalateng
267
General Russell wanted to exploit success to the hilt, fully
right upto Domel and Muzzaffarabad, more so since the
invaders had been decisively defeated The enemy was on
the run and he must not be given any time to regroup, no
respite whatsoever Russell wanted a relentless hot pursuit
right upto Pakistan border and recommended to the powers
that be that " we should continue our advance to
Muzzaffarabad on the Pakistan/Kashmir border and demolish
the two bridges over the Kishenganga at Domel and Kohala
Our troops should withdraw immediately thereafter, leaving
the Kashmir Police to take over border policing duties at
Domel and Kohala His plan further envisaged retaining
one brigade group in the Valley as a mobile reserve to deal
with any incursions, or serious border violations Sealing off
the Valley once and for all as one time permanent solution to
the Kashmir problem was the crux of Russell's future plans to
achieve a higher strategic objective — That is what is
generalship, and that is the material authentic generals and
statesmen are really made of Mere idealism and rhetoric is
not enough
The records available well after the war conclusively
prove that, after the Battle of Shalateng, there was hardly any
enemy opposition right upto Domel The raiders had indeed
reached the safety of their bases m Muzzaffarbad, if not even
beyond. If there was any enemy, or serious opposition, it was
all in the minds of Indian commanders right from the C.O. of
the leading battalion to Brigade headquarters and right upto
top echelons in Delhi Our field commanders were creating
much too much of a hoo-haa about strong enemy opposition
What was the enemy? Who — The tribesmen? Where were
they? What strength and dispositions? Or was it Pak regular
units and formations? Yes, they were there; but certainly not
in the Valley, not at that porht of time They came much later
This part does neither seems to have been analysed at JAK
Div HQ, nor correctly portrayed to Delhi, particularly to the
Political Leadership of the country. Did any one explain the
strategic pros and cons to Prime Minister Nehru, or to Sardar
268
Military Plight of Pakistan
Patel? Or was the political leadership averse to listening to
military minds?
Akbar Khan is quite candid regarding the absence of any
organised opposition to Indian advance to Domel, if it had
come "I reckoned that by this time the tribesmen and
volunteers must have crossed the border and be out of
Kashmir As the local people of this area had not yet risen to
organise themselves, there was no resistance left anywhere
along this stretch of 75 miles of road (from Muzzaffarabad
side). If the Indians became aware of this, they could move
forward in their trucks and reach the Pakistan border within
three hours. If they did not move immediately, they would do
so next morning when their aircraft would report that nothing
opposed them But our forces did not move forward, just
like Pak forces did not move forward when Srinagar was well
within their grasp' But there was one essential difference
between the two situations Whereas the Indian Forces
wanted to move forward at break neck speed — Sen was
straining on the short leash that held his Brigade back, and
General Russell was very much in favour of letting Sen go for
Domel — the Indian political leadership did not permit the
advance to continue in the right direction at the right time
On the other hand, the Pak authorities very much wanted
their 'force' to move forward and make a victorious march
into Srinagar, it was the 'force' that was neither willing nor
ready to move forward, they wanted to enjoy the fruits of
Baramula'
Akbar Khan further goes on to add, Indians, still very
cautious, showed no signs of hurrying They were content
with long-distance shooting — and as for every half a dozen
rounds that we fired they probably fired six thousand . This
worked, and worked as well as I could hope for. We were
succeeding in creating the impression that the front was still
very much there — and consequently the Indians continued
to be cautious Although their forward elements had already
reached Uri, their mam body took yet another day to reach
there."-’ The enemy thus succeeded in imposing a delay on
The Battle of Shalateng
269
US by merely pretending that he had a fairly large force when
m fact the bulk of the invaders were no where near Uri It
was "General Tariq" himself with a handful of men fighting a
rearguard action, since in any case he had hardly any place
to go to after leaving Kashmir'
The final full stop came at Chakhoti, 15 miles from Uri
where he destroyed a bridge across a very deep nullah with
sheer drops on both sides virtually precluding a diversion
Indian troops did threaten Chakhoti two days later, but by
then It was too late Too much water had flown down the
Jhelum by then' Meanwhile, "General Tariq" did manage to
gather together a rag tag team of about 75 men designated as
the First Muzzaffarabad Battalion under Lieutenant
Qudratullah, an Ex State Forces officer.
161 Infantry Brigade "advanced 62 miles to Uri with two
of these five battalions. If it could crush the enemy strength at
Shalateng with just two battalions, and gain 62 miles of
territory thereafter, Domel, which lay 45 miles further, was
not beyond its compass had it been given all the five units .
The Government of India was keen that Domel should be
recovered, and so were the popular leaders of Kashmir 161
Infantry Brigade, riding the crest of a wave, was ready and
willing to move forward and make a resolute attempt at
achieving the object. Unfortunately, the military hierarchy kp
N ew Delhi did not appear to share the objective."^- May be,
the chemistry between the two senior field commanders, the
Brigade Commander and hir superior too had a part to play
in this unfortunate trend.
Continuing the advance to Domel with constant probing
attacks in front had the added advantage of keeping the
retreating enemy remnants on their toes, on the run all the
time, and thus not allow the raiders to regroup and form up
to put up a worthwhile defence, let alone mount an attack on
the Indian column(s). Just holding the Uri Bowl and sitting
there was exactly the opposite of what was militarily correct
and desirable course of action at that point of time
Furthermore, pursuing the operations on the lines suggested
270
Military Plight of Pakistan
by General Russell had the added advantage of securing the
right flank of any subsequent operations for the relief of
Poonch In fact, it is well on the cards that recapture of
Domel and Muzzaffarbad areas by the Indian forces might
well have neutralised enemy positions in Poonch area, if not
make them altogether untenable.
But that was not to be Unfortunately, India was destined
to be saddled with the Kashmir problem for the lifetime of
the Nation
General Russel was a notable exception amongst the
British top Brass. He rendered honest, bold and militarily
correct advice and made a positive effort to steer India to
complete victory — the best any government could have
asked for. But when snubbed in his efforts by inexperienced
political leadership, he like a good soldier, obeyed the
directive without any mental reservations. The magnificent
Battle of Shalateng, a dazzling masterstroke of generalship
achieved through the blood and bravery of Indian soldiers
under extremely difficult conditions, was destined not to bear
fruits for India Russell's sound military advice spurned by
non-professionals, by no less a person than Prime Minister
Nehru himself, albeit for purely humanitarian^ and political
considerations It is a matter of conjecture who his personal
military advisers were There is no denying that, while in
infringement of the recognised military chain of command,
he did have some trusted military officers and perhaps some
civil intelligence officials too, who were otherwise close to
him in such matters It is sad to note m the hindsight of
history that Prime Minister Nehru was ill advised in spurning
the advice of his military commanders, both in the higher
headquarters as well as the those in the field.
The above is one side of the story — On the other side it
appears that further advance to Domel was scuttled by senior
British officers in Army HQ at New Delhi This aspect gains
credence from the statement attributed to Prime Minister
Nehru in the Defence Committee meeting held on 28 ^'’
The Battle of Shalateng
271
November 1948 wherein he is reported to have said that,
"he could not understand why Indian Army had stopped at
Uri instead of going to Domel and even Kohala He
considered the occupation of Domel as most important as it
controlled two roads from Pakistan into Kashmir
Instead, 161 Infantry Brigade was directed towards
Poonch And that too, without even the elementary military
precaution of a route reconnaissance before rushing head-on
into the unknown 'Time spent on recce is never wasted' is
an old military cliche There is no substitute for military
reconnaissance before undertaking a mission This cardinal
principle of military planning and preparation was
deliberately ignored, given a bye In a way that is
understandable, since our higher military commanders had
received accelerated promotions for which, perhaps, some of
them were not fit for
Uri was captured on 13*'’ November The Brigade was
required to advance to Poonch on the 18'^ in coordination
with advance by 50 Para Brigade from the south However,
the diversion to Poonch actually commenced only on the
20“’ In the meantime, the fine tuned fighting machine was
lying idle
General Russel's recommendation for an immediate
advance to Muzzaffarabad was not accepted "I have reasons
to believe that the decision to go to the relief of Punch was
taken at the highest government level at Delhi .. It was of
course not the first time in history that when political
considerations outweighed military requirements From the
humanitarian point of view the decision to proceed to Punch
may have been commendable but" militarily it was not a wise
move There was no gainsaying that advance to
Muzzaffarabad would not have been an easy undertaking
There was also the risk of our stretching our necks too far
forward across a difficult line of communication, which the
enemy could cut from the south. Yet with all these attendant
difficulties, I feel that an advance to Muzzaffarabad, when
272
Military Plight of Pakistan
the enemy was off balance, would have been a calculated
risk, well worth taking In the event, the fact that the enemy
still held so-called Azad territory from Muzzaffarabad to Uri,
not only gave him scope for getting reinforcements and
developing his operations but also gave him useful
propaganda material with which to boost the morale of his
shaken tribesmen, namely his alleged claim to have halted
our advance at Uri. Another fact which must not be
overlooked while considering this issue, was that our advance
beyond Uri would have forced the enemy to ease his
pressure on the besieged garrison of Punch "2'*
It was certainly not the last time that non-military
considerations prevailed when deciding a purely military
matter This unfortunate trend was to bedevil Indian
diplomacy and military thought many times in the short span
of Independent India's history. It was, so to say, in the genes
of the ruling elite for which the country had to go on paying a
high price — Non-military political considerations over-ruling
a purely military situation; decisions on military matters being
imposed by those not competent in military thought and
strategy — This was, and shall continue to be the bane of
Indian political leadership who, as opposed the Western
democracies, never had, or shall have, any exposure to basic
military grounding in geo-strategic studies.
India lost the golden opportunity to solve the Kashmir
problem once and for all, for all times to come. To seal the
Valley from Pakistani interference forever Decisive victory in
the very first major battle won by Indian troops was frittered
away into a positive advantage for Pakistan. In the ultimate
analysis, India's victory turned out to be a success story for
Pakistan And India continues to pay a heavy price for that
Himalayan blunder of judgement till today, spilling the blood
of her soldiers in a proxy war with no end in sight.
The raiders were completely off balance. The invading
force had been crippled and decimated, the remnants fleeing
to their bases across the border. But with the pursuit having
The Battle of Shalateng
273
been jerked to a sudden halt, they must have looked back in
surprise that In fact, they were dumb founded as was later
revealed in a candid narrative by Akbar Khan "One cannot
permit unique opportunities to slip by for the sake of
trifles. "25
India also missed another golden opportunity when we
failed to make full use of our air power to at least achieve the
very limited aim of destroying the two vital bridges of
Lachman Patan and Kohala. In the words of General
Shrinagesh " the effectiveness of the air effort had already
been limited due to political considerations, and the lAF was
unable to function in one of its primary roles of indirect
support and the isolation of the battle field by attacks on the
enemy's supply bases and mam lines of communication by
interdiction Air commodore M.M. Engineer, commanding
No.1 Operational Group, was now even forbidden to attack
enemy installations near towns such as Muzzaffarabad and
Mirpur and also vital bridges of Lachman Patan and Kohala
over which enemy personnel and enemy equipment regularly
passed. This meant that the Air Force in J&K was never
allowed full scope of action "2®
NOTES & REFERENCES
1. The Battle of Shalateng was the first of the three most crucial
and significant offensive battles fought in this Campaign The sec-
ond was the Battle of Jhangar which resulted in the recapture of a
vital military objective and securing our lines of communications
thereby leading to capture of Rajauri and paving the way for relief
of Poonch The third in this category was the Battle of Zojila,
which resulted m the breakthrough of a formidable mountain pass
and saved Leh-Ladakh for India
The description of this Battle in this Chapter is based on Chapter 8
of the Book written by Lieutenant General L P Sen, DSO, the then
Commander of 161 Infantry Brigade, under whose command this
Battle^ was fought — "Slender Was the Thread Kashmir Confronta-
274
Military Plight of Paki^.tan
tion 1947-48", Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1969/1994
2 Akbar Khan, "Raiders in Kashmir", Pakistan Publishers, Karachi,
1970, p 39
3 Sen L P, op cit pp 78-79
4 Sinha S K , Lieutenant General, "Operation Rescue Military Op
erations in Jammu & Kashmir 1947 49", Vision Books, New Delhi,
1977/1997, p 28
5 For details, please see Chapter 14, "Incident in the Ops Room"
6 Rau R M , Major General, "Tradition of Valour", Commandant
Bombay Engineer Croup, Kirkee, 1984, p 28
7 Sen L P, op cit p 97
8 Akbar Khan, op cit pp 39,41-42
9 lbld,pp 50-52
10 Palsokar R D, MC, Colonel, "The Dogra Regiment", Com-
mandant Dogra Regimental Centre, 1982, p 256
11 Atal, Hiralal, Major General, "Nehru's Emissary to Kashmir",
Army Education Stores, New Delhi, 1972, p 133
12 Lieutenant Colonel S S Kalan was awarded the Military Cross
in Burma during the Second World War
13 Sikh mountain gunners earlier employed as a rifle company
with 1 Sikh were given the guns of Patiala Mountain Battery, and
the Patiala State Forces personnel were repatriated to their State
Cun dial sights had been received in the meantime
14 Sen L P, op cit p 109
15 "History of Corps of Engineers", Palit & Palit Publishers, New
Delhi, 1 980
1 6 Sen L P, op cit p 1 1 3
1 7 Nanda K K Lieutenant General, "Conquering Kashmir — A Pa-
kistani Obsession", Lancer Books, New Delhi, 1994, p 85
The Battle of Shalateng
275
1 8 Sen L P, op cit pp 113-114
19SinhaSK op at p31
20 Akbar Khan, op cit p 70
21 Ibid pp 72-73
22 Sen L P, op cit p 294
23 Prasad S N Dr and Dharam Pal Dr, "History of Operations in
Jammu and Kashmir - 1947-48", History Division, Ministry of De-
fence, India, 1987, p 71
24 Sinha SK, op Cl pp32-33
25 Rommel quoted by Sinha SK, op at p 33
26 Lieutenant General S M Shrinagesh's talk to student officers of
Staff College, Wellington, on 26 October 1949 quoted by Dr
Sudhir S Bloeria in his book, "The Battles of Zojila", Har Anand
Publications, New Delhi 1997,p 211
27 Daimler armoured car was built to the 'Tank, Light, Wheeled'
formula Rear mounted 95 bhp Six-cylinder engine Transmission
taken via 'Fluid Flywheel' to a centrally mounted transfer box No
central transmission shafts Automotive components attached di-
rectly to hull, no chassis as such Good cross country performance
Top road speed 50 mph Disc brakes Second steering wheel facing
rear so that car could be driven rapidly in reverse in emergency
Armament identical to Tetrarch Light Tank, viz , 2-pounder gun
and coaxially mounted 7 92 mm Besa machine gun (Humbers in
the other Squadron had 37-mm guns)
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